RENCH PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT—*by Julien Benda*

FREE WORLD

New Zealander and His Land
BY WALTER NASH

French Africa in the War
BY HENRI BONNET

OUR HEMISPHERE IN THE PEOPLE'S PEACE
by Dewey Anderson and Stephen K. Bailey

FEDERALISM AND WORLD CONFEDERATION
by Li Yu Ying

PAN-AMERICANISM OF ROOSEVELT
by Nicolas Repetto

HARTROTT AND HITLER
by Stefan Zweig

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ROUND TABLE:

Two Trends in Public Opinion

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DECEMBER, 1942
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WORLD CONFERENCE

of the

World Confederation of International Groupments

will be held at the Hotel Astor

New York City, on December 4 and 5, 1942

PROGRAM

Opening Plenary Session

***Friday, Dec. 4,—10:00** A.M. to 1:00 P.M.*

SPEAKERS: Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia; Professor Li Yu Ying, Alvarez del Vayo, Hugo Fernández Artucio, James Peter Warbasse.

Commission Meetings

***Friday—3:00** P.M. to 6:00 P.M.*
***Saturday—10:00** A.M. to 1:00 P.M.*

Commission on Federalism

SPEAKERS: Chairman, Michael Straight; Henri Bonnet, Anup Singh, Milos Safranek

Commission on International Federal Administration

SPEAKERS: Chairman, Pierre Cot; Ludwik Rajchman, Roger N. Baldwin.

Commission on World Economics, Unions, Co-operatives

SPEAKERS: Chairman, E. J. Coil; Henry Shoskes, General Julius Deutsch, H. T. Liu, Robert J. Watt, Shih-Chi Hu.

Commission on International Education

SPEAKERS: Chairman, Ernest Minor Patterson; Taraknath Das, A. Powell Davis, Evans Davis, A. D. Henderson, Elmer Carter.

Commission on Organization of Public Opinion

SPEAKERS: Chairman, Freda Kirchwey; Howard O. Eaton, Wousaofong, Henry Laugier, Anne Minor.

Closing Plenary Session

***Saturday, Dec. 5,—2:30** P.M. to 3:30 P.M.*

SPEAKERS: Chairman, Louis Dolivet; Max Lerner, Herrymon Maurer, Lester Granger, K. W. Shaw.

Confederation Dinner

Hotel Astor, New York City,
on December 4, at 7:30 P.M.

SPEAKERS

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt

Kathleen Courtney
Vice-Chairman League of Nations Union

Walter Nash
Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand

Wei Tao Ming
Chinese Ambassador to the United States

Luis Quintanilla
Minister of the Republic of Mexico

Adrien Pierre Tixier
Chief of the Delegation of Fighting France

Informal $3.50 per plate

Admission to the session of the Conference is free. Reservations for the dinner may be made by writing to FREE WORLD, *55 West Forty-Second Street, New York.*

FREE WORLD

A Monthly Magazine

devoted to

Democracy and World Affairs

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EDITORIAL

WHO will ever be able to describe the feeling of hope which swept over the democratic world when the news of the liberation of North Africa from the Vichy yoke and nazi threat was made known? How great must have been the joy of the people of the occupied countries, of the men and women in the concentration camps, in the ghettos, and in the slave labor gangs!

This first offensive step of the United Nations has completely changed the military and political situation. Hitherto the United Nations have fought on the defensive and have often been defeated; now they take the offensive and engage in victorious actions. The magnitude of the operations, the perfect synchronization of arms, the skilled leadership, the heroism of the troops, the complete co-operation between the Americans and the British are so many symptoms of the virility of democracy. The favorable reactions of the Russians and the Chinese are already known. Soon we shall hear of the great effect on the underground movement. The second, third, and fourth fronts from the South, the North, and the West, are already within reach of the Allies. Behind these new fronts, which will be difficult, much more difficult than people realize, lies the prospect of victory and of the end of this most inhuman chapter in our history. But there was, and there still is to a certain extent, a shadow on the picture. The shadow is Darlan and the small, ruthless gang gathered around him.

We understand the situation. In the interest of a quicker victory, of fewer dead and wounded in the Allied ranks, of the preservation of arms—arms which will be needed, piece by piece, in the decisive battle against Hitler which is yet to come—we cannot disapprove. On the contrary, in these pages we have always stood for political warfare in its global sense. Everything which will weaken, which will divide and confuse the enemy, must be done, and the secret American mission under General Clark has done a splendid job in laying the groundwork for the United Nations offensive. No serious Allied leader would have hesitated to accept the help which General Clark was able to get, or to pay the price which he was asked for it. In this war of Hitler's, all arms and many means which normally we dislike to use have been forced upon us. We know that in North Africa the situation was particularly complicated because of the fact that Vichy had the monopoly of poisonous propaganda and of anti-democratic repression for two and a half long years. We also know that it was easier for

Vichy to find accomplices in the reactionary Colonial Administration than in Continental France. The United States military command, therefore, had to take all precautions and to win over or, more exactly, to buy over as many Vichyites as possible. This is sound policy.

We know also that while Morocco and Algeria are in Allied hands, it is important to take over, with a minimum of opposition, Tunisia, Dakar, Senegal, with the armies, arms, and ships which are there. We, too, would have entrusted (under good guard, as was certainly done by the American command) the microphone to Darlan to appeal to his appointees and protégés to lay down arms.

But it hurt terribly, despite everything, when, under the most sacred flag of the world, the flag of the United Nations, Darlan was permitted to appoint himself supreme French commander in North Africa. And it hurt even more when he was permitted to proclaim that the whole Nazi-Vichy Administration would remain in effect. This meant the anti-democratic laws, the concentration camps, the anti-labor legislation, the anti-Semitic statutes, and all the infinite shames of a fascist puppet regime.

Fortunately, once more President Roosevelt's great voice has made itself heard. His statement that "no permanent arrangement will be made with Admiral Darlan" has brought nearer the prospect of the end of the bitter Darlan-Flandin-Pucheu farce. The President also announced that he had requested the liberation of all those who had fought against the Nazis. Their liberation will bring new democratic blood to North Africa in the form of thousands and tens of thousands of anti-Fascists, French and foreign. Men who fought in the labor movement and in other democratic organizations, men who fought the battle of freedom in Spain, will again take their place in the democratic ranks to which they have longed to return. The United Nations can find no better allies, no better military and political soldiers, no better workers than those anti-Fascists who had the supreme courage to fight under desperate circumstances and against terrible odds.

Finally, President Roosevelt has asked for the "abrogation of all laws and decrees inspired by nazi governments or nazi ideologists." At last the glorious laws of the French Republic are again in effect in North Africa, and we recall in this connection that long ago General de Gaulle proclaimed that all Vichy or German legislation would be nullified whenever or wherever French territories should be liberated from the enemy.

The French Republic is back in the war. As a matter of fact, thanks to the underground movement and to the Fighting French under General de Gaulle, it has always remained in the war on the side of the Democracies. But now it has a chance to participate more fully with a strong army in the battle for the common cause. Thanks to the United Nations offensive, the time has arrived when France can resume her full place within the United Nations. But France and her army cannot fight under the Darlans. Even before the Armistice, the Darlans, the Pétains, and other reactionary generals proved by their pro-fascist sympathies that they are not fit for a real struggle against the Axis. The new French Army will only fight well under the banner of the French Republic, and under a democratic administration which will function until the liberation of France, and which will represent, as far as possible, the political aspirations of the French people. It is plain common sense that it cannot be otherwise, and we are sure that it will not

be otherwise. After all, the greatest offensive against the Axis on European soil has still to come. Out of the nearly five hundred million inhabitants of Europe, more than three hundred million have voted and struggled for democratic or Left regimes. To win their active participation in and their help to the common United Nations offensive is a political and military problem of primary importance. The Darlan episode must not last if we want their fullest co-operation. This entire situation emphasizes more strongly than ever the need for a supreme council of the United Nations which could take up many of the political problems and solve them according to the most vital interests of democratic victory in war and in peace.

Appeal to Revolt

WE have followed with great attention those speeches of the United Nations leaders which have reached a level higher than that of the usual war propaganda and have established some of the basic principles of the new world to come.

Today we report upon another important democratic speech of this war—the address delivered before the Mazzini Society, by Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State. It is, of course, extremely difficult to address people of an enemy country and to convince them that one is really fighting against the horrors of their regime and not against the common man. Mr. Berle has succeeded in doing so by his splendid demonstration of how to separate the people of Italy from their fascist masters, addressing the people of Italy across the battle lines in the following terms: "You are Italians, enslaved today by fascist masters who secured and held power by the methods and with the ethics of gangsters. These fascist masters, in their turn, have betrayed the country to nazi tyrants beyond the Alps, and have sold you as mercenary soldiers to fight the battles for Hitler."

Mr. Berle knows that the people of Italy want to be free of their fascist masters and the nazi tyrants, and he offers them advice on how to do this, and why it must be done in their own interests. How far is this conception from the classical identification of all citizens of a hostile country as enemies! Mr. Berle's second important point is his demonstration of how the aggressions against Ethiopia and other countries have brought Italy to a state of vassalage under Germany. The supranational character of this war and its true ideological aspect appear best in a clear statement contained in his speech, a statement which deserves to be repeated by all those who are sincerely attached to the ideas of democracy:

> Plainly, there can be no compromise with the cult of fascist slavery; nor with any of the men who have carried it on: A treaty with Fascists could be nothing more than a trap for fools. There can be no peace with those who deny the right of peace. There can be no faith in those who insist that good faith must go out of the world. There can be no compromise between free men and slave-masters. Until the fascist domination of Italy is ended, and while Italians, however blindly, follow fascist leadership, there can be no valid dealing save by force alone.

> Nevertheless, we in America insist on hoping that the day will come when we can once more welcome into the brotherhood of civilization a free and friendly Italian nation, giving again to the world the fruits of her shining culture and her splendid traditions.

Italian Quislings are trying to convince the people of Italy that a United Nations victory would mean the end of the Italian nation, of its cultural life, of its art, and of its independence. We hope that Mr. Berle's answer will be carried a thousand times over the short wave: "No American seeks to destroy or impair the nationhood of Italy. When Italy, freed from her fascist gangsters, is able once more to speak to the world, and as the armies of the United Nations achieve that victory which cannot fail, the pledge of the United Nations will be redeemed. This pledge does not contemplate a punitive peace: the aim is justice, not revenge."

Mr. Berle goes even further in promising to the people of Italy all those great freedoms "beyond the wildest fascist dreams: freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom from want, and freedom from fear; the freedom of farm and vineyard; peace in the olive groves; quiet workmanship in factory and shop; freedom again to work, to hope, and to live." His declaration that those freedoms depend on the acceptance of "peaceful arrangements of peaceful peoples" and on submission "only to those restraints which must bind free peoples if freedom is to remain in the world," is a perfect demonstration of the fact that world order and obedience to international law are not threatening national freedom but are implementing it. Mr. Berle promises to those Italians who will take up arms against their tyrants an alliance with the United Nations. Speeches like this address are not just "talking." They are real arms, fighting instruments of the United Nations. They can do as much good as fighting armies.

At the same dinner, Count Carlo Sforza, the leader of the Free Italian movement, brought out a number of ideas which need to be repeated:

> A feeling which we have in common unites us all: the necessity that this war, which is a war of ideals and not of nationalities, be won in the name of the better world we want to set up tomorrow; a world in which there will be no room for the old petty nationalistic hates of yesterday.
>
> It will be an eternal glory for the United States that you, the Americans, were the first to travel with serene hearts and with farseeing spirit this road which is the only one that can insure prosperity to the world, the only one that can prevent errors that might even transform the old nationalistic hates into new exasperated grievances.

And to America he made this plea: "By giving today to every Italian the certainty that by overthrowing fascism he will help Italy in the war, rather than damage her, you contribute to the victory of the Democracies and to the salvation of Italy."

These speeches, expressing the political ideals and longings of our own day of crisis, inevitably call to mind the memorable article of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man from the Constitution of 1793: "*Quand le Gouvernment viole les droits du peuple, l'insurrection est pour le peuple, et pour chaque portion du peuple, le plus sacré et le plus indispensable des devoirs.*"

OUR HEMISPHERE
in
THE PEOPLE'S PEACE

by

H. DEWEY ANDERSON

and

STEPHEN K. BAILEY

THE people are on the march. Their unmeasured tread can be heard through the roar of battle and the clash of armies. They are part of the battle, they are the armies, but they are something more. In our more romantic moments we middle-class Americans think we know the people. The people are Jimmy Stewart and Gary Cooper as Mr. Smith and Sergeant York; the people are Joe Palooka and other modest military heroes; the people are brave nurses and English air raid wardens and Mrs. Miniver; the people are Aunt Emma and Uncle John; the people are decent, humane, kindly human beings—next door, in America, all over the world.

But have you ever been eight blocks west of the Loop in Chicago, or two hundred miles south of Atlanta? Have you ever smelled the native quarter of Algiers, or the fever ridden slums of Colombo, or London's Limehouse? Have you ever visited a health clinic in Asunción, or slept in a junk on the Yellow River, or taken a dip in the Ganges at Allahabad, or chased cockroaches in Harlem? "The people, yes—the people."

If we were all Mrs. Minivers, the problem would be simple. But we are black and brown and yellow and red; we have rickets and pellagra and leprosy; we have known freedom only on occasion, some of us never; we can't read too well or figure; we have a lot of animal heritage left in us, at times precious little else. For the most part we have never known what it means to live like free, creative, dignified beings. We are sick and poor and hungry and dirty. We, too, are the people.

If we take Mr. Wallace's Free World speech seriously, it is the *people* we want to free, not just part of them; it is *free* enterprise we want, not freedom from restraint as we corner bauxite and copper; the day is over when our only interest is in markets and profits and colonial exploitation. We are interested in the *people,* in their health and education and living standards and freedom. No longer is economics to be a science hemmed in by "indifference curves" and "statistical projections." It is to be an imaginative art with welfare, not wealth, its concern. And there is tremendous work to be done. The clutches of Giant Despair are reaching out to crush mankind's great adventure almost before it has begun. It is the task of our generation to make sure the giant does not succeed.

More specifically, this is the task of the Western Hemisphere. For the probability is that from the standpoint of physical destruction and loss of man power, we in the Americas will be more fortunate than any other world area—Antarctica excepted. Not that this is to be an "American Century." We are talking now in terms of obligation and mutual aid, not power and subtle domination; about overstuffed grain bins in Buffalo and Buenos Aires, and starving peasants in Greece; about rotting bananas in Honduras and underfed babies in China; about 80 per cent of the world's oil production, more than that of its coffee, over three-fourths of its bananas, two-thirds of its copper, corn, and machine tools, half of its cotton, steel, and meats, almost half

of its barley, and one-third of its sugar, wheat, and wool. This Western Hemisphere provides the world with four-fifths of its automobiles, and the war-time step-up in airplane production places it in a commanding position in this newest form of transportation. These are realities, not potentialities.

The immediate role of the Hemisphere after the war is obvious. It will be the food basket and technological storehouse of the world. It will help rebuild the farms and factories of the old world. It will help to bring new hope to millions. It will help clear away the shadows of cruelty and suffering in what is left of Europe and Asia. This it will and must do.

II

BUT there is something else. The Western Hemisphere must lead, not by imposition but by example, in the social regeneration of the post-war world. It was one of our leaders who framed the war in the phrase "the march of freedom for the common man," and democracy, like charity, should begin at home. More powerful in its implication than any imposed social experiment in a distant area, would be a Western Hemisphere plan to make the "march of freedom" mean something concrete to the 250,000,000 humans from Baffinland to Tierra del Fuego. Not that we should shun our horizontal international obligations or crawl into a false isolationism; the fact is that we have in North and South America a potential testing ground for domestic and international freedom which, if successful, would offer great hope to the rest of mankind.

Within the twenty-one republics we have on a limited scale most of the problems which exist on a larger scale in the rest of the world. While we have made progress in solving many of these economic and social questions, we still have many failures for which we alone are to blame. We still have a road to travel if we are to succeed entirely in banishing intolerance and poverty and the will to exploit our fellow men. In spite of our tremendous resources, we still have people ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed.

But we have voices of freedom in our heritage which make us ashamed of our failures, and fortunately most of us have some form of political democracy which acts as a potential threat to those vestiges of feudalism and other forms of institutionalized selfishness which remain in our midst. What is most important, we have a running start in intra-hemisphere relations. No rigid political pattern will have to be established to enforce co-operation among the twenty-one republics. Much can be accomplished through existing informal channels represented by the dozens of multilateral inter-American agencies, semiofficial and official, which are at present concerned with total Hemisphere problems. One thing must be made absolutely certain: that the Hemisphere's "march of freedom" is not effected by a United States "missionary" movement. Economically, politically, socially, and culturally, the new democracy must spring from the hearts and minds of *all* the sovereign peoples which make up the Western world.

What, then, can the American republics do to make the coming peace a "people's victory," a victory which gives legitimacy to that vast mass of beggared human beings liv-



ing in the dark places, without whose full participation no society can become sovereign, no democracy can be fully attained? What we can do is, of course, part and parcel of what we are doing and have done. As surely as "the web of history is woven without a void," so are we, now, yesterday, today, and tomorrow, shaping the course of events which will spell out a people's victory, or whatever measure of it we may achieve. And the story thus far, although much remains to be written, is encouraging. Let us look at some recent chapters, and some now in the writing, to see if we may not glimpse in some small measure the unfolding plot of the future.

Picture, if you will, twenty-one republics, on two continents, set apart from each other by physical boundaries, and guarded by the strongest border police of all—a police whose powers reach into the homes of the humblest citizens living farthest from that physical border—"tariff police," who prevent the movement and interchange of goods and stoutly defend the boundary walls which hem in an entire people, preventing their access to the needful things of a good life. That has long been the condition in this Hemisphere. It has been the source of grave trouble and international dispute over the world since the rise of nations. It is one of the basic faults to be corrected before any continued peace can be achieved or the bounty of the world can be used by its people.

Here in the Western Hemisphere, we are making beginning strides toward its peaceful solution. In the Central American countries the greatest progress has been made, a harbinger of things to come elsewhere in the Hemisphere. Beginning with the first timid approaches toward a trade accord by Nicaragua and El Salvador in 1922, the outstanding example of Hemisphere solidarity is the free trade agreement entered into by Guatemala and El Salvador in 1941. All natural and manufactured products of both countries, with the exception of the export crops of tobacco, coffee, and sugar, and their by-products, may move freely across the borders of these nations. Shipments, accompanied by certificates of origin, are visaed by consuls. Moreover, the agreement covers the free use by both countries of border rivers and water power. Since the agreement was signed, the increase in volume of freight traffic has been phenomenal. As a natural consequence, the economies of the two countries are undergoing a functional transformation. A small thing, but an indication of resulting economic co-operation, is the appearance of a popular brand of shoes whose soles are made of Guatemalan grown rubber and whose canvas tops are manufactured in El Salvador. This is a beginning and an important beginning.

The ramifications of tariff adjustment are, of course, legion. Consider trade barriers in relation to wartime food requirements on the South American continent alone. An analysis of the basic foodstuffs of these sister republics indicates that *together* they could be independent from outside world sources; they possess enough native foods to sustain themselves without recourse to the United States or other countries. Yet, so powerful are tariffs, so feeble the means of transportation, that there are areas where people are near starvation, vast populations struggle along on niggardly, unbalanced, and harmful diets. The removal of tariff barriers, even without improvement in transportation facilities, would at least be a start toward bringing food to these people, at costs which they could pay.

The difficulties, of course, must not be overlooked. Tariffs are a major source of internal revenue in most Latin American countries and, as in the United States, are intimately tied up with important vested interests. Economic foundations must be established which will provide a steady and more equitable source of government revenue if tariffs are to be lowered or abolished. Mexican experience is encouraging in this respect, for as industrialization has advanced, the percentage of internal revenue from tariffs has steadily decreased.

Removal of international barriers must, of course, be accompanied by the liquidation of local ones. In many parts of Spanish America the old colonial alcabalas still exist. These internal tax barriers hamper the free movement of goods and must give way if a high-level production is to be secured and maintained.

III

EVEN more threatening to a people's peace than the perpetuation of tariff barriers are the designs of international big business. The pattern of international cartels, giant monopolies dividing the world trade for their particular profit with little regard to the rights and needs of the people who inhabit it, has been nowhere

better exemplified than in the relationships of these octopuses of economic power to the Latin American republics. For example, the agreement between a certain German chemical firm and its American counterpart provided for an exchange of patent rights, and so divided the territory that the German firm stayed out of the United States, its possessions, and Canada, while the United States company relinquished all Latin American territory. Thus, on the highly important and lucrative aspirin business (for this drug is almost a "necessity of life" in some parts of Latin America), one corporation had a working monopoly, could rig the market price to suit itself, was not above engaging in bribery and corruption to maintain its control, and paid back to its American ally 25 per cent in profits for performing the simple task of remaining out of the market. This example could be multiplied many times. It illustrates the worst form of international economic penetration. The markets of Latin America have been used as pawns played one way or another at the dictate of corporations operating out of Berlin, New York, or London.

But here again the present is shaping the future in a most fundamental manner. As wartime controls are set up, these international cartel agreements are being carefully scrutinized. Legal steps toward breaking up the above mentioned patent pool and cartel agreement have been taken, and competition is on its way back in the South American aspirin trade. In other fields, encouragement is being given to the orderly practices of several hundred business men residing in Latin America representing competing firms. The hope is that through this encouragement of *free* enterprise many controlling cartels may be liquidated. It is along this route that we must go if the vices of international cartels and business monopolies are not to refasten themselves on the business structure of the post-war world. Within the limits of war necessity, that trade and commerce which extends international good will and builds up human resources, must be given first priority in the Latin American market.

One of the greatest contributions which Latin American nations can make to a "people's peace" is the adoption of a hardboiled attitude toward any possible manifestation of Yankee business imperialism which has as its goal profits at the expense of welfare. Strides in the right direction have been made under the Good Neighbor policy of our own State Department and the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs, but this policy must be continued and strengthened during and after the war, with the active aid of forward-looking Latin American interests.

IV

BASICALLY, the problems of this Hemisphere, as of 99 per cent of the globe, stem from an income structure where great numbers of people live in poverty, a substantial number are constantly fighting poverty, a minority enjoy comfortable living standards, and a very few possess conspicuous luxury. Unfortunately this has too often been the condition in the United States, which enjoys the highest general living standard in the Hemisphere. Retain the form, but drop the whole structure many rungs on the income ladder (except for a small segment of large landowners and industrialists), and you have the conditions prevailing in Latin America. In economically advanced Argentina in 1937, a typical industrial family had an average income of $38 a month, while its estimated health subsistence costs were $49. A city school teacher in Rio de Janeiro received $21 a month. In 1938, the average monthly wage for all Brazilian workers was $11.80. Even when adjustments are made for differences between real and money wages, these figures are shocking—as shocking as tenancy conditions in some sections of the United States.

Nutrition studies are few, but they universally attest the poor diet and bad health of many Latin American workers, much of it traceable to low income permitting only limited purchases of food, clothing, and shelter. Meat consumption in Mexico is half that in wartime Britain, one-sixth that of the average American. In the United States the average worker earns enough per hour to buy 17.16 pounds of bread; in Argentina 7.04; in Cuba 3.74; in Mexico 2.42; in Bolivia 0.66. A Bolivian tin miner is worn out and unemployable in the mines after ten years. As Luis Quintanilla so aptly says, "The issue raised here is the most important in any factual discussion of Pan-Americanism. Can Democracy have any meaning whatsoever for the ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed Latin American millions who have never known a concrete, tangible benefit of democracy?"

Here is a problem posed for a people's victory. What can be done about it? On purely humanitarian grounds, of course, Hemisphere business and government interests should have done something years ago. Where conscience and reason have failed, however, the exigencies of war have succeeded. The war has brought these social problems unusually close to the immediate interests of the United Nations, for we are dependent on our southern neighbors for much, and sometimes all, of our supply of certain strategic materials. The Bolivian tin miner's ability as a working machine, and consequently his welfare, become of sudden and practical importance to the war effort. With this in mind the United States Government is now beginning to insist on labor clauses in procurement contracts, guaranteeing minimum wages and the enforcement of social security provisions. Ours is the haste spurred by necessity and tremendous work lies ahead; even so, means are now being found to provide transportation facilities, develop farm production, drain swamps, control disease, and care for people who are an essential part of the United Nations' cause, whether they fight on actual battlefields or produce the tin, rubber, copper, bauxite, cinchona, or tanning extracts needed so desperately to supply the war machine. As the Hemisphere grows smaller daily, as our inter-dependence becomes more evident, these and other steps must and will be taken to raise the standards of living of the masses of our people from Cape Horn to the Bering Straits.

This is the road toward practical internationalism. It means more income produced in a country, and it lifts the basic barrier—woefully divergent standards of living—which hinders the flow of goods southward and northward between the American republics.

Hemisphere conservation efforts attest further the conviction that relationships now being established are enduring. The last few years have seen a growing interest in so-called Development Corporations in Latin America, some of them local, some of them international, which have as their primary function the orderly development of natural resources and markets. Perhaps the most successful of these has been the SHADA (Société Haitiano-Americaine du Développment Agricole), a Haitian-American Development Corporation. With money loaned by the Export-Import bank, and with the advice of U. S. Department of Agriculture specialists, SHADA since 1941 has done amazing things for Haitian agriculture. Extensive rubber plantations have been started; timber production has been stepped up; the quality of Haitian cacao is being improved; plants are being distributed free to farmers; efforts are being made to eradicate plant diseases; 114 kilometers of drainage and irrigation canals and 134 kilometers of roads and trails have been built; 40 reinforced concrete and structural steel bridges have been erected—all this since a year ago last August. Other Latin American nations are following the SHADA experiment with interest, and it seems clear that development corporations will become important agents in the future evolution of the Latin American economies.

V

ALONG with the program of conservation and development within countries, a program of regionalization is essential if a people's victory is to have economic meaning. For national boundaries have seldom coincided with economic boundaries. Resources are unevenly distributed over the world, hence the need for international agreements which will pool our needed supplies of raw materials and permit the freest movement of finished products. An important testing ground may be found in Latin America. The West Coast countries are an example. If the war continues for several years, it will be necessary for these countries to become, collectively, as self-supporting as possible. It is likewise to our advantage to foster moves in this direction. Many Chileans dream of making their country the "Sweden of the South." With a road system, more hydro-electric development, and a steel plant, Chile could supply the West Coast with many industrial products. Peru, with complementary industries, could perform her important part in this regionalization development. Ecuador and Colombia, with their agricultural and industrial possibilities, could supplement the production of their southern neighbors. Coastal shipping, for the most part free from the danger of submarine sinkings, could be developed for the interchange of goods. This is no idle dream. Broken up into realizable projects, each a unit in the larger program, here is in prospect a regional approach to economic and social problems which hints at the way

things must go, if we are really to become so interdependent that a fuller life is possible.

But such regionalization would bring to the surface, for skimming off, age-old problems which have beset the nations to the south—archaic tax systems, stilted banking and credit mechanisms, and feudalistic thinking on the part of entrenched "first families." Vice-President Wallace, in his Mexican Independence Day address, suggested Mexico's interest not only in the Four Freedoms, but also in the following: (1) free access to capital at reasonable rates of interest, and (2) free access to land at reasonable prices. Beneath a bad income structure lies a land tenure system whose survival hampers every move toward the fullest development of the potentialities of the land and the people. Mexico has made the most progress toward solving this problem, but the other nations are on the march. The old land laws are giving way before the need for increased yields and greater diversification. As diversification proceeds and liberal credit is made available, the load of poverty weighing on the one-crop countries will be liquidated and feudalism will die a natural, if long overdue, death.

Believing deeply in welfare economics as the only sound approach to international problems, the American republics must continue to stress the importance of educational and cultural interchange. Permanent economic stability must be based upon the type of mutually respectful co-operation which has been strengthened recently by the efforts of our own and other governments to promote cultural contacts between nations. Last year, even under the war conditions prevailing, 2,000 exchange students and professors visited this country from Latin America, and hundreds of our people went on cultural missions to the countries to the south. When the Brazilian Industrial Mission left Washington for Rio de Janeiro a few weeks ago, it was urged to consider means of aiding Brazil in industrialization, a field of endeavor in which we can be most helpful for many years to come. Nor need the relationship be one sided, for the United States may well ask Brazilian leaders to give us the benefit of their experience in solving race and color problems — problems which Brazil has handled intelligently and democratically for centuries. In many aspects of truly enlightened behavior the United States has much to learn from her neighbors to the south. One of the first steps toward that level of mutual respect which is basic to the democratic development of international culture has been taken; we of the Americas have learned enough of each other to recognize the worth and dignity of each. This state of affairs is largely the result of good long-range planning, brought to fruition by the catastrophic events of the last few years which have made us, in more than one sense, "brothers in arms."

A free world is a realizable goal. Existing inter-relationships between the American republics are proof. The Americas have set in motion a whole series of economic and social programs having immediate and long-range goals which fit into a pattern of permanent importance. They are aimed at removing artificially created and unsound barriers to the movement of goods and persons; breaking up monopolistic, uneconomic practices of cartels; developing a complex, complementary economic structure; regionalizing proper economic areas for their mutual benefit; establishing a sound base for the gradual and continuing improvement of living standards among the masses of people; shaking off age-old restraints against land ownership and tenure, and diversifying crops to remove the blight of one-crop dominance; extending development and health programs among the backward areas; increasing cultural contact between peoples; removing the hindrance of outworn tax systems and fiscal controls; thereby tapping the resources of each country for its fullest development, and for their use by the people. These many fronts are being attacked with vigor and insight, with the will to establish a free world among men.

THE PAN-AMERICANISM of ROOSEVELT

By Nicolás Repetto

ALL the countries of the American continent have passed almost simultaneously through common historic experiences. First came the struggle for emancipation from the Mother Country, which all had to face equally. Then they had to contend, all of them, with difficult periods of anarchy, civil wars, and inter-American conflicts. Then came the task, common to all, of providing themselves with political and institutional organizations. Now all these American countries are faced with the common task of defending themselves against the danger of totalitarian domination.

It is not venturesome to suppose that these four historic periods common to all the countries of this continent indicate that in the destiny of America all the countries which compose it will have a common share in the formation of a home for a new civilization and a new culture. The strong feeling of solidarity which is developing in American countries is only the translation of a growing consciousness of the importance of their great future.

At the present moment there has opened for our continent the historic period, common to all our countries, of defense against the attempted German-Japanese invasion. What the countries of the Americas have not known how to do, or have not been able to do in more than a century of independent life, must now be done with the greatest possible haste, under the pressure of grave world events. In these moments, not only is there danger to the economy of American countries, which rests in large measure on foreign commerce and is dependent to a large degree on the free existence of the countries which Germany now holds in subjugation; the attack upon us threatens our territorial integrity, our sovereignty, our very existence as a continent of free peoples. It is a grave and urgent task, which the countries of America must hasten to face without loss of time, all working with the best possible will to solve the difficulties, real and fictitious, of this great enterprise. The danger threatening America today consists not in the substitution of one economic imperialism for another, but in the loss of its political liberty.

One scarcely needs to point out the many things that American countries have in common. They gained their freedom almost simultaneously, after untying with more or less violence the bonds which subjected them to some European motherland. Most of them are closely bound together by linguistic, social, and religious ties. All, without exception, assign an extremely important role to the future of the continent. General conditions favorable to a solid and co-ordinated union of the countries of America are much more favorable today than in 1822, when Bolivar planned his famous Congress of Panama, for we have at our disposal today much more efficacious means than Bolivar did for carrying out his brilliant scheme.

The moment to take stock and to march in unity has arrived, and to President Roosevelt fell the great task of translating into effective reality, the old ideal of American unity. No man has heretofore expressed with more inspired accuracy the new historic meaning of this continent and of its infinite possibilties for the future. Directing his glance at all America, Roosevelt pointed out the duty of each nation to know itself and to understand the efforts and needs of its neighbors. In every

American nation there is today something permanent, greater than the sum of its parts: that something is the spirit, the faith of America. "Product of the centuries," says Roosevelt, "it was born in the multitudes of those who came from many lands—some of high degree but mostly plain people—who sought here early and late, to find freedom more freely." "America," he adds, "has been the New World in all tongues, to all peoples, not because this continent was a new-found land, but because all those who came here believed they could create upon this continent a new life—a life that should be new in freedom." The maintenance of liberty and the republican form of government, created by the people of America, has been definitely confined to his keeping.

There existed in the United States, as there still exists among us, a not inconsiderable number of citizens stubborn in not seeing evil, even though in their heart of hearts they know that evil exists. Roosevelt took upon himself the task of pointing out the truth.

"But we well know that we cannot escape danger, or the fear of it, by crawling into bed and pulling the covers over our heads." Some North Americans invoked the existence of solemn treaties; others maintained that the Germans aspire to the domination of a country in order to protect it; certain isolationists asserted that the Axis Powers would never attack the Western Hemisphere, and a few ingenuous ones wanted to convert the Axis Powers into friends, and even partners.

Said Roosevelt to them: "There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be no reasoning with an incendiary bomb." Roosevelt dissuaded North Americans who seemed seduced by the idea of a "New Order," making them understand that it was only a question of the restoration of a despotism of the most ancient and abominable kind, of an "unholy alliance of power and pelf to dominate and enslave the human race."

In the opinion of Roosevelt, America is in the process of creating a new society in a new world. On freeing themselves, Americans did not wish to be citizens of an Anglo-Saxon, Italian, Spanish, German, or Portugese America, but simply citizens of an independent American nation. The different nationalities which have come to the new continent have fused and are fusing into one single citizenry: American citizenry. The democratic ideal of America is not a thing of the past; it is a new force, actuating, progressive, which pushes continually toward a better life. Nor are American liberties things of the past: their democratic expression has always been progressive and ascending. "The fire of freedom," says Roosevelt, "was in the eyes of Washington and Bolivar, and San Martin and Artigas, and Juárez, and Bernardo O'Higgins, and all the brave, rugged, ragged men who followed them in the wars of independence."

With his Good Neighbor policy, Roosevelt has succeeded in sealing forever the policy of American unity and friendship: "It was the policy of the good neighbor, the neighbor who knew how to mind his own business, but was always willing to lend a friendly hand to a friendly nation which sought it." That is the policy practiced by Roosevelt with patient insistence for the space of ten years, and crowned in Lima, in 1938, by a significant triumph, on declaring that "The New World proposes to maintain collectively the freedom upon which its strength has been built." It is the thought of Bolivar and also of our Alberdi when, referring to the Americas, he declared: "The Americas are a great political system: the parts draw life from the whole; and the whole draws life from its parts."

For the Rooseveltian conception of Pan-Americanism, America needs better methods than those used by the Huns and Vandals 1,500 years ago, because war between American countries would be as antiquated and as useless as weapons of the stone age. It is necessary to know, says this great statesman, "whether our civilization is to be dragged into the tragic vortex of unending militarism or whether we shall be able to maintain the ideal of peace, individuality, and civilization as the fabric of our lives. We have the right to say that there shall not be an organization of world affairs which permits us no choice but to turn our countries into barracks, unless we are to be vassals of some conquering empire."

Argentina, like the other countries of the continent, has been called to joint and co-ordinate collaboration. As an integral part of American continental unity, it must lend, without limit the co-operation which is expected of it and which it has promised, putting at the disposal of the whole, all the moral and material elements capable of serving the common enterprise, which is the enterprise of liberty, of civilization, and of historic destiny.

—Translated by Richard Holder

THE ROLE OF FRENCH AFRICA

By *Henri Bonnet*

THE arrival of the American and British troops in French North Africa foreshadows the building up of a great offensive force on the southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Once again in history, civilization and freedom will come to Europe over the waters which carried the glory of Greek culture and of Christian civilization.

In the month of November, 1942, after three years of war, the armies of the United Nations are beginning to tighten the circle around the forces of the Axis, put, in their turn, on the defensive. Lately there has been much criticism in the press regarding the strategy of the Allies. Impatience was growing at the very time when the essential decision had already been made in regard to the action against Italy and Germany. An answer had already been given by the commanders in chief of the Western nations to the pressing question of how and when to beat Germany. The first results of their decisions are now here for the whole world to see.

One may be sure that in due time a similar answer will be given to the question of how and when to beat Japan. Here again, due to the conditions of the totalitarian war, of a war which envelops the whole globe, succor will probably come from some distant base to the troops now resisting the Japanese invader in the front lines, just as rescue for the Russians is arriving over the long roads leading through Africa. Support for the Chinese armies will probably come from India by the clearing of Burma through the combined Anglo-Indian-American forces. There the road will be opened which will clear the way to equip Chiang Kai-shek's divisions and to break the Japanese domination on the Asiatic continent along the immense front which extends from Manchuria to the Indian Ocean. This may be the way which will allow the American fleet to liberate the Pacific Islands and waters later.

Long ago, ever since the beginning of the war, the role of Africa in the European struggle had been foreseen. During the years which preceded the outbreak of the conflict, when it was already clear that Mussolini had thrown in his lot with his fellow-despot and future master, Adolf Hitler, plans had been drawn up by the French commanders in Africa to answer an Italian attack in the Alps by marching from Tunisia to Tripoli. It was expected that the fall of the capital of the Italian colony would be a matter of a few days.

During the war itself, in spite of the duplicity of the Duce and his Foreign Minister, Ciano, and of the blindness of the appeasement policy, it was clear that the threat had not disappeared. The French General Staff had, in consequence, to consider the possibility of the traitorous attack which came on the tenth of June, 1940. General Gamelin was credited with a plan which would have wrecked the Axis strength by first crushing the forces of the weaker partner. After the Germans and Italians had been checked on the European fronts, the final defeat would have begun, as in 1918, in the South. Decisive and lightning attacks against continental Italy were planned to come from the North African shores.

At the time of the disaster in the fateful summer of 1940, the only hope of French resistance in connection with the British was to maintain the French Empire, and especially North Africa, in the war. Today the situation has been brought about which would have

existed then if the famous promise of fighting north of the Loire, south of the Loire, of fighting in Africa had been fulfilled. Truly, the French General Staff, in this case, would have proceeded to Algiers and, after the lessons of the defeat, would still have been a match for the German generals; an important part of the army would have been evacuated to North Africa and the French fleet would have sailed to Bizerte and Oran. A formidable force would then have been constituted.

But it must be realized that in spite of two years of disarmament and of control by the Armistice Commissions of the Axis, which are now in prison camps in Africa, there is still a potentially formidable force remaining in the French Empire. The nucleus of this military strength is formed by the crack troops of the 19th French Army Corps and the Colonial armies of Tunisia and Morocco. The very fact that little resistance was made to the American troops on land, and that none of the French divisions went to the mountains to carry on the fight along the Syrian pattern, is clear proof of their feelings toward the Allies and toward the Axis. They will be the vanguard of the French Army in the second World War.

To the formidable consequences, from the military point of view of the American initiative in Africa, other ones must be added from the political angle. Instead of his dream of establishing his new political order in Europe, Adolf Hitler is now faced with the impossible task of organizing the whole continent under the threat of popular insurrections, as a gigantic fortress with all doors and windows closed to the world.

From this point of view, the re-entry of France and of the French Army in the war has a tremendous importance. It must be realized that the Germans, through depredations, torture, and jail have forged the unity of all the conquered European peoples. The submerged populations have now found again all their comrades and leaders of the past. Again, as in the first World War, liberation is coming from the West, under the united flags of the United States, Great Britain, and France. Again, as in the period preceding 1914, when the Western Democracies, threatened by German imperialism, joined hands with Russia, the armies of the great Slavic nation are in the field, heroic and indomitable. The permanent conditions of a new European order are realized again. They foreshadow for all the martyrs of the Continent a future which will be, according to the promises of President Roosevelt, of the Atlantic Charter and of the Declaration by United Nations, protected against new fascist and imperialist aggressions, a future in which there will reign "Freedom from Fear."

In spite of moments of despair, ever since the downfall of France the enslaved peoples of Europe have always realized what was at stake. Their hearts, in spite of the efforts of a handful of traitors, were with the big armies of the free nations, and with the free forces of the governments-in-exile and of General de Gaulle. They do not doubt any longer that victory is now on their side. Just as there is now the prospect of a free Asia for the slaves of the Japanese, there is for 500,000,000 Europeans the certainty of a free Europe in a reorganized free world.

For this free Europe, if freedom from fear and aggression comes in the first rank at a time when everything must be subordinated to military considerations, the three other freedoms of President Roosevelt also symbolize the ideal for which tomorrow the people will rise, risking the supreme sacrifice, in attacking the troops of their oppressors from the rear. This presupposes that, in a war against international fascism, French fascists and their accomplices will not be allowed to retain any political responsibilities in Africa.

During two years of sufferings and distress, France has recovered her role in history, and especially the role which she should have played in the recent past when French imperialism in Europe had entirely disappeared, when she should decisively have been the dynamic force for the organization of a profoundly democratic Europe.

This implies and demands that the France of Africa, which is again in the fight, be fully representative of the real spirit and ideals of the Mother Country—of all those Frenchmen who never despaired of the French Republic and of its great traditions. That is the France of tomorrow, which will play her part in complete union with the other members of the Europe who desire, like France herself, to see economic and social as well as political democracy firmly established. In the world tragedy she is and will be the bridge between America and the old continent.

SECOND FRONT
on the Adriatic

by Robert Groetsch

SPECULATIONS on the location of the future second front on the continent of Europe must include consideration of a territory which is probably more ready for action than any other section of Europe. That territory is the east coast of the Adriatic where the indomitable warriors of Jugoslavia are carrying on a real war against Axis forces. But even more convenient to North Africa is Albania, where 200,000 first-class fighting men are ready to join the invading armies against the Italians who are now occupying the country. The Albanian mountaineer is weaned on a rifle and the tradition of his land is to fight anyone who threatens his independence. More than at any time in the history of that small but strategically situated country, its people are united in opposition, not merely among themselves but with those who in the past have been considered enemies.

The flames of revolt are licking skyward in Albania. Unrest had long been smoldering, but only last spring did it take on violent forms. In May, three students assassinated Ali Bechi, Albanian police chief, placed in office by the Italians. That was in Tirana, the capital. Soon afterward came a bombing attempt upon the life of the Quisling Premier Mustafa Kruya. It was followed by mass arrests. The official newspaper *Tomori* published new decrees making the slightest opposition activities punishable by death. Groups of more than four were forbidden to walk the streets.

But these repressive measures only called forth greater mass opposition. Only quite recently, a group of young girls marched to the Tirana prison and demanded that political prisoners be set free. The prison guards were quick on the trigger; the result—sixteen girls were killed and twenty-five wounded.

Armed bands against the fascist terror were formed. Guerrilla warfare was reported from northern Albania as early as last March. The bands' size and activities grew swiftly: they attacked Italian sentries, blew up arms depots, ransacked ammunition dumps. Today three sizable rebel groups are busy waging war on alien rule, each of them led by former Albanian army officers. One operates in the North, where Colonel Muharrem Bajractar has established contact with the Yugoslav Chetniks. Another, with Major Abas Kupi at the head, has chosen central Albania as its field. Another functions in the South, around Valone. It is headed by Colonel Bila Nivica, once Chief of the Albanian Constabulary. He is backed by the Epirus clans which maintain contact with well-armed Greek bands.

In this chain of guerrilla areas, extending from Greece all the way to Croatia, Albania constitutes Italy's most sensitive and vulnerable spot. Since the Italian Fascists occupied Albania on Good Friday of 1939, little has been heard about developments in this, Europe's most romantic and backward country. Mussolini has built it up into a fascist bastion, making it of outstanding military importance for the Balkan struggles to come. The Italian Army has excellent and short communications to the Mother Country, across the Adriatic. A ring of mountains cuts off the armed camp that is Albania from Yugoslavia to the north and east, from Greece to the south. The Albanian people, numbering about one million—another million dwells outside the national boundaries—are as one in opposition to the invader.

In the thinly settled mountains of the North and East live war-like tribes, eking out their frugal living by stock-raising. The flatland of central Albania is settled by impoverished peasants and tenant farmers. They are virtual serfs of the landowners, the feudal beys who wielded power under Turkish rule. But after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, which stirred up the whole Balkan region, demands

Gateway to the Second Front

for agrarian reform were voiced even by these primitive peasants. Since the Balkan War, they and the hill tribes have on several occasions constituted the revolutionary element in Albania.

Mussolini knew all that. After the occupation, he promised the tribes something resembling autonomy, and the peasants the long sought agrarian reforms. He failed to keep his pledges. The hill tribes fell under the yoke of occupation garrisons, while agrarian reform remained on paper. True, there was some expropriation of land; but it was not for the benefit of the peasants. It was for two of the fascist "big-shots"—Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law, and Gacomoni, Governor of Albania and husband of the daughter of Caballero, the Italian general. Right after the invasion, Ciano kicked out the Albanian oil proprietors in the South, sharing the booty with Gacomoni. The two also appropriated valuable timber stands.

Albania is being exploited by the top fascist clique as though it were some primitive colony. The Albanian upper crust, the feudal beys, were silenced and made pliable by means of arrests and threats. They are well aware that the firm of Ciano & Gacomoni can ordain a general expropriation of land, whenever they think it to their advantage. The rest of the people groan beneath the fascist heel. Crops are seized for the Italian Army, live stock is requisitioned, hunger stalks city and country.

II

SUCH a broad movement of national rebellion is something new in Albania. For among the Scipetars (Sons of the Eagle, as the Albanians are fond of calling themselves) national sentiment was feeble before the occupation. Even today there is utterly lacking that strong middle class which elsewhere has developed a strong political consciousness. Export has always been slight; what little skilled work existed, tinged with oriental somnolence. For the most part, exports were limited to hides, wool, tobacco. Up until 1940, they never exceeded $1,500,000 in annual value. To this very day Albania is a country without railroads, except for a short stretch in the South. Durazzo and Valona, the two larger Adriatic ports, are silted up. Large vessels have to anchor far outside. What Albania needs above all is roads and proper cultivation. Fifty per cent of the arable soil lies fallow. Such conditions are conducive to the development of neither a vigorous middle class nor a sound peasantry.

The tribes in the mountains have furnished valiant guerrilla fighters for many wars, often as mercenaries for other countries. They have little interest in Albanian nationalism. They never acknowledged the central government at Tirana. They stood on their tribal rights, demanded tax exemption, recognized the vendetta as their supreme law, and gave many a tough skirmish to King Zog's gendarmes. It casts a revealing light on the state of Albanian nationalism that these war-like tribes did not lift a hand when the Italians occupied the country. The largest tribe in the east, the Miridites, actually disarmed King Zog's retreating troops. They could not bring themselves to pass up this chance to replenish their low arms and munitions stocks. The Malisores in the North did likewise.

Democratic nationalism after 1918 was limited solely to the cities. But even there the slogan, "Albania for the Albanians," long had a hollow sound, for the small towns have long been settled by a mixed population consisting of Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians, and Greeks. The only proponents of democratic nationalism were a thin stratum of merchants, officials, and intellectuals. One of the few who might have given a broader base to Albanian national aspirations after the first World War was the militant Bishop Fan Noli, Albanian Premier, and forerunner of Ahmed Zog. His political aims consisted of liberation of the tenants, democracy, general agrarian reform. But the feudal lords mobilized all the reactionary forces against any such "bolshevism." Fan Noli had to flee. The old counter-revolutionary powers barred all roads to democracy and reform.

The situation has changed radically under Italian rule. The beys have been deprived of political power. Indeed, many of their sons are fighting in the ranks of the rebels. For the first time in recent Albanian history, there is a situation in which all sections of the population have a stake in the country's independence. Nationalism is rising—a revolutionary nationalism. The struggles of the Yugoslav guerrillas in neighboring Montenegro sound across Albania's northern border like a tocsin of freedom. This has even in-

spired some co-operation between the Albanian rebels and the Yugoslav Chetniks—a remarkable fact when one takes into account the old and rankling Serb-Albanian conflicts, eagerly exploited by Italian propaganda. There have always been border "incidents" between the two countries. Nor have the Albanians forgotten that after the Turks were driven out of the Balkans, the Serbs demanded access to the Adriatic—by way of northern Albania. After the first World War, Greek and Yugoslav politicians went even farther, demanding the partition of Albania. But last spring the Yugoslav and Greek Governments-in-exile declared for a Balkan League. This and the common enemy have reconciled the traditional foes.

III

TWO factors can increase the resistance of Albania against the Axis Powers. First, of course, is military aid either by means of an Allied invasion or through the same channels that the Chetnik forces of General Mikhailovitch are now being aided. But an even more important stimulus to this end is to be found in the political sphere. The political warfare which the United Nations are now carrying on in their effort to arouse the peoples of the occupied countries must be directed to this front. An official and specific statement by the United Nations, formulating the organization of a Balkan League in which Albania would be assured of participating on a basis of equality with her neighbors will awaken a revolutionary enthusiasm in these fighters.

For forty years socialistic and democratic elements in Southeastern Europe have been calling for a league of Balkan nations. This demand has been stifled by dynastic interests and the intrigues of the great powers. But it has nonetheless become part of the hopes of the masses. Now is the time to tell the peoples of these countries that their aspirations will be realized. If the United Nations will state clearly that in the general re-organization following this war there will be established a federation which will guarantee the rights of minorities, which will deal with the economic problems of the individual states and of the region as a whole, and which will provide a legislative and executive body representing each participating nation, this act will do much to convince the Albanians, among others, that their ancient controversies with neighboring countries will be eliminated and that they will at last find the long-hoped-for basis for the satisfactory development of their national existence.

The 200,000 men of arms-bearing age who are prepared to carry the fight to the Axis occupying forces must be reached by propaganda apparatus that unfortunately does not yet exist. The slogan, Albanian autonomy within the Balkan League, must penetrate to every village, thereby to co-ordinate the forces of rebellion into a unified nation with a known goal. In this act the United States must take an outstanding part, for even among the politically backward mountain tribes the United States enjoys the greatest prestige and inspires the highest confidence. I had a clear illustration of this in the fall of 1932 when I was, as often before, a guest on the rocky slopes of the North Albanian Alps. We were crouched around a roast mutton, literally sitting on the rifles of Zog's gendarmes. Bottles of Rakki were going round; the gendarmes were enthusiastically talking of war against Serbia; and even the old Malisores nodded agreement. I felt the poisonous breath of fascist propaganda and tried to tell these sons of nature about the terrors of modern war.

"Bombing planes will circle your valleys and destroy your flocks," I warned.

Destroy their flocks? They crossed themselves and assured me earnestly that America would never, never tolerate such atrocity. To them America was something all-good and all-powerful—and that is true today more than ever. After Pearl Harbor, when Mustafa Kruya sent his country's declaration of war against the United States (ordered by Rome), there were spontaneous pro-American demonstrations in Albanian cities.

If the United States, speaking in the name of the United Nations, were to advocate a Balkan League with Albanian participation, the plan would be immediately accepted by the people. It would hasten the Albanian-Jugoslav rapprochement which circumstances have now made possible; it would make the entire eastern coast of the Adriatic receptive to an Allied invasion army; and it would divert to this front immediately thousands of Axis troops which Hitler would like to use elsewhere.

—Translated by Heinz and Ruth Norden

THE NEW ZEALANDER AND HIS LAND

BY WALTER NASH

NEW ZEALAND in this second world war provides to a very great degree proof that a democracy can wage war as vigorously and effectively as any totalitarian country—provided certain essential conditions are fulfilled. These conditions I would define as a definite belief on the part of the people that the war is necessary and worthwhile and a definite resolution on the part of the Government to wage the war with the maximum of vigor and efficiency regardless of cost to people or property.

New Zealand is, of course, a small country. It has only 1,640,000 people. This has meant that we have been able to tackle there through the machinery of the central government many of the problems which in an enormous country like the United States have to be met by delegation of authority, involving the setting up of Boards, Committees, Sub-Committees, and countless other organizations. But even if one makes allowance for these facts, I think that an examination of New Zealand's war effort can prove that a democracy can wage war efficiently and at the same time remain a democracy if its people are united and its Government is vigorous.

New Zealand came into the war at 9:30 P.M. on Sunday, September 3, 1939. We had strongly and resolutely advocated throughout the preceding decade a policy of resistance to aggression. We had supported Abyssinia and the policy of sanctions in 1935 and 1936. We criticized the non-intervention policy as being opposed to the fundamentals of the League of Nations Articles and unfair to the Spanish Government during the Spanish Civil War. We had supported the Chinese, our great Pacific neighbor, in their appeal for aid against Japan. We had opposed appeasement. In 1936, we prohibited the export of scrap iron to Japan. We knew ours was only a small voice to raise in these matters, but we thought it should be raised. We knew, too, that all these things might well lead to war. But that was a risk any country which had any self-respect and belief in the basic principles of democracy, freedom, opportunity, and self-development, was obliged to accept.

When word came through that September evening in 1939 that Great Britain had gone to war on the Polish issue, the New Zealand Cabinet at once followed suit. Two days later this action was unanimously approved by Parliament. We then set our faces toward the job for which none of us had any relish, but which we all saw as essential, that of waging war.

What has happened since then is written partly in the history of our times and partly in the records which cannot yet be published. We at once manned our coastal defenses, put into operation certain controls over our resources, and set about contributing our share toward Britain's war effort. A group of New Zealand bomber pilots were at the time in Great Britain preparing to fly out bombers to New Zealand. We decided, however, that these bombers could be more usefully employed in Britain than in New Zealand at that time and so they were handed over. Since then New Zealand Bomber Squadrons, Fighter Squadrons, and Torpedo Squadrons have served with the R.A.F., and never a big bombing raid takes place over Germany without some New Zealanders being among the crews. A New Zealander, "Cobber" Kain, was the first War Ace on the Allied side. He

was an intrepid Hurricane pilot, one of the few who met the first German onslaughts over France.

At sea, the New Zealand cruiser "Achilles" took part in the Battle of the River Plate against the German Pocket Battleship "Graf Spee." On land, we took the same action which had been taken in the last war. We had already arranged to occupy certain strategic islands in the Pacific. This we did. Then we sent the vanguard of our army overseas to Egypt, where they camped in almost the same places as the Anzacs had done twenty-five years ago. This force was built up to a division and, despite the very heavy casualties which have been suffered, has been kept at the strength of a division throughout all the bitter Middle East campaigns.

New Zealanders fought their way as part of the British forces in the great rear guard action in Greece from the Yugoslav border to the beaches below Athens. Tired and half armed, they fought on again in Crete against the German air invasion and smashed the pick of the famous Nazi Seventh Flying Division. In Libya last winter they were the first troops to reach Tobruk and relieve the attacked garrison there. This summer, when they were doing garrison duty in Syria, they were hastily recalled to the desert and very much in the tradition of the halfbacks in their own rugby football teams flung themselves in to stop Rommel's rush into Egypt. Mersa Matruh, where five German tank attacks were fought off and where the division, encircled and with its Commander, Lieutenant-General Freyberg, seriously wounded, cut its way out, became another name enscrolled on the New Zealand battle flag. At El Alamein once again they fought valiantly and bitterly—and at great cost to stop the main drive toward Egypt.

More detailed figures cannot be given of New Zealand's effort in her own home area and in the Middle East because these figures would obviously be of advantage to Rommel and to the Japanese generals who would like to invade our land. But I can say that one out of every two men in New Zealand between the ages of sixteen and sixty is serving in the Armed Forces. One-sixth of the whole population is under arms. Every New Zealander who is not in the fighting services must serve in the civil defense organization in one form or another. We have in New Zealand now mobilized an army equivalent to a United States Army of about 13,000,000 men, plus a part time Home Guard Army equivalent to a similar United States force of 8,000,000 men. We have turned over our small, slightly developed industries to the making of war materials. We have done things which have surprised ourselves in this field. We are making Bren gun carriers, trench mortars, mortar bombs, high explosive bombs, grenades, small arms ammunition, minesweepers, water bottles, steel helmets, and countless other items of equipment. All the clothing and footwear of the New Zealand armed forces is made in New Zealand.

In our main industry, farming, we have achieved similar results. At the request of Great Britain we switched over to cheese production—more than doubling our output, of which 90 per cent was shipped to England, during the past season. When other sources of cheese developed we switched our great dairy industry once again to concentrate on the production of butter. This was possible under the system of guaranteed prices and government controlled marketing which had been instituted by democratic methods before the war began. We have continued to produce and export to Great Britain great quantities of meat, wool, hides, as well as dairy products, and since December 7, 1941, when New Zealand became the main base for America's South Pacific front, we have fed thousands of American men in the United States armed forces in the South Pacific region with food provided under Reverse Lend Lease.

In the New Zealand war effort the native inhabitants, the Maoris, who comprise about 5 per cent of the population (they number approximately 90,000) have played a full and equal part. There is no color bar in New Zealand and no racial discrimination. The Maori enjoys full and equal civil rights and liberties. He goes to high school and college. There are four Maori members of Parliament and one Maori Minister. The value of this policy of complete co-operation and complete equality with the Maori was already manifesting itself in pre-war days when the Maori population began to increase after a period of serious decline and when Maori economy began to revive, particularly where it centered around the co-operative farms established in many of the Maori districts.

When the war came so many Maoris en-

listed that New Zealand decided to form a Maori Battalion. These troops rapidly turned out to be among the best we had. At Thermopylae, on the very spot where Leonidas and his 300 Spartan troops made their famous stand, the Maori Battalion fought a rear guard action against the German armored divisions. In Crete their repeated bayonet charges contributed largely to the tremendous losses inflicted on the Germans. In Libya and again recently in Egypt the battalion has distinguished itself, not only by its fighting spirit, but by its high standard of efficiency. The first commander was a Pakeha or white man, a New Zealand regular soldier. In Egypt this year, however, the battalion was commanded by Colonel Tui Love, a Maori. He was killed in action leading the battalion in a bayonet charge. At the stage when only volunteer enlistment existed in New Zealand some 38 per cent of the Maoris of military age enlisted.

At home the Maori people have played their full part in the war work of the country, and recently another Maori Battalion was formed to serve among the forces stationed inside New Zealand. The contribution which the Maoris are making to the war and the steadily growing number of educated and distinguished Maoris who are active in civilian life of the Dominion may be of interest in post-war years. Maori leaders should be able to play a considerable role in developing democratic institutions and a democratic way of life in other parts of the Pacific Islands inhabited by people of similar stock.

This then is the balance sheet of our achievements under democratic methods. I stress that sentence "under democratic methods." Let us look at these methods first in the political and secondly in the economic field. When New Zealand came into the war in 1939, the dominant political party was the Labor party which had fifty-two members in the House of Representatives against twenty-eight members mainly of the more conservative National party. The ordinary Cabinet composed of representatives of the Government party was in full charge of the war effort until July, 1940. Then, when it became clear that even greater efforts and greater sacrifices were going to be required, a special War Cabinet was formed, consisting of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Finance, together with two representatives of the Opposition. This body dealt with all the main decisions regarding the war. It, for instance, authorized the utilization of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the December campaign in

Libya at the end of 1941. It had that same autumn to face the fact that a General Election was due. At first it was intended to hold this election and representatives were even sent to Egypt and Fiji to arrange there for the troops to vote as if they were at home. But in October, when it became apparent that New Zealanders were about to be used in the Libyan campaign, the Government felt it was no time to raise questions of political parties and political problems. The election was accordingly postponed and Parliament unanimously voted a continuation of its own life for a further year. This was done only after considerable debate inside the Government.

In the middle of 1942, in response to a demand for a National Government, an extended War Administration came into being. Under the new arrangement six of the opposition party were given Cabinet posts and specific responsibilities in connection with matters relating directly to the war effort. The War Cabinet remained as before, with the addition of the Leader of the Opposition, the Executive Body of the War Administration. Each party still kept its entity in the House of Representatives. The Ordinary or Domestic Cabinet still remained in existence. The War Cabinet was still responsible for making all decisions in relation to war matters except those dealt with by the War Administration as a whole. Cabinet Ministers who did not become members of the War Administration retained their portfolios and full responsibility for all matters of policy and administration not connected with the war effort.

These arrangements functioned successfully until recently when a small group of miners in the Waikato area who went on strike illegally were imprisoned and then released on agreeing to work while their dispute was being settled and to refrain from any future activity detrimental to the war effort. The Opposition members of the War Administration resigned in protest against what they considered to be too lenient treatment afforded to the miners. Two of the Opposition representatives, the Rt. Hon. J. G. Coates and the Hon. A. Hamilton, who have been members of the War Cabinet since its initial formation in July, 1940, have, however, agreed at the request of the Prime Minister to continue in that capacity. This may yet bring an election.

II

WHAT has been the tone of the New Zealand Parliament during this war? I can think of no way in which it differs greatly from the New Zealand Parliament in peacetime. There has been vigorous and outspoken criticism and discussion of every step the Government has taken. There have been a series of secret sessions in which the Government has discussed fully with members of the House the steps it has taken in furthering the war effort. Many of the debates have been of unparalleled vigor. In accordance with the New Zealand practice instituted by the Labor Government, Parliamentary debates, when not in secret session, have been broadcast over the air.

As in Great Britain, the normal powers of the Government were extended immediately after the outbreak of the war under an Emergency Regulations Act, which gives, for instance, wide powers of censorship, control over subversive activities, and the same authority to detain people as in Britain, on the grounds that their actions might endanger the security of the State. So far this particular power has not had to be exercised. Pacifists and Conscientious Objectors have had their views respected, but they have not been permitted to hold public meetings or propagate their opinions. Agitation against the war has not been permitted.

On the economic side we have proceeded to carry out the policy which Prime Minister Peter Fraser described as conscription of wealth as well as people. Conscription of wealth takes the form of heavy taxation for the wealthy which may reach a maximum rate of 90 per cent on the highest income brackets. War time excess profits are taxed by 75 per cent after the other taxes have been levied. Those who did not contribute to the War Loan floated in 1940 according to their means were compelled to do so. This particular Loan bears no interest for three years and 2½ per cent thereafter. The Government has power to take over overseas assets held by private persons. It controls the purposes for which capital may be used and it may take complete control of productive resources. For example, the Waikato Mines around which the political dispute of this autumn centered have been taken over to be run under a Directorate of State, owners,

and workers' representatives, for the remainder of the war. It is proposed to restore them to private industry later.

A national register of man power was drawn up early in the war. Regulations have been issued to control man power in industry. These have decreed that employment in certain stated essential industries cannot be terminated without permission. The inflow of workers into non-essential industries, including all retail shops except those engaged in distribution of food, drugs, and fuel, and all factories except those declared essential, has been forbidden. Men with experience in engineering have been registered irrespective of age, and many of those suitable have been drafted to munitions or defense work. Many thousands of workers have been drafted from non-essential into essential branches of industry under these powers.

The Germans have made much of their ability to draw skilled men from the forces and return them to industry between campaigns and then return them to fight again when the need arises. New Zealand has accomplished the same thing by allowing trained men out of the army for periods to return to work on their under-manned farms or in coal mines. Mr. P. C. Webb, the Minister of Labor, announced, for instance, on October 13 that several hundred miners had been released to spur coal output.

Girls of 20-30 and men of 46-50 have been required to register so as to be included in the ranks of essential workers. Workers absenting themselves have been penalized by deduction from wages. Hours of work were extended in war industries and New Zealand, one of the first countries to introduce the 5-day, 40-hour week, passed at once to working long war hours. Statutory holidays were suspended and detailed conditions governing employment were varied. When, particularly following the arrival of American forces, there was an urgent need for new camps and new airdromes, a Commissioner of Defense Construction was appointed with power to transfer workers to jobs in any part of the country, to take over material and equipment or the management of concerns, and to set the price at which contract work was to be done. Hours of work on defense construction jobs were extended to 54 a week. A Director of Production has also been appointed with wide powers to see that the fullest and best use is made of materials and machines in the production of munitions and war goods. Employers and employees are represented on War Advisory Councils which make criticism and recommendations to the Government on every matter relating to war production and organization.

The Government moved at once to check inflation. Prices and rents have been rigorously controlled. Prices on a range of 38 items of food, clothing, footwear, light, and public utilities have been stabilized. No price increases beyond those ruling on the outbreak of war are permitted without the consent of a Price Investigation Tribunal. As a result, the rise in retail prices has been less than 10 per cent. A 5 per cent wage increase was granted by the Arbitration Court to partly compensate for this rise in living costs in October, 1940. A further 5 per cent increase was permitted in April, 1942, to apply only in respect of wages up to and including £5 a week in the case of men, £2/10*s* in the case of women, and £1/10*s* in the case of juniors. The wages of those receiving more, were increased by only 5 per cent of the above amounts. Corresponding cost of living bonuses have been granted to Government employees on the lower income levels.

III

THESE controls—political, military, and economic—are as rigorous as any that other countries have enforced in order to wage the war. The fact that they have been enforced in New Zealand and have been readily accepted there is due, I believe, to something essential to our democracy. New Zealand democracy had in pre-war times and particularly since 1935 become inextricably linked with social progress. In two great periods of her history—in the 90's of the last century and in the last half of the 30's of this century—New Zealand instituted widespread social reforms.

Let us look at the reforms of the 30's—the Reserve Bank was completely nationalized, the State took over again direct control of the railways, of the State Advances Corporation, and of broadcasting, and it reorganized the whole system of social security. New Zealand's social security legislation now provides for generous monetary benefits to those who are in need because of

old-age, unemployment, invalidity, widow- or orphanhood, war disabilities—so that those who have helped to build up the prosperity of the country by working for it or fighting for it when they were able to do so, shall not suffer because of age or illness or destitution. Free hospitalization, free maternity service, free medical attention, free milk for school children, and—now with the lack of shipping facilities for fruit—free apples for school children, are all provided. The farmers receive a guaranteed price for their products.

This organization gave the average New Zealander one of the highest standards of living in the world. But it did more. It gave him a direct and vigorous interest in the war because he felt that at every turn he had in his country something to defend. This organization which he had built up and which was primarily a transference to the sphere of Government of the same principles of co-operative aid which had marked the early settlement of New Zealand—plus a blend of very vigorous individual initiative—was something he felt worth defending. But in addition, it was something which had fitted him to carry out that role of a vigorous soldier and a vigorous worker in war time. The good food, good schools, good training which he had had were not only something which gave him a goal to fight for but which fitted him for the fight.

One of the reasons why the ordinary New Zealander has acquitted himself well in this war—already five New Zealanders have, for instance, received the Victoria Cross, the highest battle honor—is undoubtedly the fact that he has in general known through his life good food, decent housing conditions, good schooling and—except for a bad patch in the early 30's—good work. He is not an undersized man taken off the street corner in some distressed area with his physique already ruined by a diet of substitute foods. He is not sluggish and lacking in initiative through months if not years of idleness. He is instead a man who has probably been to a high school, who has had a job which required individuality and self-reliance, who has spent his summer weekends swimming from a beach within easy streetcar ride of his home, and his winter weekends playing Rugby football —a game which only strong muscles and strong bones can endure. He has had without any of the palaver of Hitler Youth Movements and Strength Through Joy meetings and Storm Trooper Drills exactly the type of hardy existence which fitted the German people for war. But he has had something else as well which the German has never known. He has lived in a country where men have spoken their own minds from the start and where every political issue has been vehemently and vigorously disputed. This has given him a solid training in democracy. That is why as a democrat he and the others who make up the population of New Zealand have been able to put their backs into this war with a vigor and a capacity for organization equivalent to anything any totalitarian country has achieved.

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Johan J. Smertenko

WE are particularly happy to welcome as a member of the Editorial Board Johan J. Smertenko, author of "Alexander Hamilton" and contributor to Harpers, The Nation, *and other periodicals. From the first appearance of totalitarian movements in Europe, Mr. Smertenko has been active in rallying public opinion in America to the cause of freedom and democracy. Since the beginning of this year, he has been closely associated with* FREE WORLD *and has rendered valuable service to our movement.*

A Policy for India

BY HENRY STANLEY

NEARLY four months have passed since the jailing of Nehru, Gandhi, and the leaders of the Indian National Congress, together with the leaders of several other Indian political organizations. During this period we have had an opportunity to judge how successful has been the British policy of intransigent determination to surrender none of the essentials of power to authentic Indian politicians. News from India is meager and even the London *Times* has protested against the severe and uncompromising censorship which has shut off practically all information from this unsettled part of Asia. However, what little information we have seems to indicate that the Churchill policy of future promises, coupled with a present retention of power, has produced something approaching a state of civil war. It seems pretty obvious from all accounts that the British determination to smash Indian nationalist resistance before it has had an opportunity to organize effectively has been successful. There does not appear to be any prospect of a widespread armed revolt by the Indian people. In spite of this "success" of Mr. Churchill's policy it also seems apparent that rioting, bloodshed, and violence have not subsided. It has been casually admitted that Bengal, which has a population four times that of the State of New York, was cut off from the rest of India by the militant activities of Indian partisans. Reports of bombing and sabotage continue to come from the Bombay Presidency. Comments on the loyalty of the Indian police by British officials leave the suggestion that there has been some disaffection even among these people.

The total effect of these hazy details of violence is a feeling of grave uneasiness on the part of a very large number of people. A growing number are in like manner extremely disturbed, not only by the accounts of riot and disorder but by the swing away from Britain and the United Nations of Indian moderates: men like Mr. Rajagopalachariar, the former Premier of the Madras Presidency, the Moslem Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh, the Premier of the province of Sind, and the Indian liberal leader, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. This indicates pretty clearly that men who want a compromise on almost any terms are either fed up or are being driven into opposition by rising popular pressure. There seems to be some defection even in the ranks of the "loyal" Indian princes. The deposition of the Maharajah of Indore may mean anything, but it is disquieting to say the least.

The classic reply to criticisms of British policy in India is that no one except a few Englishmen understand the Indian situation and its vast complexity. It is quite true that India and its problems are not well known and are largely misunderstood, but it is doubtful whether repeated statements about the stubborn separatist character of the Moslems and the evils of the Indian National Congress will assist us along the path of brotherhood with the Indian people.

In his speech of September 10 in the British House of Commons, Mr. Churchill had this to say about the Indian National Congress: "The Indian Congress Party does not represent all India; it does not represent a majority of the people of India; it does not even represent the Hindu masses. It is a political organization built around a party machine and sustained by certain manufacturing and financial interests."

How does this description square with the facts as it is possible to ascertain them from published documents?

The only test of Indian opinion which has ever been permitted by the British Government was the election of 1937 held under the authority of the India Act. The high property qualifications for voters excluded all but 20 per cent, or 30 million, of the people of voting age in British India proper, and it can be argued that any vote under such conditions is not representative. In so far, however, as the voting minority is representative of India, the Indian National Congress speaks for the people because it won an overwhelming electoral victory. The Congress had large absolute ma-

jorities in six of eleven provinces and the largest single vote in three more. In eight out of the eleven of the provinces of British India the Congress leaders had sufficient popular support to form ministries.

There are no means of measuring accurately the support for the Congress among the unenfranchised masses. The fact that the Congress is committed to the introduction of universal franchise would seem to argue that the Congress leaders are at least not afraid of the unenfranchised people. In so far as it is possible to ascertain opinion in a non-democratic country, it can be justly said that the Indian National Congress is the most representative political organization in India.

Mr. Churchill's references to party machines and financial backing require scrutiny. Like the British Conservative party, and the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States, the Indian National Congress receives financial assistance from what may be described as "interests." The principal financial supporters of the Congress are Messrs. Birla and Sarabhai, who have a considerable interest in textiles, life insurance, and several other undertakings. The "interests" are very close to Mr. Gandhi, and it is generally understood that his policies are the most agreeable to them. The friends of Indian business do not, however, run the Indian National Congress. Like the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States, there are both reactionary and progressive elements within the Congress. There is a group known as the Congress Socialist party which operates inside the Congress. Its representative is Jawaharlal Nehru, whose support for democratic socialism is well known. Since 1938, the All-India Trade Union Congress has had a working agreement with the Indian National Congress very similar to that existing between the British Trade Union Congress and the British Labor party.

II

THE Indian National Congress is, of course, predominantly Hindu, which must necessarily be the case in any country where the Hindus constitute 70 per cent of the population. The Congress is not, however, a sectarian organization. Its president is a Moslem born in Mecca and widely respected as a theologian among Mohammedans. There are several Moslems on the Working Committee, the best known of whom is Dr. Ansari. These men are not just show pieces. They represent the Moslem supporters of the Congress who voted for Congress candidates in the elections of 1937. Moslem candidates endorsed by the Congress won twenty-six of the seats set aside for Moslem voters, and in the Northwest Frontier Province, which is inhabited predominantly by Moslems, the Congress won an absolute majority. The movement of Moslems is toward the Congress. Abdul Gaffar Khan, the leader of the Moslem Red Shirt Organization, has joined the Indian National Congress, and, it should be added, he has recently gone to jail. The Congress has been officially endorsed as the representative Indian political organization by the religious organization of the Shias, a Moslem sect numbering 16,000,000.

There is a prevalent impression that the vast majority of the ninety million Moslems in British India are opposed to the Congress policy of working for an independent, United Indian State. This impression does not square with the facts. Apart from those who support the Indian National Congress, Moslems are organized in a number of political parties. The best known of these is the Moslem League. In the election of 1937, candidates supported by the Moslem League secured 321,772 votes of the 7,319,445 Moslem votes cast. Contrary to popular belief, the greatest concentration of Moslems in India is in Bengal, where there are 27,000,000 of them. In this province the Moslem League won 40 seats, the Indian National Congress 50 seats, Moslem independents, 43 seats, and the Proja party (a poor peasants party) 38 seats. In the provinces of Sind and the Punjab, where there are also large concentrations of Moslems, the Moslem League won only one seat. The by-elections of the last five years in these two provinces have revealed a considerable increase in the League's strength in this area, but their gains have not been sufficient to alter the general picture. In the United Provinces, which, next to Bengal, is on the basis of the electoral record, the League's strongest area, the League won 27 seats, the Indian National Congress 134 seats, and the Moslem independents 30 seats.

These electoral figures show that the Moslem League is not the representative Moslem organization. It is very largely a landowners and lawyers party and it has practically no fol-

lowing among the poor Moslem peasants who constitute the vast majority of Indian Moslems. The League supports Indian independence, however, and Mr. Jinnah, its spokesman, associated himself with Nehru and Azad in rejecting the Cripps proposals. The Moslem League's stand on the question of a separate Moslem State has become well defined in the past two years, but from his recent statements it seems equally clear that Mr. Jinnah would not reject office in any provisional government of a united India provided he was given real power.

The Moslem League is the only Moslem political organization which has flirted with the idea of a separate Moslem State. The other organizations: the Proja party in Bengal, the Jamiat Ul-Ulema, the Ahrars, and the Red Shirt Organization of Abdul Gaffar Khan support Indian *independence and unity*. This is also the case of the religious organization of the Momin sect, the All-Indian Momin Conference. This organization speaks for 45,000,000 Moslems, and it has gone on record as favoring Indian independence and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

A good many Moslems, particularly in northwestern India, are not within any political organization. These independents provide the support which exists for the governments of the Punjab and Sind which remained in office when the Congress ministries in the other provinces quit on the outbreak of war in 1939. Today the Premier of the Punjab, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, is still in office and presumably supports the policies of the Viceroy's Government. The Premier of Sind, Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh, has resigned since the beginning of the armed repression of the Indian National Congress and other militant Indian political organizations. He has also returned all honors and decorations given him by the British.

When the facts relating to the political position of the Moslems are carefully examined, it becomes clear that the Moslem population, far from constituting a danger to any authentically Indian provisional government which may be set up, is so well disposed to Indian unity and independence that Moslems are likely to be active supporters of such a national government. Separatist Moslems are a small minority of the Moslem community, and the one Moslem organization which has toyed with separatism has only recently dared to advocate a separate Moslem state in categorical terms.

III

No serious person can help regretting the civil disobedience campaign which has broken out in India. It is possible, however, to understand if not to approve it. Whatever Mr. Gandhi may be in politics, he has become a symbol for the Indian people: a symbol of poverty, simplicity, and austerity. His arrest at a time when he had offered to negotiate with the Viceroy has driven many Indians crazy with exasperation. It is not hard to believe that, were a foreign government to imprison Mr. Churchill, not a few Englishmen would start throwing stones at the police, blowing up railway lines, and chopping down telephone poles. They would do this whether it was in their ultimate interest or not, and such action would be a worthy manifestation of the human spirit.

The unrest in India today is a testimony to the fact that Indians can and will fight. In a recent letter to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Gandhi states that the majority of the Indian people do not accept his policy of non-violent, non-co-operation. This being so, the problem for us is to canalize these fighting energies against the enemy and away from Britain, which already has enough to do.

It seems pretty evident that the present Indian policy of the British Government in all its integrity can accomplish little more than the suppression of the immediate threat of internal anarchy. It contains within it no political dynamic capable of rallying the people of India for the attack and the defense. In many respects the policy laid down by Mr. Churchill on September 10 resembles that of the Czar following the abortive uprisings of 1905-06. It differs in this important respect, that the Czar had the advantage of being at least a symbol of Russian nationalism. Neither the King-Emperor nor the Viceroy has this advantage.

More and more people in North America, Britain, and China are becoming from all accounts gravely worried by the state of affairs in India. There seems to be emerging from this anxiety a belief in the necessity of some common action by the United Nations; some action of international readjustment which rises above national sovereignty and demonstrates that the United Nations stand for a new international order.

The concrete suggestions made under this

head are worth looking at. There should be formed at once an international body representative of the United Nations on which there would sit men from Great Britain, the British Dominions, the United States, China, the U.S.S.R., and at least one representative of the exiled European governments and at least one representative of the Latin American States. This body should have plenary powers to assist in the establishment of a provisional government in India drawn from the ranks of authentic Indian politicians with a popular following who are prepared to fight against the Axis and preserve Indian unity. It should be frankly agreed that defense policy must be entirely within the power of the provisional government, and Chinese advisers, because of their familiarity with the problems of mass resistance as they exist in Asia and because of their record of successful resistance to Japan, should be sent to help guide the steps of the new government.

There is growing support for such a policy. From all accounts, Colonel Louis Johnson, President Roosevelt's representative in India, did all he could to insure agreement between Cripps and the Indian leaders. This indicates that Mr. Roosevelt would welcome a solution of the Indian problem. Mr. Willkie has demonstrated that he will support any steps that may be taken to draw India into the world front against the Axis. In Canada, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation has called for a solution based on joint action by the United Nations. In Britain, no political party has yet advocated joint action, but the liberal *Manchester Guardian,* the socialist *New Statesman and Nation,* and the communist *Daily Worker* have spoken out strongly in support of some action by the United Nations; the *London Economist* seems well disposed to some humane settlement, although it has not specifically endorsed the policy suggested.

The Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, has said: "Much is being said about a new world order to take the place of the old world order when the war is at an end. If that new order is not already on its way before the war is over, we may look for it in vain." This seems to apply exactly to our relations with India, and indeed with all the peoples of Asia. We have to build a new order to win the war, and that order will make the peace good and true.

●

WALTER P. REUTHER

IN adding the name of Walter P. Reuther to our International Honorary Board, we are proud to welcome to FREE WORLD *one of the most distinguished leaders of the American labor movement. The Reuther Plan, proposed in 1940 and put into practical application immediately after Pearl Harbor, has been recognized as a major contribution of labor to the war effort.*

Mr. Reuther is giving direct service to the nation in many ways. He is now one of the members of a joint AFL-CIO committee which advises the War Production Board on labor problems. As International Vice President and Director of the General Motors Department of the UAW-CIO, he is continuing to play a major role in the organization of the vast automobile industry in Detroit. From 1936, the year of his election to the Executive Board of the International Union, he has been re-elected each year.

THE HISTORIC ROOTS of French Principles of Government

By

JULIEN BENDA

WE shall endeavor in this study to determine what, in our opinion, constitutes the traditional conception of the French respecting the nature of government, in so far as the conception of a community of millions of men, and one that has persisted through the centuries, can be dealt with as a unity.

The French, in their traditional conception of the nation, consider it as an association of individual persons, who are invested with a sacred character; not as a mystic and indecomposable entity in which, by definition, the notion of the individual disappears. Let us say at once that this conception in no sense excludes the willingness of these separate persons to submit themselves to the requirements of the whole, but *this willingness is expressed by these persons as individuals,* who always remain the elementary components of the nation as here defined. One may say that the dogma of the "Moloch-state," adopted by other nations, was never accepted by the French. Those of their rulers, for example, certain kings, who showed the greatest scorn for the individual never made their practice the basis of a formulated doctrine; the theoreticians of the ancient monarchy, even at its most absolute, such as Bossuet, never preached such a doctrine; the contemporary doctrinaires of this regime, the writers of the Action française take pride in their profession of respect for the individual. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, despite the assertions of some of his adversaries, is no exception; the "general will" that he exalts in his *"Contrat social"* is in no sense an indivisible thing in which the notion of the distinct person is dissolved, but on the contrary a sum of individual wills. For this reason he was formally condemned by Hegel, the typical apostle of the state for which the individual does not exist. In France the only professed theoretician of a society which negates the individual would seem to be the Vicomte de Bonald, and it will be admitted that, as such, he has not attracted many disciples. In upholding the idea of the individual and of the moral reality that he represents, the French conception of society is essentially Christian.

It may also be said that, for the French, the primordial element of the nation has always been the individual; the nation is made for him and not he for it. A French government which declared as its principle that the nation was an end in itself, that it might use the individual simply as a means for the fulfillment of purposes which it alone was to judge with no need to take into account the individual's sense of the proper and the suitable, and which officially stated—in the phrase of the Fascist Congress of Bologna—that "the individuals are the instruments used by the nation to achieve the plenitude of its power"—such a government would realize that it was setting itself up in direct opposition to what has always been, among Frenchmen, the conception of the nation.

The French have always believed in a certain degree of liberty for the citizen. This con-

ception, according to which the nation is an association of individual persons, implies that they enjoy liberty (in so far, of course, as it is compatible with the existence of the whole), liberty being the constituent condition of the person—or of consciousness, which in the Kantian philosophy is synonymous with the person. This conception that the citizen may have a certain degree of liberty is traditional among the French, and it did not need the famous declaration of the Revolution to make itself evident. A sixteenth century Frenchman expressed his satisfaction in living under a sovereign king because, so he said, that is "the supreme liberty." (And that was true when compared with his condition of existence under the great feudal lords.) It may be asserted that no Frenchman of any epoch would have written, like the historian of a neighboring country: "The Burgundians then rebelled against their lord because of a desire for liberty, which, *it seems,* is an inestimable good."

Specifically, the French nation never accepted, as a formulated principle, the denial by its kings of freedom of speech and writing, a denial which, indeed, they never officially proclaimed, and which, in fact, seems to have been much less rigorously applied than is generally believed. (One need only think of the free publication of the books of Rabelais, Montaigne, and De la Boëtie, as well as of *"Tartufe," "Fables," "Caractères," "Télémaque,"* and *"Dictionnaire philosophique."*) Louis XIV once wrote to his grandson, Philip V of Spain, that if he ever became King of France, he would have to take into account a certain need of freedom in writing which was traditional among the French. Here again, a French government which violated this need of freedom, which declared that the citizen could enjoy no liberty as an individual but could know liberty only "in and through the Whole" would set itself up in direct opposition to the age-old spirit of France.

The French have always believed in the contractual obligations of the State; they have believed in the rights of the individual in opposition to the State. This conception which postulates the existence of individuals apart from the nation, or more accurately apart from the State, implies the idea of the contractual State, according to which the individual understands that in return for his obligations to the State, the latter has obligations toward him. It is opposed to another conception which maintains that only the individual has duties and only the State has rights. The reader will immediately recall the classical example of the French concept of this contractual obligation of the State: the insurrection in July, 1830, against Charles X, who by his famous ordinances had violated his pledge to observe the royal charter. Another example, which is not mentioned so frequently although it is equally significant, is the conversion to Catholicism imposed on Henri IV before he was allowed to wear the crown of France. The nation believed that royalty had accepted a contract whereby the king must be a Catholic; if the king became a heretic, it would consider the contract broken and would refuse him the crown. A historian of this period tells us of a member of the Burgundian parliament maintaining that the heir of Clotilde lost his rights to Burgundy if he did not respect the act by which the holy queen had dedicated the province to Christ. To be sure, the French kings, for the most part, did not admit the thesis of the contractual State; the king, according to some jurists, was free of all obligation toward the citizens: *rex a lege solutus est.* But the nation did not homologate this arbitrary power. The last Bourbons alienated the nation because they did not observe the "fundamental laws of the kingdom," which, in the mind of those who invoked them were nothing other than a formally concluded if unwritten contract between the nation and the monarchy, in force since the time of Clovis.[1] In blaming Louis XIV for his failure to observe these laws, and in throwing up to him in the *"Remontrances"* the reproach: "You love only your glory and your convenience," Fénelon felt it his duty to reveal to the king the effects of this conduct: "Even the people, who loved you so much, who had so much confidence in you, are beginning to lose their affection, their confidence, and even their respect." The obligations of the government and the citizens are *reciprocal* obligations; such is the traditional concept of the French.

Finally, the will of the French to set themselves up as individuals in the face of the State, implies their possession of *rights,* which may not be violated in the name of the *"raison*

[1] These laws, according to a theoretician of the sixteenth century, were the basis given to the monarchy by "the Franks and the Gauls freely gathered around the Merovingians." (Fr. Hotman, *Franco-Gallia,"* 1573.) Bossuet himself declared that the king should respect the laws. (*"Politique tirée de l'Ecriture sainte,"* I, 4; IV, 1; VII, 2.)

d'Etat"; rights which today include even the right to attack the State (inherent in the *Conseil d'Etat* which corresponds to the American Supreme Court); the consciousness of these rights revealed itself under the old regime in the solidarity of the people with the parliaments, whenever they resisted the arbitrary actions of the government. A remarkable instance is the famous night of May 5, 1788, when the people of Versailles crowded about the Palace of Justice to show their solidarity with the Parliament which, to prevent an attempted *coup d'état* on the part of the king, had just promulgated a decree which the historian of that epoch characterized as "a declaration of rights in the American fashion."[2] Here once more the institutions of democratic France only codified conceptions which had long been developing in French consciousness.

II

***FRENCHMEN** have always conceived of their government as one which, in some measure, emanates from them, or at least allows them to feel that it does so.* The consequence of this French conception of society as an association of individuals, and not a mystic unity negating the individual, is that the French have always desired that their government should, in part, emanate from the individuals, and not be imposed upon them without their consent; that it be, in some measure, *representative.* Here once more, if this desire had not been given formal expression prior to 1789, it nevertheless existed long before this date and constitutes a permanent characteristic of the nation. From the time of the earliest States-General, thoughts like these flash out: "The sovereignty emanates from the people, which is the universality of the inhabitants" (1356). "The monarchy is an office, not an inheritance; the State is the people's thing; sovereignty does not belong to the princes, who exist only through the people." (Speech of Philippe Pot to the States-General of 1484.) The author of *"Franco-Gallia,"* cited above, declares that the French monarchy is elective in principle, although the kings were ordinarily chosen from the same family. In Hubert Languet's *"Defense contre les tyrans ou du pouvoir légitime du prince sur le peuple et du peuple sur le prince"* (1581), we read that the kings hold their crown from the people and that they may "forfeit" it by crimes against the people, just as the vassal "forfeits" his fief to his lord. A treatise of the same period pronounces: "The oath of fealty has been taken not to the king, but to the crown for the preservation of the State. The power of kings is subject to the hand of God and to the authority of the people." Without doubt, the conception according to which authority belongs to the nation *and to it alone* (those who exercise it being only delegates) is not definitely expressed before the eighteenth century. It is only then that the Marquis d'Argenson can note in his *"Journal"* (1753): "In the public mind the idea is becoming established that the nation is above the king, just as the universal Church is above the pope." Without doubt, until that time the predominant opinion of the majority of Frenchmen accepted a limited monarchy in which, along with the power the king received from the nation, there was another which he owed only to himself, which came "from the hand of God." But the significant fact to be borne in mind is that, for the French, this autonomous nature of the government has never been its *whole* nature, and they have always, and in continually increasing measure, conceived of their government as owing its existence to the consent of the nation.

This conception, we claim, has at all times been the French idea of government, but it has never been that of their kings, at least under the old monarchy. A certain party today maintains that the Revolution might have been avoided if the crown had been allowed to accomplish the democratic reforms toward which, so we are assured, it was moving. Yet these kings of France never admitted, as did those of England since 1688, the right of the nation to the slightest share of power. The meetings of the Parliament and of the States-General never had, as far as the king was concerned, any purpose other than to register and homologate the royal will; and when these bodies laid claim to some initiative, they always aroused royal resentment. Francis I warned them that they would regret it if they presumed to "ape the senate of Venice." One of his successors declared that all authority lay in the king's hand, that there could be no other in the country.

[2] *"Histoire de France,"* edited by Lavisse, IX, i, 340. It decreed, among other things, the right of every "citizen" to be judged by a jury of his peers and by them alone, as well as the right of juridicial courts to review the laws and to "order their registration only in so far as they conformed to the fundamental laws of the State."

The States-General was never able to win the right of periodical assembly; it was always the king who convened them in his moments of need, and his need was invariably that of money. The sentiment of the kings with respect to these bodies seems to have been accurately expressed by Cardinal Dubois when he declared: "In the pomp and display of the deputies of the people, in their permission to speak before the king, and to offer him memorials of grievances, there is to my mind something tragic which a great prince should never tolerate in his presence." Again in November, 1787, eighteen months before the meeting of the States-General, Louis XIV announced to the Parliament of Paris "that to the king alone belonged the sovereign authority in his kingdom; that the legislative powers, which belonged to the king, were not dependent on nor to be shared with anyone; that a king of France could recognize in the representatives of the three orders of the State only an augmented council composed of selected members of a family of which he was the head; and that he would always remain the supreme arbiter of their representations and grievances." As late as June 23, 1789, six days after the *Tiers* had assumed the name of National Assembly, the king declared to the States-General: "None of your projects, none of your measures can have the force of law without my special approbation." The tradition of the French nation is here in direct opposition to that of its kings.

The will of the French that the government should emanate from them, or at least should not officially oppose their desires explains the failure of the attempts of even the most absolute of French rulers to impose on the nation something it did not wish or had not yet come to wish. We note the failure of Henri IV to impose, by the Edict of Nantes, religious toleration for which the nation was not prepared; of the Constituent Assembly to institute a Christianity of its own making; of Saint-Just and Robespierre to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat; and of Napoleon to reduce the University to subservience. Once again, it is this will that the government should emanate from the nation, or at least that people should be able to believe that it does so, which largely explains the fall of the old regime. The profound historian G. Pagès says that under the Bourbon monarchy the French were perhaps better governed than ever before, yet they overthrew it because they felt the government considered itself essentially autonomous and without any obligation to represent the nation. One may wonder whether certain French governments (for example that of Napoleon I) really represented the nation, but one must recognize that they *formally inscribed in their organic articles their intention to do so* and so respected the traditional will of the French.[3]

III

THIS desire of the French for a government which emanates from the nation in no sense implies their will to govern themselves. On the contrary, they feel that the government, once it has been definitely recognized as the expression of the nation's will, should possess a certain autonomy of action, and they are prepared to offer it their obedience. This has been true even of democratic France, where the dogma of popular sovereignty was explicitly formulated. There is here, and the remark may be applied to all democracies, a certain contradiction of which the opponents of democracy, especially in France, have taken full advantage. As they have no trouble in showing how frequently the activity of democratic governments is independent and uncontrolled, they deluge with sarcasm those nations which "imagine that they are sovereign." The question at issue is how can a nation agree to obey a government, that is to say be subjected to it, since the nation is sovereign and the stronger of the two. The answer is found in the classical work of the eminent French jurist, Maurice Haurion: "The question is whether one may be subject to something smaller than oneself, and on this point experience answers in the affirmative. Obviously the nation may not be subjected in all matters without abdicating its sovereignty, but it may be subjected in many. Important men are dependent on their valet or their butler; the greatest personages take tutors or music teachers or dancing masters whom they obey; their sovereignty is shown by the fact that they can discharge a valet or butler, replace a music teacher or dancing master. With due recognition of necessary distinctions, we

[3] In July, 1871, after the defeat, when the Comte de Chambord withdrew his candidacy to the throne of France, because he refused to accept the tricolor flag, one of his counselors begged him not to make the matter a point of honor, since that would force the French nation to do likewise. *"France,"* he said, *"has always had its own will and it has always known how to express it."* (Marquis de Noailles, *"Le Bureau du roi,"* 1848-73, p. 131.)

may say that the same holds true of the nation. When the nation accepts a government, it takes unto itself a master whom it agrees to obey; while it thus becomes subject to the government, still remaining sovereign, it reserves the right to replace the master if he does not satisfy." The author, wishing to indicate the degree of autonomy granted the government by democratic nations, states that it is the object, not of a *delegation,* but of an *investiture*. Such, it may be said, is the traditional conception in France; the kings themselves were the object of an investiture on the part of the nation. When their rule pleased the nation, it asked for nothing better than to retain them, and it put itself entirely in their hands with no idea of interfering in matters of state. (This is especially to be noted at the States-General of 1614 shortly after the reign of Henri IV.) When the nation was displeased with its kings, as with the last Bourbons, it dismissed them.[4]

Another traditionally felt desire of the French is for an authoritative government, a government "which governs." It is a fact that every time the rulers of France have proved weak in the exercise of their authority—as during the minorities of Charles VI and Louis XIII and under Louis XV—they lost the good will of the nation. The great popularity of Henri IV after the disorders of the League, and of Louis XIV after the Fronde, clearly sprang from the fact that with them there once more appeared a strong government. The Constituent Assembly became unpopular when in order to conform, as it felt, with the Declaration of the Rights of Man, it allowed its authority to become weak, gave up all control from the capital and granted complete autonomy to the provinces and communes. France demands a government that possesses real power, that assures the energetic functioning of the administration, that commands, punishes and exacts obedience. The opposition of the Girondins to the establishment of such a government cost them their heads. One of the causes of the unpopularity of the Third Republic with many men not all of whom were theoretically opposed to democracy, has been the frequent lack of authority of its executives.[5] A great difference between the citizen of England and of France may be noted here. The Englishman (see the writings of John Stuart Mill and of Spencer) wishes to have the activity of the government, except in time of crisis, reduced to a minimum, indeed limited to administration. The Frenchman, even if he is a democrat (is this a result of his Roman ancestry?) wants a government that at all times makes its presence felt.

IV

WE shall consider two other demands which seem traditional among the French with respect to the nature of their government. The first is that they wish the government to be *civil* in nature, and not as in a neighboring country, military. In the fullfilment of this wish the French have had the powerful support of their kings. The latter, although they devoted the greater part of their attention to military matters and were often themselves men of war, were essentially civil sovereigns who subordinated the military element. To begin with, when Charles VII created a regular army and one that he paid (and therefore controlled), the royal authority freed itself from dependence on the great lords; in contrast to feudal militarism, it represented the principle of a civil power based on an army obedient to it. Furthermore, in the seventeenth century the crown brought about three changes which made the governmental authority definitely a civil one. First, it replaced its provincial representatives, who had been essentially military officials, by intendants. Then, under the direction of Letellier and later, Louvois, two *civil* ministers of war, the army was reorganized and placed under the control of *intendants d'armée* (direct ancestors of the Civil Commissars of 1793) so that the Revolution acted in the spirit of the monarchy when it decreed that the military authority owed obedience to the civil authority. Finally, the king himself ceased to be a military man. While Francis I, Henri IV, and Louis XIII had been soldiers, Louis XIV directed no action and only lent his presence at

[4] It may be said that the French sometimes admit that the government ought not to be controlled, but take it for granted that it ought to be always controllable. Of course, this does not apply in times of crisis.

[5] The French have often denounced the paralyzing interference of parliamentarians in the administrative branches of the government as one of the causes of the weakness of the Third Republic. That they themselves are responsible for this practice escapes them. Yet they can be seen in the lobbies of the ministries urging their deputy or senator to win them a favor, and threatening that he will not be re-elected if he fails. And then these same men complain!

the crossing of the Rhine and at a few sieges; Louis XV appeared before his soldiers once (at Fontenoy); Louis XVI did not even do that. The civil character of the government was preserved by Napoleon.

From the point of view with which we are here concerned, with the Second Empire there began a unique period in French history. It was a period of pretorianism, that is to say the military element was preponderant, at least psychologically. Its spirit was military and dynastic rather than national (as in the case of Bazaine), and if it was nationally-minded, it conceived of the nation's interests as essentially linked with the supremacy of the military element (as in the case of MacMahon). This latter conception was swept aside by the will of the nation which turned against the men of *Seize-Mai.* When this idea attempted to reassert itself with Boulangism and with the militarist movement at the time of the Dreyfus Affair, it was again crushed. It may be said that a French government which would declare itself to be essentially military, refusing to recognize the supremacy of the civil power, would find itself in direct opposition to the age-old ideas of the French.

Finally, we note another traditionally expressed will of the French, namely that the government shall be free of the influence of churchmen as mandatories of a spiritual power; in other words, that the government shall be *secular* in nature. This will of the French runs all through their history, and frequently, if not always, it too had the support of their kings. It first appeared in the fourteenth century when French public opinion, in so far as it was able to express itself, approved Philip the Fair's determination to be independent of the papacy. From that time on it is a constant factor in French history. It made itself felt in the demand of the Estates of Tours in 1484 for the re-establishment of the Pragmatic Sanction, which was considered a check on the encroachments of the Holy See; in the popularity of Louis XII's war against the papacy, a war which he called a defense of France against the claim of Julius II to interfere in its affairs; in the displeasure the parliaments showed throughout the sixteenth century when they had to execute the Concordat of 1516, which seemed to them too favorable to the power of Rome; in the persistent unpopularity—even among Catholics—of the Jesuits from their first appearance in France, because they were considered the agents of the papacy; in the discontent of the nation when the aged Louis XIV accepted as royal confessors members of the Jesuit order, which had come to symbolize Roman intervention in national affairs;[6] in the public anger when the hand of the Jesuits was discovered behind the Cellamare conspiracy which proposed to offer the crown of France to the king of Spain; in the unpopularity of the ministry of Cardinal Fleury because of his allegiance to the Holy See; in the enthusiasm with which the condemnation of the Jesuits was greeted in 1761;[7] in the hostility toward the Holy See during the Revolution when the French discovered that it was attempting to bring back a regime they no longer wanted; in the exasperation created by the favor shown the *Congrégation* by the government of Charles X; in the violent anticlerical movement (pillage of the Archbishopric of Paris) which followed Charles' fall; in the unpopularity of Napoleon III and of the Assembly of 1871, in so far as they served the interests of the papacy; in the vote of 1877 against the clericals of the *Seize-Mai,* one of whom wrote, "If we became unpopular, it was less as monarchists than as clericals." This anticlerical tradition has not prevented the French from rising against their government every time it attempted to lay a hand on catholicism, not as a political power but as a religion. The tradition of France has been expressed in all its nuances by this famous phrase: *France is Catholic and anticlerical.*

Such, it seems, are the principal characteristics that the French traditionally expect their government to have. We emphatically do not say that a government which rejected traditional French ideas and the will of the nation, and whose principles were military and clerical, could not endure; nor do we say that it would necessarily be fatal to France. These are things that we do not know. We simply say that such a government would constitute a rupture with the tradition of the French spirit with respect to the nature of government.

—Translated by Albert Lippman

[6] It will be recalled, however, that Louis XIV did not allow prelates to enter his council. When the Marquis de Torcy asked him why he did not admit Cardinal de Janson who so skillfully managed the affairs of France at Rome, the king answered, "Because I have made it a rule never to receive an ecclesiastic in my council, a cardinal least of all."

[7] "At the palace the crowd received the verdict with cries of enthusiasm. . . . Strangers embraced one another as if France had won a victory." (Lavisse, *op. cit.,* VIII, i, 321.)

FEDERALISM AND WORLD CONFEDERATION

BY
LI YU YING

READERS of my article, Making the World Ready, in the November issue of FREE WORLD, will recall the emphasis put on the necessity of a political world confederation. Now I shall endeavor to examine the principles of federalism as they apply to the world confederation. Federalism is a political system which can be at the same time economic and social. All dictionaries give us definitions of federation, confederation, and the composite state. Diderot's Encyclopedia furnishes an extensive definition of the last which embraces the other two. Its most significant passage states:

> In connection with the composite states which are formed by a permanent confederation of several states, it may be noted that such a confederation is the only means whereby many small states, too weak to maintain themselves individually against their enemies, can retain their liberty. These confederated states pledge themselves to exercise in common certain privileges of sovereignty, especially those which concern their mutual defense against foreign enemies; but each member of the confederation retains complete liberty to exercise in any way he deems proper those elements of sovereignty which are not specifically mentioned in the constitution of the confederation as having to be exercised in common.

But the etymological definition of the encyclopedia is not enough, because ever since ancient Greece, through Germany, Switzerland, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, etc., there have been, apart from official or governmental federal regimes, other economic and social forms of federalism. For example, the General Confederation of Workers in France and the co-operative federations all over the world are the prototypes of those non-governmental federal organizations. At present, the governmental as well as the non-governmental federal organizations are functioning only in a small part of the globe and affect but a small part of mankind.

A federation for a whole continent—for example, the United States of Europe—is for the time being, only a hypothesis. To be sure, the League of Nations and the United Nations are even larger federative organizations, but they are also very incomplete — incomplete from the point of view of federative principles and incomplete as to the number of nations participating in them. Consequently, federalism is still on hypothetical and experimental terrain and is far from being the real application of that idea, at least in a world sense.

But this does not mean that federation or world confederation is utopian or unrealizable. On the contrary, it is in existence. At present it is realized partially and superficially, but in the future it will be more generally accepted. It is only a question of degree. We are already at present in the first phases of such an organization. I insist that federalism is not utopian, because all the other systems opposed to federalism, that is, authoritarianism, statism, absolutism, or whatever name they may be called, were only ephemeral and were never realized. There are definite federal tendencies opposed to these totalitarian categories from Laotze and Confucius to Sun Yat Sen and Chiang Kai-shek in Asia, from the limited European and American federations up to the League of Nations and the United Nations. In the popular and nonofficial field, there are

such groups as Free World, World Co-operation, or the World Confederation which we are creating now. It is this orientation which is the right one. It is a kind of federalism which will progress slowly and not without difficulties, but which certainly will succeed.

There are at least two kinds of federation: directed or governmental federalism and free or popular federalism. Those two systems are different, but they are not as much opposed to each other as the previous political or economic regimes, as were the absolute monarch or dictator and the people, or as the capitalist tyrant and the worker. Previously, authority and liberty were diametrically opposed, but federalism and the co-operative system are drawing them together and reconciling them, and are employing them more or less together as allied principles. In a federal system it is impossible to enforce either authority or freedom 100 per cent. Each must make concessions; each agrees to surrender its maximum expression in favor of the minimum demand of the other, and in such a manner to reach a common optimum.

Federalism is consequently a system tending toward obtaining the optimum for everyone. Of course, this general agreement is not very easy to reach, but it is a historic necessity and humanity will certainly succeed, sooner or later, in realizing it. Thus federalism is not purely an economic or political question, but also a philosophic and moral one. Sentiments and reasons of wisdom, justice, and goodness also play their part. This moral aspect is best expressed in Chinese ethics by the word, *shou,* which is the special virtue of "not being content to think and to do good (or in the negative sense, to avoid evil) for oneself, unless one is willing to do the same for others." This is a single monosyllabic word in Chinese (it has a bisyllabic synonym, *shoutao*) but its sense is very complex. It is, so to say, a whole conception of morals in the sense of virtue and in the sense of social technique. The occidental words such as co-operation, mutuality, and altruism translate this word partially but not completely. It would be in place perhaps to adopt this neologism in the occidental vocabulary in the realm of morals generally and in relation to federalism particularly.

If I insist on this word, it is because if there is neither *shou* nor *shoutao,* agreement is impossible, and consequently federalism is impossible. We have seen that in matters of social organization there is only one right path, and that is an orientation to federalism. It would be well to adopt *shoutao. Tao* means the path, the way, or the road; *shoutao* would thus mean the way to federalism.

II

WHAT practical measures can one take to establish the road necessary to lead us to the world of the future—a federative world in which all people will live as brothers? I believe that this road consists, principally of two systems which can be subdivided in turn. These are two world confederations of (1) international governmental organization and (2) popular groupments of all men from all the corners of the earth. These two confederations may be compared to two systems of communication: the railway and the highway, which are not in opposition but are complementary. The railway has advantages which the highway does not possess, and the inverse is equally true since the highway can lead us right to our doors.

The international governmental system—League of Nations, United Nations, etc.—is, first of all, essential to destroy the Axis, the principle enemy of federalism, liberalism, and world understanding and then to rebuild a better world after the war. It will also play a great part in preventing future wars and in establishing collective security which will provide for all means of common defense against whatever "Hitler" may appear later in any country. Thus we see that the confederation of governments is of primary importance and deserves our faith and support. But nevertheless, it cannot have a monopoly on all human affairs. Moreover, if society is not sufficiently advanced, the governmental organization will be rendered impotent despite the best intentions, and it will fall victim to the inevitable bureaucratic defects of a system that lacks intimate contact with the people. In other words, this system is like all other organisms; it can only function effectively if it corresponds to a specific public need.

When an organization is relatively limited and localized, for example a state which has anthropo-geographic homogeniety, there is a chance that the administrative system may succeed for a time. But when it is a matter of one or more vast countries or one or more continents, the situation is different, and it is necessary to change the forms in keeping with the new conditions. These changes may be com-

pared, if not exactly to a human illness, at least to a crisis in development which requires medical and sometimes surgical treatment. But the treatment does not last forever; sooner or later the situation becomes normal. In this period of transition the governmental federations operate as administrative and legislative bodies while the popular confederations serve to teach, inculcate, and safeguard federal principles.

We are convinced that it is possible to organize, within the framework of the world confederation, a system in which the world is the greatest unit and the individual the smallest. There will be a reciprocal relation between them which will result in an acceleration of the process of federalism. In other words, through the confederations different groups on every continent will be reached; supporting groups will reach smaller associations; and those will reach the individual. Conversely, there is a similar process. Individuals form themselves into small groups; groups become parts of groupments; and the groupments form the World Confederation. If this conception is transformed into reality, it will be possible to reach and to affect all of mankind. But to achieve this it is necessary to carry on an immense program of education and of organization that will prepare the people for a peaceful and united world order. This is the task of the World Confederation of International Groupments which is holding its first conference.

There is an encouraging example in China of the possibility of establishing a harmonious relationship between the governmental and the popular federations. For almost half a century the National Government of China has been collaborating effectively with an organization called "World Co-operation," founded thirty-six years ago. The National Government comprises men and political groups that participate in the exercise of power. "World Co-operation" does not participate in this function, and does not want to do so, but it instills in the public both knowledge of and loyalty to the principles of democratic government. A harmonious relationship exists between the officials of government and our wholly unofficial group, inspired not only by friendship but by effective joint activity since the beginning of the Chinese Revolution, through the period of resistance to Japanese aggression, and including the formation of a future United Nations organization and a popular world confederation. The message of encouragement which President Chiang Kai-shek has sent me as a member of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, of "World Co-operation," and of the World Confederation of International Groupments is the best proof of this cordial relationship.

If this is possible in the Chinese Republic, why should it not be possible in other countries and among other people? Surely we do not constitute an exception. In fact, we are all aware that in many Democracies some collaboration has already been established between governments and progressive private groups. Wherever this co-operation was effective, wherever the officials of governments respected the opinion of such private organizations and these organizations, in turn, constructively supported the efforts of the governments, there democracy was not in danger. It was only when governments ceased to reflect public opinion that democracy became endangered.

We are confident of defeating the totalitarianism of the Axis Powers, but the extent of our victory will depend entirely upon the success with which we can establish this twofold world confederation, governmental and popular, which alone can secure for all people freedom, democracy, and peace.

World Conference of International Groupments

A PROGRAM giving detailed information concerning the first conference of the World Confederation of International Groupments which will be held at the Hotel Astor in New York City, on December 4 and 5, is printed elsewhere in this issue. Readers and subscribers of FREE WORLD *are cordially invited to be present at all sessions of the conference. Invitations for the dinner on Friday evening, December 4, at which Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt will preside, may be obtained at the office of* FREE WORLD.

HARTROTT AND HITLER

by

Stefan Zweig

OUR time has a short memory, and there is hardly a more forgotten book than a best-seller of twenty-five years ago. By chance such a book fell into my hands recently, "Los cuatro jinetes del Apocalipsis" by Vicente Blasco Ibáñez. I had read this novel in 1916, when everybody was reading it, and vaguely remembered that it contained excellent descriptions of the last war. But I had forgotten completely one of the less important characters, a German professor of history, a certain Julius von Hartrott, who in this book proclaims the political ambitions of the German people—as I then thought—in a most exaggerated and even ridiculous manner. This champion of the wildest Pan-Germanism seemed to me unreal and I regarded his arrogant and arbitrary ideologies merely as malevolent exaggerations of the author.

Now as I re-read this book a quarter of a century later, I could not believe my own eyes and I had the feeling that I owed an apology to Blasco Ibáñez. For this man Hartrott, whom I had formerly regarded as a crazy caricature, now appeared to me as one of the most lifelike characters ever created by a writer, because, unfortunately, Hartrott's absurd theories have become through Hitler the official credo of seventy million Germans. The very ideas which this fictitious person proclaimed in 1914, at a time when Hitler was an unknown house-painter and his satellites, Rosenberg and Goebbels, still in school, are at this moment endangering the freedom of our earth. The fiction of a poet has become frightful reality, and there is perhaps no better proof that Hitler's conceptions of world domination are not as new as they seem than to listen to what Blasco Ibáñez' imaginary character proclaimed twenty-five years ago.

Like a true German professor who needs a theory for everything, Julius von Hartrott seeks before all to find a moral, a metaphysical basis for the German claim to world domination. The theory of race seems to this ardent Pan-Germanist most serviceable for imperialistic intentions. According to Hartrott's own explanation, there exist only two races on earth, the dolichocephalic and the brachycephalic; the first one the master race, the other the slaves. And Hartrott dares the world to doubt—as Hitler did later—that "the Germans are dolichocephalites par excellence, the only heirs of the old Aryans; while the other peoples, especially the Latins, only represent bastardized races." Anticipating "Mein Kampf," Hartrott boldly asserts the incontestable German superiority over all other peoples: "The Germans, whose souls are authoritarian, place order and power above everything else. Predestined by nature to command the other peoples, they possess all the virtues which distinguish the born leader. No people which is not entirely Germanic, will ever be capable of aspiring to a great future."

Again, Hitler's academic prototype does not worry about giving proofs for this self-bestowed superiority of the German race but hastens to draw the conclusions from his proud presumptions. "The Germans have from God the right to world domination. Germany must finally take possession of all the countries in which German blood exists or which have been civilized by our ancestors." And his list includes, not only Belgium and Holland, but also France under the pretext that it had once been conquered by the Franks, a German tribe; it includes Italy, too, because the Lombards had once occupied part of it, and Spain and Portugal for the reason that they had ostensibly received their best blood from Teutonic tribes. But these Hartrott-Hitler's claims are far from being satisfied with such a morsel as Western Europe. Likewise South America, being largely populated by Spaniards and Portuguese, falls in their opinion logically into the sphere of German domination; and it goes without saying that North America as well is regarded as subject to Germanism as it owes its prosperity to the labor of German colonists.

The Hartrott of 1914 and the Hitler of a quarter of a century later agree not less completely on the means by which this supreme aim must be reached—by war. Professor Hartrott, a shade more candid than Hitler, explains: "We are not sentimental. We wage war because we are the first people of the world, in order to extend our activities over the whole planet. When Tangier and Toulon, Antwerp and Calais will be German, then we shall be willing to discuss German barbarism. In this moment we have the strength and are not in the humor to discuss it. Force is the best argument."

For such a ruthless use of force any kind of morals means only a hindrance, and on this point also the whole conception of nazi politics is already perfectly formulated by this charming professor. He lectures: "Morals may have a certain justification in the relation of individuals among themselves because they serve to make the individuals more docile and more disciplined. For a Government, however, they are a hindrance which brings no advantage whatsoever. The State does not need to concern itself with truth or lie; the only thing which is important is its advantage and the efficiency of the measures it takes. Why trouble about treaties and law? Germany has the strength and strength creates new laws. History does not ask an accounting from the victor."

In reading all these nazi theories, I often turned back to the title page of Blasco Ibáñez' book, because I wanted to be convinced again and again that the book had really been published in 1916 and not in 1940, by order of the *Reichskulturkammer*. But more surprising still is the prophetic actuality of Hartrott's Pan-Germanic dreams, when he talks about the methods of this so desirable war. "So far, war has been fought only by soldiers, but this one will also be waged by scientists and scholars. The university has no smaller part in it than the General Staff, and German science—the best in the world—has forever united itself to what the revolutionaries so disdainfully call militarism. Only force, this queen of the world, creates law, and by war we will enforce our civilization on everybody. Our army represents our culture."

Also about the method by which this *Kultur* is to be spread, Hartrott informs us with shocking sincerity, and Blasco Ibáñez makes this insignificant professor the first herald of the *Blitzkrieg*. "In the opinion of the most efficient generals terror is the only means to quick success because it bewilders the intelligence of the enemy, paralyzes his activity, and breaks his resistance. The harder, the more cruel the war, the shorter it will be. Germany, for this reason, will have to be very, very cruel in order to prevent the struggle from being prolonged. But one should not believe, therefore, that the Germans are vicious. On the contrary, their apparent cruelty is nothing but kindness, for the vanquished opponent will surrender more quickly, and the world thus suffer less."

One of the participants in this conversation, perplexed by Hartrott's ominous prophesies which have now become such literal and cruel realities, ventures the modest question as to what would become of freedom if only force ruled the world. In his answer Hartrott anticipates Goebbels' assertions that the National Socialist press is the freest in the world. "We have all the freedom which a great people needs: economical and intellectual freedom. Only the decadent and ungovernable peoples and inferior races, seduced by the ideas of equality and democracy, worry about political freedom. . . . Freedom must be replaced by organization as soon as the German genius takes command. Each people must be organized in such a manner that the individual gives the maximum to the community. All the individuals must be regimented for all social functions. They have only to be obedient like machines to a higher leadership and to produce the greatest possible quantity under the supervision of the leaders. This alone creates the perfect State."

One's eyes are opened by this book. All the conceptions which Hitler today seeks to impose upon the whole world are enunciated by this imaginary—and yet so real—Hartrott. And with alarm we perceive that in the subconsciousness of the German people this dream of world domination has always been present. Hitler has not invented it. He only made real by his furor what Blasco Ibáñez saw in the postulates of the Hartrotts twenty-five years ago. What formerly had been only the diabolical dream of a few isolated individuals, has today become the aspiration of millions and the greatest danger for our world. Blasco Ibáñez' fiction has shown again that it is the poet who understands his time and the future better than the professors of politics.

Two Trends in Public Opinion

ROUND TABLE No. 12

IN the minds of the readers as well as the Editors of FREE WORLD the Round Table discussions have served two functions: they have presented significant facts from persons able to speak authoritatively for countries, organizations, and movements; and they have also indicated, from time to time, the views and reactions of the public to the rapidly changing events of our day. In this issue the Round Table treats changing public opinion concerning two of the most significant developments in the economic and political field, namely, the co-operative movement and the concept of nationalism. Both are considered from the point of view of their contribution to international relations and the evolution of a world organization.

Under the chairmanship of Louis Dolivet, the following participated in the discussion: Raoul Aglion, Counselor to the Free French Delegation and formerly Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France; Hugo Fernández Artucio, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Montevideo and Director of the Latin American Bureau of the Free World Association; the Reverend Howard L. Brooks, author of "Prisoners of Hope," and Executive Secretary of the American Free World Association; Shih-Chi Hu, General Secretary of the Co-operative League of China and Inspector-General of the Central Co-operative Administration of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Chungking, China; George Kagan, Polish journalist, Associate Editor of* Poland Fights; *Anup Singh, Editor of* India Today, *and Director of the India Research Bureau; Johan J. Smertenko, author and publicist, member of the International Editorial Board of FREE WORLD; Wousaofong, member of the International Editorial Board of FREE WORLD and former member of the Political Section of the League of Nations Secretariat.

LOUIS DOLIVET—The tremendous transformations which the world is now undergoing have had a marked effect on public opinion everywhere. It is impossible to treat in one Round Table all the gigantic aspects of this world-wide transformation, but I think that today we could profitably continue our previous Round Table discussions by examining particularly two trends in public opinion.

In the first place, we feel that it is important to consider the co-operative movement. Its significance at this time cannot be overestimated both as an economic consequence of the war and as an indication of future political developments. I suggest that we limit our discussion to countries other than the United States, since in the September issue of FREE WORLD we published a thorough consideration of the co-operative movement in America by Dr. James Peter Warbasse.

Another subject which demands immediate consideration is the question of nationalism. There has been a significant change in public opinion in the concept of nationalism. It will be profitable to consider whether the new interpretation will be an obstacle to world organization or whether it will enable us to integrate nationalist ideals into a world system.

Mr. Hu, will you start the ball rolling by defining for us the essential characteristics of the Chinese co-operative movement?

SHIH-CHI HU—The Chinese co-operative movement is the youngest co-operative in the world. In its modern form, it was introduced into China by Professor Hsueh, a disciple of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It has a history of only about twenty-three years. However, we did have some co-operative societies or organizations in the early days. As a matter of fact, about a thousand years ago we had a kind of credit society—but not of the Rochdale type. We also had, about a thousand years ago, community granaries, somewhat like the farmers' co-operative elevators here in this country and that movement was initiated by one of the

ESSENTIAL FINDINGS

1. **All over the world popular approval of the co-operative movement has increased immensely, and in some countries, like China, the effective organization of co-operatives has made immense progress during the war.**

2. **The co-operatives are everywhere important centers of democratic and educational activities.**

3. **It is suggested that a section be established within the United Nations Organization which will aid the world co-operative movement as an essential element in the establishment of permanent peace.**

4. **It was agreed that democracy was an imperative concomitant of national existence, and that without democracy national autonomy favors only the ruling clique. National independence, for example, for the Indians or Jews is important in order to permit those peoples to participate fully in the international organization on the basis of equality.**

5. **The education of public opinion and its organization into powerful progressive movements which would understand the interrelation of war and peace aims were regarded as vital to the winning of a real democratic peace.**

most prominent Confucian scholars, Tsuhsi. Vice-President Wallace acknowledged America's debt to China for the idea. In China today, we have more than 166 co-operative societies of all kinds; about 80 per cent of these societies are credit unions.

DOLIVET—How many and what types of co-operatives are organized in these societies?

HU—About 7,000 co-operatives are farmers' producing and marketing associations. And then we have about 4,500 industrial co-operatives of which about 1,800 are sponsored by the Chinese Industrial Co-operative. The rest of them are organized by the different county organizations all over the country. We now have about 2,200 consumers' co-operatives which are very effective in stabilizing war prices. In the winter of 1939, the Chinese Government set up the National Co-operative Wholesale Agency for the promotion of consumers co-operatives. This co-operative has already erected three plants—one for manufacturing clothing, one for producing preserved fruits, and the last one for making soap.

The credit unions are helping the farmers, and the farmers' co-operatives are simply wonderful. They have already contributed to an increased production of foodstuffs for feeding our armies.

JOHAN J. SMERTENKO—Mr. Hu, in addition to these facts about co-operatives, we should like to know the attitude of the Chinese people concerning the movement. How far is it imposed on the people; how much does it grow out of the people? What is the current of opinion?

HU—At the beginning, the people were not very receptive. However, as soon as a society is organized in a district, when the society has really done something good for the people, for the members, then the farmers in other parts of the country or in the neighborhood will come to the society and inquire about it, and then they organize new societies.

SMERTENKO—You would say that the co-operative movement is a popular movement?

HU—Oh, a very popular movement!

DOLIVET—Dr. Singh, are there any co-operative tendencies in India, and can they be considered as a new important trend in the evolution of India?

ANUP SINGH—The co-operative movement before the war was growing very strong in India, especially under the impetus of the Indian National Congress and its Board of Planning, of which Nehru was chairman. They had a very elaborate scheme of national planning, but under the circumstances they were unable to put it into effect. But there are some co-operatives run and sponsored by the British, by the Government. The feeling in India was that they were started more or less to counteract the influence of nationalism, which was growing very quickly.

Then we had a small movement of co-operatives sponsored by Gandhi himself, which placed, in my opinion, too much reliance upon small cotton industries. Well, that also increased Gandhi's influence in the villages, because he was for the first time doing something concrete for them. The Indian Government, the British Government in India, had its own plan to help the villages. The main difficulty in India is that every time something like this is started it is immediately under suspicion, because India is ruled primarily for political ends. So instead of any co-ordination in these various activities sponsored by the Congress, sponsored by the British, and sponsored by Gandhi personally, matters always end in a conflict.

DOLIVET—Do you think that if there were more favorable conditions in India, the co-operative movement would emerge as an essential part of the economy, or are the Indians opposed to it?

SINGH—I think the Indians are very much inclined to accept the plan, particularly in the villages. I think that is the coming plan in India—large co-operatives. But as I indicated, it is the present political tension and difficulty that are hampering the whole progress; so everything is more or less clogged up. But that's the coming trend, as I see it—the co-operatives are more important than any other possible trend.

DOLIVET—Might we make a switch over to another continent now? Mr. Artucio, would you comment on the trend toward co-operatives in Latin America?

HUGO FERNÁNDEZ ARTUCIO—The developments in Latin America have been something like those in Europe, particularly in France. The movement is very strong in some countries, like Argentina and Mexico, and it is not by chance that in both countries the co-operative movement is linked very profoundly with the new ideas of social progress. In Argentina, for instance, the co-operative movement was established in the last century as another branch of the labor movement, completing the classical three branches of the labor movement—the party (that was the Socialists), the co-operatives and the unions. The co-operative idea in Argentina has been pushed on by this initial group. Now there is the new and very interesting development spreading throughout the country, and taking the form of agrarian co-operation.

In Mexico, the co-operative movement has also been the result of social revolutionary experience, and its principal aspect, the agrarian, is the most ripe fruit of the Mexican revolution. In other countries, the co-operatives have taken different forms, but always on European lines. For instance in my country, in Uruguay, where social legislation, as all of you know, is very far advanced, co-operation took the form, a long time ago, of a certain type of state socialism. And then you find, for instance, in several zones of activity of the country, in the farms, in the public works, and also in some industries, co-operation initiated by the state and organized by the state.

DOLIVET—Would you say that the co-operative movement depends to a certain extent on the general progress of democracy?

ARTUCIO—Absolutely.

DOLIVET—And if a new democratic system should be developed, you see a strong co-operative tendency in Latin America, too?

ARTUCIO—Yes.

DOLIVET—Will you confirm that for China, too, Mr. Hu, that it is definitely linked up with progressive democratic ideas.

HU—Oh, yes, the co-operative societies in China are definitely democratic organizations. The Government is only promoting the movement. As soon as the co-operatives are organized it keeps its hands off.

DOLIVET—Now I should like to ask our friends from Europe, where the co-operative movement has made great progress—England and France and the Scandinavian countries—what they think is the situation today? Mr. Aglion, what do you think about the co-operatives? The co-operatives in France were always strong democratic centers, were they not?

RAOUL AGLION—Particularly in the north of France.

DOLIVET—Do they continue now?

AGLION—I wish to point out first that I am speaking only in my own name and in no official capacity. Now I would take the same view as Mr. Artucio, and I am going to give you another argument. In countries where there is no longer democracy, the co-operatives make no progress. An example is France. In occupied France, of course, the co-operatives have been completely taken over by the Germans, and they are so strictly supervised that they can hardly function. In unoccupied France, they are under the supervision of the

regional prefects. They have made no progress; quite the contrary.

DOLIVET—Would you say that there are good prospects for the re-establishment of the co-operative movement in France in the future?

AGLION—When France will become free.

DOLIVET—Would you confirm this view for Poland, Mr. Kagan?

GEORGE KAGAN—I would like to say that, in general, I agree. But there are some special phenomena, especially in the Polish villages—I had recently some interesting reports about the development of the farmer co-operatives under German rule. That is very significant because, before the war, we had in Poland a strong co-operative movement in the cities, but in the farms, in the country, the movement was weak. Now, we have the same thing as in other occupied countries: the co-operative movements are supervised by the German authorities, and they are weaker in the cities, but in the villages, the Germans were obliged by the policy of confiscation and supervision of the land production to enforce and organize the co-operative movement. So now they use some of the leaders of Polish co-operatives from western Poland who were expelled from there to central Poland, and with the help of these people, they have established the farmers' co-operatives. They do not have enough Germans for this work. Therefore, the co-operatives continue to have a Polish organization; only at the head you have the German administration.

This co-operative movement, according to the information that we have, is a strong movement. It has economic monopoly in the country, because all the crops have to be given to the co-operatives, and the peasant receives some commodities only through the co-operatives. Many landowners were expropriated by the Germans, and now the role of the peasants is greater in the Polish villages, and co-operation, in this way, becomes the means of their organization. I think, of course, that in the future it is inevitable that this co-operative organization will be in conflict with the authorities, and further development, of course, is only possible after the removal of the German authority.

DOLIVET—Would you say that in countries like Poland and the other neighboring countries with strong agrarian populations there is a definite tendency toward co-operation after the war? Can we expect it to continue after victory?

KAGAN—Yes. It seems to me, that in Poland and in the other countries, there will be a more collective spirit, a spirit of co-operation.

DOLIVET—Would you say there is a trend toward collective economic system?

KAGAN—I was told—but this information is very difficult to check up—that in Jugoslavia there were some attempts to organize some kind of collective farms. However, that is possible. I have no such information for Poland where there is a strong tradition of individualism which would hinder such a development. But it seems to me that after the war, in all the countries of eastern and central Europe, we shall have a tendency toward some form of co-operation.

DOLIVET—Now, one last question about the co-operatives, to which I would like to ask our different friends here to reply: Is there some educational activity going on in the co-operatives, or are they simply limiting themselves to professional activities?

HU—Yes there is, in China.

ARTUCIO—This is probably one of the most interesting aspects or sides of the movement in Latin America. The co-operatives in Argentina, for example, have really been schools of citizenship, the same is true in Mexico. In Mexico, for instance, the redemption of the native Indian population is one of the main points in the co-operative program. Co-operation in the agrarian activities in Mexico goes parallel with activities on education, from the intellectual point of view, but also—and this is more important—from the point of view of health, and the collectivistic mind. These phenomena have been so extraordinary that it can be stated without any exaggeration that in those countries where the co-operative movement has deep roots, democracy is largely based on this fundamental movement.

In Argentina, for instance—and I beg you to pardon me because I insist so much on Argentina, but this is one of the most extraordinary examples that can be offered—the co-operative movement, linked with the democratic and labor movement, is actually the true Argentina, the Argentina that speaks for democracy against her own Government, because her own Government represents in Argentina a form of old colonial or semi-colonial power. This co-operative and socialist and democratic and labor movement is the very heart of the

new Argentina, which is genuinely democratic.

DOLIVET—Now, would you confirm this view for China, Mr. Hu?

HU—Yes, in China, I think co-operation without education is just business. We place special emphasis on co-operative education, and in the co-operative societies, there are study groups organized for the members of the co-operative societies, where once a week during the spring and summer, and then on winter days, on winter evenings especially, when the farmers are not so busy, they meet two or three times a week.

DOLIVET—How about literacy of the Chinese in the co-operatives? Are many of their members still illiterate?

HU—Oh, yes, they are, so it is very difficult to conduct discussions, but the educational program is making progress. Of course, I think most of the officers of the co-operative societies are literate, but the majority of the members are illiterate, so you cannot ask them to write too much. Therefore, they have to do it by just discussion, by spoken words. We are now training people who can use living words to function, so that the topic of discussion is always not dry.

DOLIVET—The co-operatives are trying to fight against illiteracy?

HU—Oh, yes, yes! The co-operative society, I should say, is not only an economic organization, but it is also an educational organization. We are educating the Chinese farmers, we are educating the Chinese people, through co-operation.

Shih-Chi Hu

And now, may I add just a few words? We believe that if we are going to make this war the end of war, if there is going to be no more war, we believe that now is the time to pave the way, to establish an international co-operative order, because we know very well that every nation fights for economic gain. That is the main cause of the war. If we want to have permanent peace, I think we must promote or establish an international co-operative organization. But how to establish such an international co-operative organization is the question. I think it can be done through international co-operative commerce. If all the national wholesale co-operative organizations all over the world know how to exchange commodities, then, you see, it is business for service, not business for profit. Then every nation will be able to satisfy its needs and all the needs of the nations will be very adequately met.

DOLIVET—Do you suggest this as an addition to the United Nations' program, the promotion of the international co-operative commerce as a means of promoting world co-operation in peace—because I cannot foresee a war among the co-operatives!

HU—Yes, I definitely think so.

DOLIVET—Would you agree for Europe, Mr. Aglion?

AGLION—Yes, I would.

HU—I think M. Charles Gide advocated this in France, and also Dr. J. P. Warbasse in this country.

SMERTENKO—It seems inevitable that as the cost of living in every country involved in the war rises, people will seek whatever means they can to cut down on that cost, and the co-operative movement will gain thereby because in the final analysis, that is the cheapest way in which people can obtain both commodities and services.

HU—Oh, yes, that is quite right.

II

DOLIVET—Now, we are going over from this extremely interesting conversation about the future of the co-operative movement to another aspect of international organization. I think that it is most important to know how

far public opinion in the different countries has changed its attitude from national isolationism, which, as a matter of fact, existed in all countries of the world, in favor of the idea of international organization. The nationalism of the nineteenth century being progressive, people did not realize that it tended to a certain extent, and as applied in official policies, to become an obstacle to international organization. That is the reason for the breakdown of collective security in world organization. I wonder if Mr. Brooks would tell us something about that? He travels a lot and he gets in touch with many people. Do you think that the feeling in the United States for international organization is becoming stronger than the isolationist tendency, Mr. Brooks?

HOWARD L. BROOKS—I think we have one significant illustration of this in the fact that in the State of Massachusetts, in the elections which we have just had, the people voted in a referendum "to request the President and Congress to call at the earliest possible moment a convention of representatives of all free people to frame a Federal constitution under which they may unite in a democratic world government." That referendum was overwhelmingly carried.

DOLIVET—Could you tell us the majority?

BROOKS—In a total vote of approximately 270,000, this resolution was passed by 3 to 1. About two-thirds of the voters who showed up at the polls marked ballots in this referendum, and an analysis showed that the votes in favor were just as heavy in the Republican as in the Democratic districts.

I think another interesting comment came from a man who has been working since June for the Treasury Department in connection with the sale of defense bonds and stamps and has addressed a great many workers' groups in the section of the country which we have thought of as predominantly isolationist. He insists that the people in this country are not isolationists any more—and I am speaking now of the workers in the industrial centers—neither are they apathetic or only ankle-deep in war, but he insists that they are more and more moving in the direction of a strong belief in international organization, in international government.

However, there seems to be a great deal of confusion because this concept has not been clearly enough expressed, and I think it is quite true that in spite of this vague desire

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for some kind of international organization, there is a feeling that it is utopian, or that somehow or other, we don't know exactly how we shall get it. I believe that one of our great problems in this matter is a problem of morale, a spiritual problem, if you please, expressing this thing in terms of faith, making quite clear to the common man that the real Utopians—as I think it was put in the recent book called "Democratic Manifesto"—are the people who think that just on a basis of good will, we can have world peace. The practical people are those who insist that in order to have peace and order, we must have law and the means of enforcing it.

ARTUCIO — Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question of Mr. Brooks?

DOLIVET—Please do.

ARTUCIO—The problem which you discussed is of the utmost importance for all the other peoples of the world, and it is not an extraneous fact that all of us are very much concerned and that we devote a great deal of our time to the study of this problem in this country. If I visualize the problem correctly—and I do not wish to embrace in a very schematic form all the rich aspects of life in this country, but I want to quote two important declarations and ask your opinion about them.

First, the Memorial Day speech of the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, and the speech delivered about the same time by the Director of the Board of Economic War-



H. Fernández Artucio

fare, Milo Perkins. Both those speeches expressed particularly one thought, which is that an international legal order and an international economic order should also be established. Is it correct to assume that in both speeches the United States reserves to herself a kind of leadership?

BROOKS—My feeling in regard to that, Professor Artucio, is that I wish the American leadership were a good deal stronger. I think that the American Government has a tremendous opportunity to take the initiative in urging upon the United Nations the creation of an official United Nations body which would begin to work with the co-operative problem and other problems connected with post-war reconstruction. The missionary spirit, to my mind, has not been anywhere near strong enough yet. I understand very well your concern. It might be that in a desire to have the kind of post-war organization we want, the American Government would try to impose upon the other United Nations governments some particular brand of international organization.

SMERTENKO—There is all the difference in the world between leading and directing. When we who are interested in the establishment of the United Nations Council ask that the American people and the American Government impress the other nations with the need for such a body, we really call for American leadership to stimulate and inspire the creation of a United Nations organization. We do not mean what a good many people want done, namely, that the American Government direct and impose upon others the kind of world order which some officials have decided to establish.

DOLIVET—If I understand you correctly, you wish that America would be so democratic and so progressive in international affairs that it automatically would have a sort of moral leadership among equals?

SMERTENKO—That's right.

SINGH—Mr. Dolivet, may I make this brief observation? It is a specific case that comes to mind almost every day. In talking about India in all the meetings that I have addressed, I end by urging mediation by the United Nations in the case of India to break the deadlock.

DOLIVET—As we do.

SINGH—Yes. And I think the reaction of the audiences is rather interesting. To put it very briefly, one answer they give is that this country, as an isolationist country, is finished. That is the overwhelming sentiment of any group of students, workers, or women's clubs.

One thing does puzzle them, because nobody knows the details as to what kind of United Nations organization is going to emerge; and some of them are rather timid. The other day, the chairman of a very prominent group said, "Well, we are in it, but we have had so little experience in international affairs. We have suddenly been sort of pushed into it."

They don't like to burn their hands; they are too sensitive. I asked him a specific question: "What is your objection to mediation?" He said, "Well, India is too complex. We don't know anything about India." I naturally said, "You don't have to know all about India before you mediate." One of them also said, "This might be taking the initiative, putting America in the forefront, a responsibility which we do not like to assume."

That, in essence, is a cross-section of American public opinion. They want world organization, but they are not sure about the details; they are afraid that they have been drawn into it too suddenly. They don't want to make any hasty commitments or take any steps from which they may have to withdraw. But the

concept is growing very quickly, and I personally find it almost every day.

DOLIVET—I think that this question really brings us to the problem of the evolution of public opinion. After all, this international organization of which we are dreaming is a new one with immense universal possibilities. The old conceptions of power politics, of isolationism, of non-distribution of raw materials all over the world, of an unscientific organization of world economics really poses the problem of knowing how far and in which continents are there strong constructive trends in public opinion, what countries harbor the idea of a constructive revolution—not that one of disorder which reactionaries are constantly depicting for us, but really one of a constructive nature. I should like to ask Dr. Wousaofong, who knows a great deal about revolutionary tendencies, how he would grade the various countries in this respect.

WOUSAOFONG—I think among the United Nations, China and Russia are the most revolutionary. The Chinese and the Russians are the two peoples of the United Nations who know most what they are fighting for. As far as the world order is concerned, the Chinese accepted in their last revolution the concepts of equality and co-operation between peoples, politically and economically.

DOLIVET—I shall challenge your statement because I think that in the fighting and in the occupied countries great masses of the public know very well what they are fighting for.

BROOKS—In America it has not been crystallized into a phrase or a slogan, such as we had in the last war, which catches the imagination of the American people and expresses our democratic sentiments, but it exists.

SMERTENKO—I shall go further than that. I believe that the proportion of the population which approves the great moral aims of the war and the highest aspirations for the peace is not lower in America than in China or Russia. What Dr. Wousaofong does not recognize is that in our country all elements are more articulate and therefore it seems as if the conservatives and reactionaries are as numerous as those who seek a better world order, whereas in China and Russia only the revolutionary aims can now find expression. But it seems to me very clear that in so far as the American people are concerned, where they are at all conscious of the implications of this war, they are conscious of its progressive implications.

WOUSAOFONG—But I do not believe that the Americans or the British as a whole know what they are fighting for, because if you analyze the articles and the books published in this country, you will certainly find that they do not agree as to one single ideology for which they are fighting. For instance, some of the professors or publishers in this country are still advocating fighting for Anglo-Saxon hegemony in the Pacific; others want to maintain a strong Japan in order to prevent the development of what they call a strong, dangerous China or Russia. The people know vaguely that they are fighting for a new world order, but what kind of new world order? Therefore, when you ask them what they are fighting for, they are unable to tell you.

DOLIVET—Mr. Wou, aren't there in China, too, or some of the other countries of Asia, some tendencies toward domination, opposed to the ideals of the progressives?

WOUSAOFONG—I don't think so, because philosophically, we have a national idealism. Since the revolution of the Kuomintang, China does not have to increase her territory, and politically, after the war, we shall have too much to do with national organization, so that

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we shall have neither time nor strength to conquer other countries.

DOLIVET—But that applies to others. The Americans can reply that they do not want any new conquests and the British can say the same thing, as well as the French and every other nation. The progressive elements in every country say that they do not want any expansion. I would like, before we continue this very interesting—

WOUSAOFONG—One more point: The conservative elements in England, as well as in America, certainly desire to maintain their colonies or strongholds in the Far East or elsewhere in the world.

DOLIVET — What is your opinion on this question, Mr. Aglion?

AGLION—There are two different things. There are the war aims and the peace aims. What are the war aims? Well, the war aim is to fight for our own preservation. We are fighting for living. And what are the peace aims? That is something different.

The peace aims are not just simply national ideals, even for the imperialistic people. Peace aims are a better way to establish definite peace. A peace may be built with federalist or internationalist ideals, or with strictly national ideals. Is it the internationalists or the imperialists who are right? You will remember that Rome, of course, ruled the world for centuries by ruthless force. But I think that all democratic people, all those who are fighting the war on our side, on the side of the Democracies, believe that there cannot be any peace aims without the consent of the people, without the will of everyone to live in peace, and without the definite impression of everyone that he is in safety. And I don't think that on the whole, when we have to examine the peace aims, we shall differ so much, because, after the war, we will have to reorganize the world on a democratic basis.

DOLIVET—Will you elaborate on this point?

AGLION—At that time, we shall have no more internal economies; we probably shall have no more imperialism. To take for example some country like France, which has been accused often, very wrongly, of being imperialistic, we may ask will France be imperial? I am not speaking of the military side because I think that is out of the picture. Economically, what will happen in France?

The Germans have confiscated French property in two ways: First, property has been seized by the German State; then, other property has been given to French collaborationists. It is obvious, of course, that after the war, the German State will have to give back what it took, and the collaborationists will also have to return all the goods that they have enjoyed until now. What is going to become of that property? That is not going to be given back to powerful private companies. It will probably be used in a co-operative form, or in the state economy, or in an open economy, but in such a way that there will no longer be powerful individuals or powerful companies. I think also that the age of economic imperialism has gone with this war.

Raoul Aglion

ARTUCIO—I wish to pay homage to the very distinctly French mind of Mr. Aglion in making this difference between two stages of the problem, or between two different problems. I think that, being very brilliant, he is very clever in making this distinction, and I think that this is just the basis upon which those who do not visualize, particularly in Great Britain and in this country, the problems of the post-war era, are establishing their bulwark. I wish to make clear that there is no personal implication—

DOLIVET—Of course, this is just a discussion.

ARTUCIO—But there is such a close connec-

tion between these problems that I would say they are the same problem. A war is a movement, and you cannot establish the ulterior motives of this movement without facing them at the very moment when you are fighting the war itself. In other words, the peace aims are problems that should be solved before the war is ended, and if they are not solved by us, they will be solved in fact by the reactionary economic forces.

In the United States, two trends of opinion concerning peace are apparent. The humanitarian ideals of Vice-President Wallace offer one solution to the problem of peace aims; the imperialistic conception of the "American century" expressed most sensationally by Mr. Luce but held by a certain segment of the nation presents another solution. The Wallace conception is a revolutionary one, from the moral point of view particularly. The Luce idea is also revolutionary, from the economic, political, and social point of view.

DOLIVET — Did you say counter-revolutionary?

ARTUCIO—No, I said revolutionary, because an "American century" would be revolutionary in history even if it has a counter-revolutionary content. Here I wish to ask at what point—and I address Mr. Brooks—

DOLIVET—No, pardon me. We have two challenging statements here, one by Dr. Wou and the other by Mr. Aglion. Before we let the two speak in answer and get at their adversaries, let's ask Dr. Singh what he thinks about this question.

SINGH—I would like to say that I agree with Dr. Wousaofong, with one or two qualifications. I agree with him when he says that there is more crystallization of public opinion in Russia and China. In America, just as we have been discussing, we have very conflicting tendencies, and we find the same thing in India. But I think the reason for that is not because there is any difference in fundamental thinking. It is the difference of conditions.

However, I agree with Dr. Wousaofong when he says that the Chinese and the Russians, and I will now add the Indians, have absolutely no desire to dominate anybody. Their problem is to organize their homes, their native life—and that will take a long time—before you can expect some tendencies to dominate. That really might depend on what kind of world is going to emerge. But nobody in India, to my knowledge, no authority, no political leader, would ever, even in a fit of absent-mindedness, think of expanding India and dominating the neighboring countries. The real danger after this war, I think, will come from highly industrial countries, like America, which may become more nationalistic and more imperialistic.

One more point about the British—and I don't want to make any derogatory remark about the British in general—but many in India are absolutely convinced that there is a small clique in Britain, in the Conservative Party, who feel somehow in the back of their minds that even after this war they are going to carry on in India. The recent statement by Mr. Amery in which he said, "We are not quitting India at anybody's order," does more damage to the United Nations than anything I can think of.

DOLIVET—Mr. Singh, would you say that if India were granted freedom now, India would go to war immediately against the Axis?

SINGH—I am perfectly convinced that the Indian Nationalist Party, which to my mind represents the politically articulate view on a national scale—if a provisional national government were to be set up, which simply means a coalition government—I am absolutely convinced that those people would put their whole weight into the war. Of course, the question

Anup Singh

has been raised, "How about Mr. Gandhi?" but that is a problem. He is an enigma. But he has been overruled on the issue of non-resistance and nonviolence by the Congress, and one of the most remarkable statements I ever came across was the letter in which he said, "I know there are elements in India in great majority who do not believe in my policy at all. I am not a fool to believe that I can convert the whole of India to nonviolence. I will do this, that if this kind of provisional government is set up, I will put no obstacle in its way."

The President of the Congress asked Mr. Gandhi a very frank question: "What will you do if this government is set up? Will you still carry on your propaganda to propagate the passive resistance, nonviolence policy?"

Mr. Gandhi said, "No; for the duration of the war, I will simply retire. I mean what I say. I will put no obstacle in the way, because I know that you people do not share my faith. I will make one contribution. Those who believe in my policy, I will call upon them to resort to non-co-operation."

This means that they would rather die on the spot than be driven by the Japanese to work for them, as the Europeans are doing for Hitler, and that, I think, will be a great contribution. If a political settlement is gained, then both these programs, the military as well as that of non-co-operation, will supplement each other. There will be no conflict. But at the present time, the situation is practically playing into the hands of the Japanese.

Just one more observation while we are at it: I think one of the greatest dangers that I fear, not today, but at the end of the war, is this bitterness between the Indians and the British. It is becoming so profound that even a man like Gandhi, who is very careful when he makes a statement, said that in his whole political career, he has never seen the anti-British feeling so widespread and so deep as it is today.

DOLIVET—What about the anti-Japanese feeling?

SINGH—The anti-Japanese feeling in India is the result of our pro-Chinese sympathies. The average Indian does not have a personal grudge against Japan. We are anti-Japanese and we started a boycott of Japanese goods as a protest against the bombing of China. The real danger is that if India is invaded (which is very likely), the Japanese are first going to enter the Province of Bengal, and that, incidentally, is the province which is more anti-British than the whole of India put together. The Bengali have been revolutionized in the sense of trying to overthrow the British long before Gandhi was heard of, and that is the province where Mr. Bohse has the largest following. If he is brought into Bengal by the Japanese, what is going to be the reaction of the average man, the man in the street, confronted with the Japanese and the Englishman? He will either be indifferent, neutral, by not helping the Japanese, or in many cases, as the Burmese did, he will actually help the Japanese out of sheer vengeance, to get even with the British.

DOLIVET—Mr. Singh, what tendencies are being developed as a result of this situation in India? We are really at this moment more interested in trends than in the facts behind them. Would you say that the people tend toward democracy and internationalism, or do you foresee the danger of reactionary attitudes, like aggressive nationalism?

SINGH—India has always fundamentally had the concept of humanity as an indivisible entity. By outlook we are international. The only difference between India and China is that we have in India a small but very powerful group, up to now backed by the British, the Indian princes and the landlords. I think they will fight the democratic tendency in India, and that is the coming struggle. If the United Nations and if the British, particularly, reverse their policy and begin to back the progressive tendencies, I think India will line up in an international order wholeheartedly, but if the conservative elements are encouraged, as they have been in the past, then we are creating a very serious domestic problem in India.

DOLIVET—Mr. Smertenko, would you make a statement about the tendencies and the nature of Jewish nationalism, bearing in mind the questions which I just put to Dr. Singh?

SMERTENKO—The Jews, like all people with an intrinsic and sustained tradition or a long and notable past, have what I may call an instinctive nationalism. This is not a political phenomenon at all. It is the desire of a people, as Mazzini once put it, "to elaborate and express their idea, to contribute their stone also to the pyramid of history." The Jews, like all expatriated people, instinctively associate this urge for self-expression with a yearn-

ing for their homeland as the locus of their activity. That is a sound instinct, for it is only on native soil that the national genius comes into fullest and finest flower.

Now more than ever, the Jewish people feel the need of that ancient land where the original pattern and rhythm of their life and character was created—just as the life and character of the French or the English or the Chinese was developed in their particular environments—and where they can exist normally, autonomously, and creatively. That existence at one time produced vital contributions to civilization; it may do so again.

Obviously, this type of nationalism is not imperialistic. It seeks no aggrandizement of territory; it seeks no military power; it seeks no domination of other peoples. It is an expression of the profound and immemorial determination of the Jewish people to be, even as all other people, a free and independent nation somewhere in the world. This ideal is inalienably associated with Palestine because in the 2,000 years of their exile the masses of the Jewish people have neither abandoned their hope nor surrendered their right to live in that land, because all the tangible and intangible forces which have molded Jewish character and engendered Jewish culture have their origin in that country.

There is a more immediate but, in my mind, a less important aspect of Jewish nationalism. Due to Hitler, due to the spread of anti-Semitism everywhere—even in the Democracies—the Jewish problem has become tremendously acute. The fact that Jews have been removed from all parts of Europe, that they have been either exterminated or pushed into what is now known as Eastern Poland; the fact that their places in the economy of European life have been vacated and that these places have already been filled from the available reservoir of labor—all this means that after the war is over, you will find a truly stateless people. These millions have to be reabsorbed into the world economy. Where will they find their place? If they were returned to the various countries from which they came, would the United Nations Administration insist that every journalist, physician, merchant, teacher, mechanic, clerk, and laborer, who has meanwhile taken their places, must give them up? Even if such a thing were possible, it would make the Jew's position unbearable in every community; it would automatically provoke an outburst of anti-Semitic feeling greater even than any which nazi-fascist propoganda aroused.

DOLIVET—Would you say that Jewish nationalism is democratic in character and not opposed to international tendencies?

SMERTENKO—Absolutely! Both democratic and international. From its very beginning, the Zionist movement has recognized that it depended not merely on one nation like Great Britain or the United States, but it depended on the good will of all nations. It wanted to be a part of the international order and expected the international order to assure its place in the family of nations.

SINGH—I just want to make one observation. The Jews can make a very distinct contribution, if their legitimate aspirations are met, by serving as a link, a liaison, between the East and the West. They have the tradition of the Orient. They have been imbibing a great deal of the Western scientific spirit. I think they can serve a very useful purpose. The most ticklish problem is to satisfy Jewish aspirations and at the same time allay the fears of the Moslem people, and I think the problem in the future is between the two groups. I know something about the Moslem feeling. They resent the idea. Whatever its merits may be, they feel that the Palestine situation has been played up for the advantage of the British, that the problem has never been judged on its own merits. I do hope that the younger Moslems and the Jews will be able to work out some kind of compromise so that the tension between the two will be eased.

KAGAN—Mr. Smertenko has presented here a question that has very serious and very important ramifications not only concerning the Jews but concerning all of Europe. In fact, we can no longer say that the war aim for Europe is the survival of nations because today we have a completely new situation. It is impossible to imagine that at the end of this war we shall have a restoration of the conditions of 1939. Perhaps in some recently occupied country it would be possible to restore the situation that existed before. But in countries like Czechoslovakia and Austria and Poland, the Nazis have established a completely new way of life. To restore the old conditions would bring about a civil war because there are new people with new vested interests and with new occupations which they will not easily surrender.

DOLIVET—Mr. Aglion gave us a solution. He suggested that we follow the example of General de Gaulle and cancel all of the legislation passed since the fall of France.

KAGAN—It may be possible to cancel legislation, but you cannot cancel the years that have passed and the conditions that have been developed in that period. If you look over the literature of underground Europe and I have had many an opportunity to do so—you will unfortunately see evidence of a conservative tendency and a lack of constructive ideas. The dominant idea is restoration of the national political state as it was before 1939. It is easy to understand the reason for this, which is a combination of great hatred for the Germans and equally great attachment to national tradition.

DOLIVET — Isn't the essential reason that slaves do not have the time or the opportunity to think?

KAGAN—Yes, and there is another reason. They do not have the horizon. Each small underground group in one city or one region, whose connections with other people are so difficult, which has to fight all the time against the German propaganda, simply cannot take a large view of the entire struggle. Therefore, I think that a very important role of this special international group is to help the people in Europe in the work of organization.

DOLIVET—Mr. Aglion, your statement indicating that it was necessary to separate war aims from peace aims was challenged by many participants in this Round Table.

AGLION—I think the best proof of it is what was just said—that many people who came from France are mainly concerned about the war against the invaders. It is natural since they are closer to the war than we are and nearer the danger. What they face first of all is the fight for survival, and that feeling is so strong that it is their main preoccupation. They seem to be nationalists, but that is only during the war. However, some study groups in France are making post-war plans. I know some of their plans. They are generally in favor of a democratic organization of the whole European continent.

DOLIVET—The fact remains that the backbone of the movements of resistance throughout Europe is composed of the working class and Left elements. Their views are certainly democratic and international.

AGLION—Once the war is over, of course, we can overcome these nationalistic tendencies, and the main objective will be to conserve permanent peace. They will have to be internationally-minded, and they will come automatically to internationalism.

BROOKS—I don't agree with Mr. Aglion that it will be automatic after the war. I think there will be a very bitter fight as to whether or not they will be democratic. I should like to come back now to a point that Mr. Artucio raised some time ago, and that is, the expression of American opinion. It seems to me that one of the most important things which liberal groups in this country can do now is to crystallize, to get some expression of the point of view of American liberals in regard to international organization. I say this because within the last week or ten days I have spoken with people from Turkey, I have heard news from England and France and from other countries, to the effect that these other countries, these other people, want to know what the Americans feel and what they think.

DOLIVET—That is correct.

BROOKS—It seems to be of the greatest importance for the morale of peoples all over the world just how Americans feel about international organization, and I think one of the immediate tasks is somehow to get an expression from the American people that they do believe in a free world, that they as a people believe that their Government ought to participate fully in international organization. I think we could even go so far as to urge our people to say they are in favor of the creation now of an executive council of the United Nations, such as the one mentioned by T. V. Soong some weeks ago, such as Walter Nash has mentioned more recently, such as is implied in the speeches of President Roosevelt, Vice - President Wallace, Under - Secretary Welles, and other leaders of the Administration. I think that could have a tremendous moral effect on people all over the world, and it would, I think, Mr. Artucio, convince you that the American people are not sold on the idea of the American century as expressed in the writing of Mr. Luce, which, incidentally, was used very skillfully by the Vichy-controlled newspapers in the summer of 1941. I saw them in the Marseilles papers—editorial comments on this American century, indicating that the great leaders in America were thinking about a new American imperialism.

ARTUCIO—I agree that vision is on the side that Mr. Brooks pointed out.

BROOKS—I would add that there are many conflicting points of view on this matter in the United States, and no statistics unless, perhaps, we can take the Gallup Poll, and I think I am correct in saying that the Gallup Poll indications are that the American people tend not toward the American century of Mr. Luce, but toward a democratic world organization.

DOLIVET—Mr. Wou, didn't the conversation or discussion convince you that there are other strong revolutionary aims in the other countries, too?

WOUSAOFONG—Whether we are going to lose or to win the peace after the war depends entirely upon what kind of political elements, especially in the United States or in Great Britain, will be in power—whether progressive elements such as President Roosevelt, Mr. Wallace and the leaders of the British Labor party or conservatives like Professor N. J. Spykman, like Richard B. Bennett, former Prime Minister of Canada, who said a few days ago that the British are very proud to be fighting for the maintenance of the British Empire.

That is why a movement such as Free World is most important at this time, for it is trying to rally the liberal elements of all the various countries of the five continents, in order to prepare the foundation of future peace. As far as the doctrine of the Free World movement is concerned, we are in favor of a new world order, based upon international political and economic democracy in world organization.

III

ARTUCIO—Mr. Chairman, I think the last word upon nationalism has not been said. I do not wish to pronounce the last word but I wish to add another one.

SMERTENKO—It is necessary to indicate the difference between nationalism and imperialism, for one thing.

ARTUCIO—Precisely. In Europe, nationalism corresponded primarily to the process of unity of the state; in the colonial countries, especially in Latin America, nationalism appears as a reaction to imperialism. The struggle for independence in Latin America was not a fight for nationalism but one in which

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the leaders were fighting for the independence of countries other than their own. Thus the independence of Chile, and Peru was established by the expedition of an Argentinian, General San Martin, and the independence of all the Northern Pacific and Carribean countries of South America was established through the efforts of the Venezuelan, Bolivar. Also, when the hero of independence in my country expressed his aims, he spoke for all the countries in Latin America; and when he sent deputies to the first convention of the provinces of the Rio de la Plata, he led, not the *Banda Oriental* (later the Republic of Uruguay) but some other Argentinian provinces against the unitarian point of view of Buenos Aires. All this was brilliantly expressed in Bolivar's project for a Pan-American amphictyony.

DOLIVET — What would you, as a South American, recommend to the European?

ARTUCIO—The only ideas worth fighting for in the struggle against imperialist nationalism are ideas of unions, of supranational unions.

KAGAN—States?

ARTUCIO—I said supranational unions. The Briand idea of a European union is deeply

rooted in European mentality; similarly, the anti-imperialists in Latin America are becoming, not partisans of nationalism, but of a Latin American unionism. At this moment, in Latin America, you can find the very astonishing phenomenon that ideas of an organic union of the type of the Soviet Union are appearing throughout South America, as a complete overpassing of nationalism and anti-imperialism.

KAGAN—I would like here to challenge Mr. Artucio's observation concerning Europe.

CHAIRMAN DOLIVET—You are not the only one!

KAGAN—Because I do not see here the difference between a group of South American nationalists and Europeans.

DOLIVET—It is important at this stage to examine whether an international organization can intervene to protect the rights of nations, and more especially, human rights against aggressive nationalism.

AGLION—We must recognize a very great danger in your point of view. I shall ask our Chinese friends here, for instance, if some foreign power were to interfere in China because some Chinese are persecuted, what would be their reaction?

DOLIVET—The foreign power, if it is the United Nations, should have some fundamental rules and principles which are guaranteed by an international congress.

AGLION—That is right. I must agree with you, because personally I think, for Europe, you cannot establish national states. You have to establish some common European organization, and that has to be the state for Europeans. Cultural autonomy can exist. National life can develop, not in the form of political states, however, and after, you can have some organization of united states.

DOLIVET—Let me ask one question here, Mr. Kagan. Don't you think that if, for example, the League of Nations would have been differently constituted, and if the Council of the League of Nations would have intervened to abolish the infamous concentration camp at Bereza Kartuska—the camp in which the democratic Polish leaders were tortured—don't you think it would have helped Polish democracy and the people of Poland?

AGLION—Well, I tell you, I am here in this country and I am observing the functioning of a federal Constitution, and I can see how difficult it is for the Federal Government here to abolish some forms of persecution in the states.

DOLIVET—But they don't want to.

AGLION—No, I agree with you, that it is necessary to have some force, but they have to be very careful, and especially to be careful against some attempts to establish democracy in some countries as pretexts, and in reality to establish there a foreign-dominated exploitation. Therefore, I think that here it is a question of measure; here it is a question of understanding; here it is a question of collaboration with the national forces. But if you make a very rigid constitution and try very rigidly to interfere, you can also strengthen the nationalistic feelings, and in this way, you will cause a collapse of the entire structure of united Europe.

SMERTENKO—Mr. Chairman, I believe that Dr. Artucio stated a profound and universal rule when he said that nationalism is a reaction. He put it as a reaction against imperialism. I should broaden it and say that nationalism is a reaction against oppression. The actual experience, for example, of the Jews—to come back to them for the moment—is precisely that. If there had been no oppression of the Jews for two thousand years, I am certain that by now the Jews of Europe would have been completely assimilated in their respective countries.

I think we must consider two things here that are of importance: in the first place, the question of sovereignty, national sovereignty. The very connotation of the words gives us a clew to the results of the political action Mr. Dolivet has in mind. To surrender national sovereignty literally means to give up the rights of authority and direction. Thus, as a matter of fact, the people themselves do not surrender anything when they relinquish to international rule a certain amount of national sovereignty. The only ones who lose any rights or privileges through such action are their rulers, for some of the powers which the latter exercise locally are passed on to the international organization. In our political progress from petty states and principalities to larger organizations the people, themselves, have always profited by the surrender of sovereign rights.

Secondly, there is the question of representation. If the international organization established after this war is truly democratic and representative of all the peoples of the world, it will win quickly the loyalty of mankind.

The exercise of its authority and powers will not be resented. But if two, or three, or even half a dozen nations dominate the international organization, as the League of Nations was dominated, then the rest of the world will again regard and resent this organization as foreign, imperialist, and detrimental to their national and individual interests.

HU—It seems to me that nationalism is not at all detrimental to the future international order, because I don't think nationalism is a reaction to oppression. I should say that nationalism is an outgrowth of the political state. It is closely interlocked with the national economy. If the national economy can be improved by an international economic system, then I think that all the nationalisms will die out.

DOLIVET—I think nationalism is very detrimental, and, of course, we have to face reality.

HU — Oh, yes, it is detrimental in the present situation but I don't think it is so detrimental if you can face the problem. If you tackle the problem, nationalism can be removed.

DOLIVET—Yes, if you can transform it, then I would agree entirely on the maintenance of it. Here is just the problem. If we speak about the progressive revolutionary tendencies in the world, and we maintain nationalism, then we deny entirely what we say. I agree with the necessity for an international co-operative economic system, but that is not sufficient.

WOUSAOFONG — It is unfortunate that we use this word, nationalism, and I think the word, independence, would be much better, or other words.

DOLIVET—What do you do for the poor, Mr. Wou? What does international democracy mean to the poor people? What about the poor people who do not have enough to eat? What does national independence mean to them? You gave us a corrected expression, independence, instead of nationalism. What does it mean to them if they are hungry and suffering?

SMERTENKO—Mr. Chairman, I think that throughout this discussion we have been considering nationalism in a narrow political and economic sense. After all, nationalism represents a normal social development.—I mean, nobody came and said to the people, "Now, you will be nationalistic."—Nationalism, like religion, expresses a certain desire on the part of the people, and that desire is not merely in a political and economic field, but it is in a cultural field, too. The pyramids of Egypt are an expression of nationalism.

DOLIVET — Not for the slaves who built them.

ARTUCIO — May I say, using your comparison, that nationalism is an opiate for the people?

SMERTENKO—I am speaking of the human instincts rather than of the institutions which have exploited these instincts. The Greek column and arch are different from the Roman column and arch; Chinese and Indian pagodas differ no less from each other; the music of Italy, whether folksongs or the work of composers, is unlike the music of Germany or of any other country; even a locomotive, which has the same function everywhere in the world, has everywhere an appearance characteristic of the country which produced it. All these are expressions of the human spirit in a very particular form, the national form. So are customs and mannerisms, institutions and laws, heroes and holidays. They are the outgrowth of people and land and climate. Nationalism is the natural desire on the part of a particular people to possess and perpetuate them, to create a harmonious pattern or rhythm of life.

DOLIVET—I put the challenge to the nationalist conception as being entirely insufficient, and that the content which has to be given it is a content of economic conditions that create the real possibility of expressing its freedom, without which nationalism remains a pure phrase.

WOUSAOFONG—Yes, that is all right.

HU—I agree with you.

KAGAN—I do not agree with you. You have got to have some political framework for this co-operation or world confederation when the war is over. Now, maybe it is too radical for me to say so, but I am an orthodox co-operator, and I am still thinking this way. After the war is over, the political power of the state should be eliminated to a certain extent. The sole power of a state should be confined to the activities which are, well—

SMERTENKO—Administrative.

KAGAN—Which have something to do with administration of public affairs, in relation to the general welfare. All the economic functions, all the economic activities, should go back to the people themselves. That is why the rules of conduct should be regulated, through this international organization, whatever you call it; and then to strengthen this

new world organization, we must inject as many economic elements as possible. All the political questions are economic questions, fundamentally. You can solve any political question only if you solve the basic economic question.

DOLIVET—Yes, that is what we have been doing, for the past century and a half.

KAGAN — In general I agree very much with you. But I think that you do not see one important factor—that the people who are very poor and the people who are underprivileged are often more nationalistic than the upper classes.

ARTUCIO—In the last analysis democracy is only compatible with a complete international order, with a complete international democracy. You cannot confine democracy to the frontiers of one state. You should have international democracy as a partner of national democracy, if you wish to establish a permanent order of peace.

DOLIVET—Gentlemen, I would like to make the following few short conclusions:

We all agree that the strong co-operative tendencies are a new trend in the economic and political organization of different countries; that these co-operative movements are extremely interesting not only because of their economic aspect, but also because of their educational aspect and of their international aspect. These economic organizations in all countries, we definitely agree, stand for international co-operation, and therefore, they could be an essential basis of the coming world order. It was suggested in this Round Table that the encouragement of international co-operative organizations should be a part of the program of the United Nations.

Concerning the problem of democracy, the Round Table agreed that it is an essential part of national independence and of international organization; that the process of democracy was interrupted by fascist and national aggression, domination, and conquest, which thus delayed the processes of international organization; that national independence, for example, in India, or the existence of some state for the Jews, for example, is necessary in order to permit these peoples to participate fully in the international organization on the basis of full equality. The proponents of these conceptions think that there is no danger that they will tend to develop into the old type of vicious, aggressive nationalist - imperialism.

But there was a strong difference on two points of view in this round table: one, concerning a statement made that only China and Russia have clear war and peace aims. The other members of the round table felt that it was not quite correct, and that there were equally strong and clear tendencies all over the world; but in many countries, less united than the two mentioned countries, other views were allowed freer expression. There was general agreement that the development of strong international tendencies and the education of public opinion in all countries toward those aims is a vital problem for the victorious prosecution of the war.

The second difference arose on the question of war and peace aims. Some members of the round table thought that it was essential to have unity on war aims only in order to have nations completely united for the victorious prosecution of the war. They thought that survival is the essential and natural reaction of peoples occupied by another power or threatened by conquest; that on this point all nations can be united, and that the peace aims have to come later. But a strong majority of the round table believed that it is precisely in the interest of the victorious prosecution of the war to have the peace aims immediately outlined; that thus they would be part of the war effort, strengthening it by winning the enthusiastic co-operation of many progressive elements in different countries.

Generally, it was felt that there is still much uncertainty in this field, particularly in connection with the problem of nationalism. While all the members of the round table have repudiated the extremist and imperialist forms of nationalism, they were divided on the opinion of how far nationalism is compatible with political democracy, with international organization, and with economic democracy.

Some members of the round table consider nationalism as the fundamental principle, as a point of departure for an international organization, while other members think it is possible, in given historical periods, to pass by this period of nationalism and reach directly an internationally, democratically organized society. All members of the round table agreed on the general trend of public opinion toward a revised conception of nationalism, revised in the sense of more democracy, more economic justice, and more international order.

What
JAPANESE SCHOOL CHILDREN *learn*

BY
OTTO ZOFF

FOUR years ago, the Japanese press reported a sensational incident. A certain young man had been rejected for military service on account of the poor state of his health. During the sea journey back home he had leaped overboard and drowned. He had left behind a note in which he requested that his life insurance be turned over to the Government. The military operations in China, he said, could use even the smallest sum of money. This was the only way in which he could sacrifice himself for his country. The papers printed the picture of the young hero. He was a boy, at best seventeen years old. His conduct was fervently lauded as a shining example.

September 18, 1931, is an important date in the history of Japan and of the world. On that day a track section of the South Manchuria Railway, controlled by Japan, was blown up. The Japanese Army used this "Mukden Incident" as an excuse for occupying the whole of Manchuria.

But the year of 1931 is memorable in other respects and the "Mukden Incident" may be considered the climax and perhaps the result of some of these events. That year, silk exports to the United States, Japan's chief customer, had fallen by one half as a result of the depression. At the same time, the Chinese boycott had cut exports to that country first 33, then 65, finally 80 per cent. Finally, the 1931 rice crop was the lowest in many years. In some districts, the authorities had to organize medical aid centers to treat people suffering from starvation.

Here one of the small but significant incidents that affect the destiny of nations enters into history. The Tokyo correspondent of the *North China Daily News,* a paper not unfriendly to Japan, undertook an automobile tour through certain parts of the country. He described conditions and set down the results of many interviews. Among them was the opinion of a community nurse who stated:

"The people are starving, have been starving for quite a long time, and they have now grown so apathetic that they do not care what happens. All their ambition is gone, and worst of all, there is no money with which they can be assisted to regain at least their self-respect. You must know there are 200,000 school children in Japan who get no food in their homes and about 3,000 public schools owe their teachers more than five million yen in back pay."

This statement was seized upon by General Sadao Araki, War Minister at that time, to serve his own purposes. At that time, General Araki was considered to be the most powerful man in the country. As a simple, unostentatious, and unselfish soldier who had risen from the lowest ranks of the people, he was the idol of the army. According to the most authentic reports, General Araki appeared at the Ministry of Finance accompanied by his closest friend, General Mazaki, the outstanding authority on questions of military education. He demanded the appropriation of a sum of money sufficient to feed these 200,000 children in school. The Minister of Finance is said to have countered with the statement that everybody was starving and that, while there was sufficient money to provide for the children in question, there was no reason to make an exception in their case. He showed General Araki some of the official reports made by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. One of these read as follows:

> Many villages are in a state of destitution below what we have always considered to be extreme poverty. Conditions are such that thefts of rice, sugar, salt, soybean

> sauce, and all kinds of food are no longer the exception but the rule. . . . Between 80 and 90 per cent of the revenue in the Prefecture of Niigata comes from rice-growing. Now, however, nobody has any rice except a few big farmers. The peasants, having nothing left to sell, are selling their daughters. . . . Hundreds and hundreds of families have sold their daughters, ten and twelve years old, to proprietors of public houses.

The generals glanced through these reports and departed. A few days later they delivered a kind of ultimatum to the Ministers of Finance and Education demanding that reforms be introduced as quickly as possible and indicating that, if this was not done, the army would assume supervision of the educational system. This ultimatum was followed within a few weeks by an order in which all the physical education instructors were replaced by army officers. This was the first step in gaining control of Japanese education by the military clique.

This order was recognized as a *coup d'état,* and the liberal opposition raged against it in vain. There were protest strikes on the part of the teachers, widely supported by students. In the Christian schools, Catholic and Protestant missionaries preached against the approaching menace of fascism. Both pupils and teachers were arrested.

The generals disregarded all opposition. Mazaki was appointed Inspector General of Education and he in turn appointed the new physical education officers as guardians of school morale. They really became censors of the teachers and pupils. One of their first acts was to do away with the school readers published during the Taishô administration (1912-1925), which laid special emphasis on the ideals of peace, and to replace them by the so-called Shôwa textbooks, which were rampantly chauvinistic and militaristic.

A crude appeal to militant patriotism characterizes both the texts and illustrations of these volumes. The frontispiece, of course, has the national flag, while page one is a picture of marching soldiers. The next page again shows the banner of war streaming from a high flagpole, and on the opposite page to that is an illustration of children saluting the rising sun. The following pages are filled with pictures of bombs and warships.

It is impossible to communicate to those who are unfamiliar with the old school texts how complete is the change in what Japanese school children learn since the Ministry of War took control of education. In the readers of the Taishô epoch there was an almost naïve attempt to inculcate the sentiments of peace and virtue in the minds of the children. The pages of these readers abound in verses to the flowering cherry trees, apostrophes to mother love, and explanations of the blessings of peace. In the new books, all but a few lines of filial sentiment are expunged. Instead, there are biographies of ancient Japanese war heroes; a dialogue between the father and son in which the latter is informed that the possession of Manchuria is not an international issue, but a question of life and death for the people of Japan, an alternative between starvation and a full dinner pail; a soldier's description of the beauties of Siberia and his explanation of why that vast country belongs to the Island Empire rather than to the mainland.

In the morality readers (*shushinshô*), which constitute the collateral reading in the intermediate schools, the tone of friendly and conciliatory international relationships is maintained. The text there teaches the ancient virtues of patriotism, filial piety, and courtesy. But there is a constant insistence on the duty of the Japanese subjects to the emperor. Always, the moral of the essay or story is that one must die for the emperor. The emperor is not only the chief of Japan, he is the head of the world. The emperor is ruler by virtue of his divine descent in unbroken succession from the grandson of the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu

O Mikami. No other national chief is equal to the emperor. All others are mortal; he alone is immortal. Is there any greater happiness or pleasure given to a soldier than to die for his god?

II

SUCH, then, was the result of the War Ministry's control over education which went into effect in 1932. The changes in the curriculum became more and more extreme and more oriented to the military program. By 1937, the entire Japanese school system was subordinated to a course called "War Instruction." This began in the first year of the intermediate schools where the students are about ten years old. Whether mathematics, history, or geography, the textbooks and the curricula were changed to give the maximum amount of emphasis to war-mindedness and military training.

Here is a mathematics problem given to thirteen-year-olds in the intermediate school of Nagoya in 1939: An airplane has a speed of 260 miles per hour and can carry a load of 1,550 pounds in addition to the crew. An incendiary bomb weighs 3 pounds. It takes 15 incendiary bombs to cause a fire. Question 1: Calculate the distance between Formosa and Hawaii on the map. Question 2: In what time can that distance be covered by the plane? Question 3: How many fires can be started in Hawaii by 25 planes?

Such simple arithmetical problems led in the last two years of the intermediate school to the elements of ballistics. The pupils learn to chart the flight-path of a released bomb, given the wind velocity of the speed of the plane. They receive instruction in other phases of military tactics.

In 1937, a student in the most important intermediate school of Kobe made a stenographic transcript of the final oral examination in history that was given to his class. This report is not only significant for what it shows of the educational system, but it affords a revealing insight into the confusion which the doctrines of fascism created in the Far East.

Question:—After what example are the United States of Asia conceived?

Answer:—After the ideas of the late Aristide Briand for a United States of Europe.

Q.—What people has the United States of Asia taken for its political model?

A.—The Japanese people.

Q.—Why do the Japanese people aspire to a United States of Asia?

A.—Because every country wishes to have more than it has, which leads to ever new wars.

Q.—Is it true that the nations declare that they only desire equality, but actually each nation wishes to get the better of the others?

A.—Quite true. You see this by the example of Italy.

Q.—Italy declares that its appetite is now satisfied with the annexation of Ethiopia. But will it really be satisfied?

A.—It will not. It is already putting forward claims to our ocean.

Q.—Italy! What has Italy to do with our ocean?

A. (Several voices):—Nothing! Nothing!

Q.—The question arises as to the nature of the United States of Asia, a vast continent with so many different peoples! Who of you can tell me something about this?

A.—There must be a common religion to achieve unity. That religion must be Japan.

Q.—Why Japan, of all nations?

A.—No people have ever breathed on earth who are intrinsically more religious-minded.

Here, similarly, is the composition-subject given to the students in a Tokyo commercial school the day after a morale teacher had delivered a lecture. This was the outline given to the students on the subject of the United States: "America is the richest country in the world. There are plenty of gold mines in America. Americans are the most wonderful dancers in the world. It is a country where there are lots of gangs and it is dangerous to live there."

III

SO much for the theoretical aspect of instruction. But there is a practical aspect too. The civilian teachers have nothing to do with that. It is the exclusive province of the officers, the morale teachers. They take up two school hours each week and sometimes, on holidays, leisure time as well. The subject is called "Military Exercises." These courses are compulsory for children from the age of twelve upward. In the lower grades, they consist of simple drills, turns, salutes, marching, and singing. In the higher grades, these exercises are repeated—but with arms. There is also small-arms practice, markmanship and gun-loading, guard duty, practice with small-scale machine guns, field exercises with map reading, use of terrain, estimation of distances, crossing of trenches, hoisting of flags. The marches are fatiguing—ten miles on the average. Careful study has developed a method by which children learn at an early age how to overcome pain and fatigue. In certain schools, there are elementary courses in bridge-building.

A new factor affected the educational situation in the years that followed. To the Western mind, there would seem to be no connection between patriotism and the morbidity rate resulting from malnutrition. But in Japan, the first was a means of meeting the emergency created by the second. In 1933, 82,000 persons had died of tuberculosis in Japan; in 1937, that figure had risen to 120,000. A similar condition existed in all the endemic and epidemic diseases. The situation forced the Government to take action and it established a Ministry of Welfare which held a number of academic conferences and arrived at the conclusion that the life span in Japan is some ten years shorter than in other countries because of the fact that children of school age are underfed. Since the Ministry of Welfare could do nothing about increasing the rations distributed among these school children, it had recourse to the ancient means of meeting Japanese problems. It exploited the patriotism of the people to distract them from their troubles.

One of the most common forms of patriotic expression in Japan is the pilgrimage to the national shrines and temples. There are 50,000 principal and an additional 60,000 minor shrines, each of which is dedicated to the memory of a national hero. In the past, the pilgrimages to these temples were a custom, an occasion of self-expression on the part of the pilgrim—never a compulsion. Two pilgrimages a year constituted a record! Today, every school child is required to undertake at least six such pilgrimages, now known as cultural trips. Often, these are merely excursions on foot to the nearest temple, but sometimes they involve day or night trips by railway to distant shrines. Led by their teachers, boys and girls often walk many miles from the railway station to stand a few moments before one of these shrines or little temples, dedicated to some Japanese deity. Some of the students are still quite small, others already grown-up, but all march behind their teachers with the same sullen earnestness. Sometimes these youngsters are dressed in festive garments of ancient style with quaint head-dresses, their faces painted white in accordance with ancient custom.

The most frequented of these shrines is the Yasakuni Shrine near Tokyo. It is a fine large gabled structure in the shadow of age-old trees. Many steps lead up to the entrance. The names of dead heroes are inscribed in this shrine—more and more of them, 130,767 at the last count. Slowly the children wander up the steps to stand in prayer for a few minutes. Then they clap their hands, first three times loudly, then three times softly. Finally they fall to their knees.

When the devotions are concluded, the teacher leads them down the great cherry tree mall to the Military Museum on Kudan Hill. This museum is unmatched anywhere in the world. It is a museum of bruised and battered uniforms of the sons of Japan who have fallen in recent wars—a coat with a great jagged hole in it, through which a shell fragment once found a gallant young heart, the actual blood

congealed in a dark-brown stain all round; another coat with the sleeve torn off, hanging limp and ragged, also blood-stained; handkerchiefs, shirts, and vests drenched in blood. Over each souvenir is a photograph of the man, often a mere boy.

A large crowd of visitors passes through these four long halls every day. They look at these things without flinching. They are proud. Hither come young mothers of two- or three-year-old sons dressed in generals' uniforms with many medals and ribbons and long sabers.

The mothers stand in devotion. Each holds her child's hand firmly. And ever again they pronounce this stereotyped phrase to the little one: "Ah, if my greatest desire could be fulfilled. Then you too will die for the Emperor! It would be so beautiful. . . . Then, every day, my son, I will come here, to see your uniform and to be proud."

JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THAILAND

BY SANASEN

A YEAR has passed since Thailand was occupied by the Japanese. In this year the Thais have learned to their sorrow that a conqueror is cruel, whatever may be the color of his skin. Tyranny and oppression are arousing this once warlike people to the same sort of underground activities which characterize the countries of Europe. It is quite possible that when the forces of the United Nations assume the offensive and begin to press back the armies of Japan, they will find willing and able allies in those who, of all the peoples in Asia, were supposed to be most sympathetic to the Japanese.

The early collapse of Thailand in face of Japanese aggression is sometimes given as one of the contributing causes of the reverses suffered by the British in the Malay Peninsula. Subsequent events have, however, proved that the poorly-equipped little Thai Army could only have checked the superior Japanese forces for two or three days, and then only at the price of complete annihilation. The theory has also been advanced that the Bangkok Government's rapid capitulation had been carefully prearranged with the Japanese Government. The experience of the present war has taught us to look very closely before condemning a nation as a foe or welcoming it as a friend. It would, therefore, be well to weigh the evidence available before deciding upon the category in which Thailand should be placed.

We should consider whether the Thais were particularly friendly toward the Japanese or bound to them by historical, racial, or cultural bonds. Since the forcible expulsion of the Japanese community in Thailand in the seventeenth century, there has been scarcely any intercourse between the two countries. Other ties are also lacking. Racially, the Thais are closely related to the Chinese, having migrated from Central China during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Even now there are to be found numerous communities north and northeast of Thailand, numbering some millions of souls, where the people not only speak a language closely resembling Thai but also show from their features that they spring originally from

the same stock. Culturally however, the Thais were inspired by the religion and learning of India. The Thai language borrows extensively from Sanskrit and Pali, while the Thai method of writing is entirely Indian and reads from left to right as in European languages. Furthermore, the Thai religion, observed by almost the entire population, is the purest form of Buddhism, the Hinayana form, and closely connected with the Buddhism of southern India. It is, therefore, far removed from the diluted form of Buddhism observed in Japan.

After centuries of desultory wars with their neighbors, the Thais gradually emerged from their obscurity in the nineteenth century thanks to the able statesmanship of some of their monarchs. Treaties were concluded with the United States and the Western Powers and, as the English and French empires gradually extended to the frontiers of Thailand, the little country settled down to the comparatively easy existence of a buffer state. As the British acquired a preponderant influence in the country, the post of adviser to the Ministry of Finance became their perquisite, and for many years almost all the members of the Royal Family and most of the upper classes were sent to England for their education. After the British, the second influence in Thailand was wielded by the French for whom high legal appointments were reserved. A happy counterbalance to these two influences was provided by the Americans for whom was reserved the post of adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thailand has been singularly fortunate in having the services of the highest caliber of American diplomats in this post, to whom all Thais gratefully acknowledge their debt. With the assistance and protection of these three powers, Thailand was able to make great strides toward that form of civilization which, until this war, appeared to be the desirable ideal of a nation.

When the last World War broke out, Thailand took her place on the side of the Allies and actually sent an expeditionary corps to France. After that war, Thailand joined the League of Nations as an original member and still remains a member of that body in common with nineteen of the United Nations.

No one expected Thailand to be anything but a docile but unimportant friend of the Western Powers. It was only after the collapse of France and the consequent breakdown of Thailand's eastern bulwark against aggression, i.e., French Indo-China, that Thailand really became an item of international news. The Japanese had already set foot in French Indo-China when the frontier incidents broke out between Thai and French troops. The Vichy Government needed a treaty with Thailand and the latter asked for a correction of the frontier. The Thai Government did not claim the return of the provinces which France had wrested from Thailand some forty years before, but only the restoration of two strips of territory on the west bank of the Mekong River. It is realized now that the Thai leaders committed a blunder in attacking French Indo-China since they opened the door to the forcible mediation of Japan and the strengthening of their foothold in Indo-China. They thought they were acting in their own interests when they were actually furthering the ends of Japan.

Turning to recent months, the leader of the military clique which has ruled Thailand for several years had gradually acquired all the powers of a dictator. He and his handful of followers were able to control the Assembly of People's Representatives, of whom at least one-half were actual nominees of his party. The Dictator's state of mind cannot be proved from his public declarations of neutrality; but in one of the last messages received in Washington he declared, "The first invader of our country will be treated as the enemy of the Thai people." In any case, he was kept well posted as to the relative strengths of the opposing forces in the Far East, and the Japanese doubtless lost no opportunity of convincing him of their military superiority in that part of the world.

If the Dictator suffered certain doubts and indecisions, it seems that the Assembly of the People's Representatives was in no doubt as to the identity of their real enemies. In September, 1941, they urged the passage of an act to check the alarming influx of Japanese; but the veto of the timid Cabinet effectively squashed the motion. The people's hostility to the Japanese was also demonstrated by the questions asked in the Assembly regarding the activities of a high official alleged to be in Japanese pay. As a result of the grave charges preferred, the Cabinet was forced to agree to the nomination of a committee of investigation. The justice of the accusations has since been proved by the news that the accused official has been rewarded by the Japanese with the post of Dep-

uty Prime Minister. Finally, the attitude of the Thai people can be gauged from the accounts of two American newspaper correspondents who escaped into Burma after the invasion of Thailand and whose reports give a vivid description of the sorrow of the Thai people, of their conviction that the Government would continue resistance, and of the general demonstrations of friendship and sympathy showered upon them by all classes of people on their journey to the frontier.

These few examples have been cited to show the true feelings of the Thai people as voiced by the elected and articulate members of the Assembly and as distinguished from the Dictator and his Cabinet. It is reasonable to suppose that the Thai troops would have made a very much longer resistance if, after five hours combat, they had not received orders to cease firing by a Cabinet whose will to resist had obviously been sapped by Japanese propaganda. But, in view of subsequent events, the massacre of the poorly equipped Thai troops would scarcely have been of much assistance to the Allies in the Malay Peninsula; it would have gained at most, a delay of three days.

The present trend of events in the Far East seems to indicate that it will require a long struggle before the Japanese are finally defeated, and Thailand must, therefore, be prepared for a protracted period of Japanese occupation. As in the case of other Axis victims, the Thais are faced by the prospect of systematic plunder, forced labor, and gradual starvation. Open opposition will be met by mass executions and, as borne out by reports from Burma, Thai soldiers will be terrorized into service with the Japanese forces. Thailand will one day have to suffer ever increasing bombardment from the air and may well become the Flanders field of the Far East, on which the Japanese war machine will break.

It remains to be seen how well the Thais can "take it." After a very long period of comparative peace, the Thais have undoubtedly lost the warlike qualities of their roving ancestors. To the outside world, Thailand has come to be a kind of oriental Ruritania, a land of white elephants and other charming absurdities, inhabited by a seemingly childlike people, known for an engaging, sometimes irritating, indifference to the more serious and materialistic aspects of life. If the tragic realities of their present position can awaken their old love of independence, which gave them the name "Free" (Thai), and rouse the cold, steely courage which alone can resist this calculated corruption of the Japanese, the Thais may live to thank their present fiery ordeal for the regeneration of their people. There is still a long way to go before the end of this war and the Thais may well arise to emulate the shining example of certain captive peoples who have refused to bow to their Axis masters. If they are capable of the supreme sacrifice, they will justify their existence before all the world.



MAN AND MACHINERY in Government

A Chinese View

By ERNEST T. NASH

AS government enmeshes itself in the vast perplexities of organization, and the alphabet is exhausted to furnish initials adequate to define the interminable "offices" of the administrative machinery, one remembers that somebody once said something to the effect that least government is best government. That somebody was an ancient Chinese.

China is coming closer and closer to the West. It is wise, therefore, that we should prepare for an accommodation of the differing concepts of government in East and West. The spirit of the old Chinese tradition provides solutions for many of the West's problems in this sphere of human affairs. A Chinese might well enjoy the diffusion of responsibility our clattering and clanking governmental machinery engenders, but under no conceivable circumstance could he relish the deadly impersonality of an organization seemingly full of persons but utterly devoid of personality. For in the Chinese estimation, the worth of any utilitarian ends attained is always conditioned by the degree of esthetic expression attending the means. In the old tradition of the Chinese people, man attaches primarily no importance whatever to what he does externally, but merely to what he is as a potential being. In this view there is, wholly naturally, a right action for every situation, if only the man be right.

Perfect men can make life beautiful by means of the worst institutions; imperfect men not even by means of the best. That is a Chinese precept, axiomatic in the Chinese political tradition. Personality in government is the dominant keynote. How little personality surrounds the atmosphere of a caller whose coat lapel has been labeled by the government office receptionist and who proceeds through unending corridors to a labeled desk, to which an individual somehow appears to have become attached, seemingly accidentally or incidentally. In China it is man that counts —both the inside and the outside of man—man the human and man the moral being. As an agent of government man must function as a moral being, not as an impersonal administrator of impersonal machinery. Whether a labeled desk or an abstract idea, neither commends itself to the Chinese if buttressed by no immediately apparent personal, human, and social sanctions.

Any inquiry into Chinese political philosophy leads us inevitably to that most ancient of political scientists, Confucius. Confucius taught that the worth of human personality outmeasured the worth of a person's acts; that the influence of men is the most important motive power. The machine can merely translate, not create, that influence. Confucius emphasized the dynamic, creative, cohesive powers of faith in humanity. Faith in oneself, by the rectifi-

cation of the inner self. Equally, faith in one's neighbors, whereon to found a stable society. That is the basis of Chinese community life. Whoever wishes to better external conditions must begin by improving the inner man. All ideals must first be realized inwardly. In fact, the whole of the human world can be determined only from within. The outward appearance of the world exclusively depends on the inner state of man. Upon such foundations has rested a Chinese civilization continuous for four thousand years; the most harmonious community life of the greatest number of human beings ever known. Confucius reminds us that true democracy resides not in its profession as a form of centralized or decentralized government but in its expression as a tenet of individual faith. Personal ethics is the root determinant of the democrat. That the root of the state is in the individual is one of the earliest lessons Chinese statecraft taught the world.

The "Great Learning," canon of ancient China, rivets a happy universal society in the virtuous and happy individual. Incidentally, a world society is one of the earliest of Chinese political conceptions. The "Great Learning" sets forth three main principles and seven related acts. The first of the three principles is the imperativeness of illustrating virtuousness in one's own person, or the cultivation of individual virtue; the second, to insure kinship or brotherhood with others, and the third the attainment by all mankind of the highest excellence. The seven acts are: to investigate things in order to extend knowledge, then to be sincere in thought, then to rectify the mind, then to cultivate the person, then to regulate the family, then to order well the state, and thus last and finally, to tranquilize and make happy the whole world thereby offering proof of the first requirement—namely, individual virtue. The seven acts can be accomplished, however, only in due order one after another. Among them, the fourth act, the cultivation of one's own person, is specially emphasized: "From the Emperor down to the mass of the people all must consider this act the root of everything else."

In the ancient Chinese estimate, faith is the only absolutely real tie keeping human beings together. Wherever the leaders have lost the confidence of the people, they are done for, in spite of all the machinery that apparently supported or still supports them. The frail but faithful figure of a Gandhi, the faith of a Lenin, or a Chiang Kai-shek, will cohere tens of millions; the while all constitutional powers and government procedure, all precedent, policy, and practice are but the impotent witnesses of national disintegration where faith is lacking in the people. In their faith lie the incalculable human resources of the Japanese people.

Confucius taught that "The noble one is no tool," and furthermore, that "A noble man living a life of simple truth and sincerity can bring peace to the whole world." The deadly sin is to appraise man as though he were a machine. Because of this fundamental insight into the worth of man, China carried and still carries on its government with far smaller machinery that we in the West do. Instead, they rely on personal superiority. With personal superiority everything is possible; without it, nothing can be achieved. A Chinese proverb says: "A great man has the power to change great difficulties into small ones and to dissolve little difficulties before he does anything at all."

II

In the Chinese tradition it was a matter of political principle that a dynasty was not only morally, but juridically, at an end as soon as its capacities failed. In other words, as soon as any historic structure had lost its vital significance, it was essentially dead. The significance of the person and power of the Emperor was the summation of the Chinese traditional concept of government. The voice of God he was, but only by virtue of his being the voice of the people. The people thus cloaked him only with the degree of divinity that reposes in universal man himself.

The traditional Chinese ideal of national rulership was the reproduction on a national scale of the pattern of sound home life. The ruler himself must be loyal to ethical and moral standards, imposed by a "Supreme Parent." The ruler must be a model to his people; just as a parent must be a model to his children. He was the moral, intellectual, and social leader of the Empire, to whom the people turned naturally for inspiration and guidance. His conduct was the example of the nation. It is in the harmony of family life that the Chinese find the truest exemplification of the ideal social harmony, for within the family live the natural feelings of inclination. Love is there a natural instinct. Relationships there

are natural and proper.

In the Chinese conception, the ruler's officers are moral rather than law agents; persons rather than bureaucrats. The officers of government are required to be schooled in the five virtues rather than in the legal code. Humanitarian reasoning, rather than any cold written doctrine, should govern the relations of ruler and ruled. *"Li"* was more vital than *"Lu"*; principle and reason more potent than law. Thus the Chinese magistrates of old were the *"fu"* and *"mu,"* the "fathers" and "mothers," of the people. Their wisdom, as the wisdom of all officers of government, was required to be that of men superior to their subjects in the Five Virtues—*Jen, I, Li, Chih, Hsin* —Benevolence, Righteousness, Principle, Understanding, Sincerity. Resort to the law courts on the part of the people was never a matter of first principle but rather a kind of secondary expedient. A dispute was considered evidence of an absence of virtue. Appeal to the law was an acknowledgment of lack of morality. Appearance in court was a tremendous blow to the person's social prestige. On the part of the government, the policy was to discourage appeals to law. To carry this into operation, law was made retributive rather than reformative, the punishments being unusually severe. Justice that failed, due to failure to invoke first of all the application of moral and humanitarian principles, was furnished by the people's private court of arbitration and compromise, and only in the last resort by the official public courts.

The real government of the country was, in effect, exercised by the family and not by any state machinery. That is, it was exercised by applying the benevolent principles such as are normally operative within the friendly and personal atmosphere of the family. The state's magistrate, through whom the official machinery met the people at large, administered his office in a purely negative sort of way. The village headman, an honorary non-official chosen by his village brothers, was in fact responsible for the good conduct of his village, and his authority was never questioned by the magistrate so long as the village was orderly. Both sides asked only to be let alone; but that was possible only because the little government of the bureaucrats signified the good unofficial government of the people by themselves.

To achieve harmony in government, the Chinese considered that nature or natural law and human nature must be harmonized. When the Emperor stood out in the grey light of dawn under the open canopy of the skies, a solitary figure standing exactly at the center of the Altar to Heaven, it was his function to reconcile Heaven, Earth, and Man. In that reconciliation alone could the stability of the state respose, solidly and durably.

III

ORGANIZATION or machinery must be careful to ensure that it does not violate or distort the basic nature of man, which in the Confucian estimate is good. It is of the essence of Chinese culture that it is bent upon "reasonableness" in the organization of the cosmos and of society. It presupposes that within the social framework, the tension between the distinguished and the insignificant, the rich and the poor, must not be excessive, and such as to permit of its regulation by traditions and customs. The Chinese live, as it were, with the rhythm of destiny. The Chinese sees himself, not as a single accidental ego, but as a personality surrounded by and intimately involved with the humanity about him. His is very definitely a social conscience.

Parents and children love each other from free instinct, likewise man and wife, and brothers and sisters. The love of your neighbor is no oppressive compulsion but a sheer matter of course, an impulse of nature. The responsibility of society is merely to shape these impulses so that they interlock harmoniously and so that order and discipline are preserved. The Chinese see in this way of natural harmony, founded upon the family, the natural foundation of the culture of the state. The feeling of reverent love for the father, the friendly subordination to the elder brother, become the duty of loyalty toward the prince and subordination to superiors, and vice versa. Thus duty becomes the expansion of love, or the expansion of love a duty; and the state forms an enlarged family. Just as the ever-present sky is spread in protection above the earth, so does harmony remain the ultimate entity of culture. Superiors and inferiors are naturally and harmoniously united since the noble rule while the common serve. It is in the carrying out of the simplest duties in ordinary human intercourse that a man becomes qualified for the highest responsibility. And the means by which he carries the duties into practice are singleness of heart and purpose.

PLANS
FOR THE FUTURE

THIS report, the seventh in our series presenting important proposals for reconstruction and international organization after the war, takes up the plans of a private agency in England. In the September issue the program of the British Labor Party was presented. Among other agencies in England which are devoting attention to planning for the future are the Fabian International Bureau, the National Peace Council, the Liberal Post-War Settlement Committee, the Central Committee of the Conservative and Unionist Party, the National Council of Women of Great Britain, the 1941 Committee, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the League of Nations Union, Rotary International, the Federation of British Industries, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the New Commonwealth Society.

In coming issues, we shall continue the review of government and unofficial planning bodies in this country and abroad, and from time to time comparisons will be made among the programs.

VIII—Political and Economic Planning

Since P E P observes a policy of anonymity in publishing its findings, we are not presenting its personnel. Communications should be addressed to the Editor of* Planning, *16, Queen Anne's Gate, London, S.W.1, or to the American representative, the* New Republic, *New York City.

PEP, an independent organization, "pledged to avoid personal publicity and to put forward factual statements for consideration on their merits," was founded in London on March 15, 1931. Consisting originally of a handful of working groups dealing with such broad subjects as organization of industry, utility services, social services, agriculture, and preliminary exploration of the technique of planning, it reorganized after a year, appointed a small executive committee, increased its budget (the greater part of which is contributed by active working members of the groups), enlarged its premises, extended the working membership, and began, on April 25, 1933, to publish its bi-weekly broadsheet, *Planning*, through which it has become known to a wide public.

The personnel of P E P has never been named in the broadsheet but was described in the first issue as a "group of people who are actively engaged in production and distribution, in administration, in the social services, in town and country planning, in finance, in education, in research, in persuasion, and in various other key functions within the United Kingdom."

Calling upon the "energetic co-operation of all who are working to adapt existing institutions to the new needs of the world," P E P stated in its first broadsheet that its concern was with action:

> To have its ideas molded by criticism and spread by intelligent discussion, and to have the emerging measures implemented with the least possible delay by the common efforts of all concerned, is the aim of the group. Its approach is not partisan, but cuts across existing political alignments. It rejects both the communist and the

> fascist certainties. It recognizes that the merits of institutions and states of mind are relative, and presses for quick organic growth, consciously directed, as against stagnation or revolution. It aims at giving labor effective partnership in industry, and at creating a new attitude of mind to replace sterile hostilities. It is internationally minded, but believes in beginning reconstruction at home.

Having asserted that the price of democracy is "continuous objective thought by people who have no axe to grind," P E P outlines four tests of a modern planning program: (1) Does what is proposed supply the necessary initiative? (2) Does it preserve and widen democracy? (3) Is it backed by persuasion rather than force? (4) Is the consumer, as consumer, the chief ultimate beneficiary of the system?

European Order and World Order

SHORTLY after Britain's declaration of war, an issue of *Planning* (November 7, 1939) was devoted to recommendations for post-war settlements: "Reconstruction . . . must be studied and discussed now if a technically possible and politically acceptable settlement is to be found, for no international conference can be expected to do more than put into final form and ratify measures which in broad outline have already been worked out by experts and approved by the political advisers of all the countries concerned." The main task of reconstruction is to fill the existent vacuum in society in regard to the use of economic power and of adult leisure: "There can be no political security in a world so badly organized as to allow millions of wage-earners to be thrown out of work and millions of farmers and small business men to be chronically on the verge of bankruptcy." Steps which have already been taken toward the establishment of world economic security (i.e., commodity control schemes and cartels) should be extended and improved by the following means: (1) securing their joint control by consumer and producer interests, and providing buffer pools under disinterested management; (2) making them accountable to an international organ of supervision such as a Permanent Cartel Commission of the League of Nations; (3) establishing international public utility corporations, comparable with the Tennessee Valley Authority, for backward territories; (4) providing international mechanisms for making raw materials available on special terms, outside normal trade, for particular backward areas and for victims of aggression, of national disaster, or of exceptional financial breakdowns; (5) creating international mechanisms for rural loans, grants in aid, and price insurance schemes. To these measures should be added encouragement of the industrial development of all nations, of the international working-class movement, of international social services, and of international development of colonies.

On the question of the federalization of Europe, P E P sees potentialities in Europe's geographical unity and powerful cultural tradition, but, it warns, "an attempt to force the pace of unification would run the risk of defeating its own ends." The aim should be "to create political forms out of which a fully developed federal system can easily emerge when, as a result of the working of international economic and other mechanisms, the necessary degree of economic and political homogeneity in Europe has been attained." The experience of the League of Nations has shown that narrowly European problems may harness the effectiveness of an organization of world-wide scope. "The problem of European order can and should be isolated within the problem of world order, and the settlement of the first would immensely simplify the settlement of the second, particularly as such large areas in other continents are European dependencies."

Essential principles to be incorporated in the preamble of the settlement as objects to be pursued in common are the following:

1. Upholding freedom of thought, of the expression of opinion and movement.
2. Upholding the rule of law, both nationally and internationally.
3. The progressive use of the State, not as an instrument of domination nor merely for policing and the protection of private interests, but as the instrument of public welfare.
4. The organization of production and distribution for the raising of standards of living and of life of the peoples of the world.

As a nucleus for the development of a European Government, a European Council is proposed:

> A standing European Council of Premiers and leading Ministers could be brought into appropriate relationship with the League and might, through a specialized executive subcommittee, make a start with common European policies, for example, in financial and economic affairs. . . . It would in any case be the final referee on matters of European policy, provided that its formal meetings were attended by those holding power in the chief States. It might at the outset not cover the whole of Europe, but that would not prevent it from functioning so long as those who did participate were in earnest.

In addition to the Council, an embryo European Parliament is suggested, with representation weighted according to population, which

would exist for the airing of grievances, the supervision of broad lines of policy, and the spending of the common European fund. Two technical necessities would be required to effectuate the organization. The first, a common policing agency for Europe, would be supplemented by sea power pooled on a world basis and dependent on the co-operation of the United States, especially in the Pacific. The second would be an agency for reconstruction and finance, to deal immediately with reconstruction necessitated by the war and permanently with common European development. For these purposes, money would be essential: "Both friends and critics of the League of Nations have often overlooked the fact that the influence of an institution is apt to depend largely on the amount of money passing through its hands, and that the total sums subscribed to the League budget by the nations of Europe in recent years do not greatly exceed the annual expenditure of the London County Council on main drainage." A common European development budget of substantial size—£100,000,000 is suggested—"would do more to provide effective European unity than any number of unsupported pacts and redundant organizations."

Under the European Group, regional groupings for purposes of economic development might be formed. If clear-cut lines of demarcation were avoided so that, for example, Austria might belong both to the Danubian and to the Balkan region, dangers would be lessened. The division of authority between the European and the regional organization should be, however, clearly distinguished: "Thus, in those matters which are primarily *political,* the institutional framework would be *geographical,* and would be based in the first place on the unity of Europe; while in those matters which aare primarily *economic* the framework would be *functional,* and therefore would-wide. In this division of powers lies the essence of the proposals here outlined."

Britain and Europe

THE post-war role of Britain in Europe is the subject of further analysis by P E P in *Planning,* No. 182, published after more than two years of the war, on December 9, 1941. Europe, it is remarked, is moving irrevocably toward unity, and after victory, Britain will have the choice of renouncing leadership, thus forfeiting her position as a world power and probably condemning herself to another war, or of accepting a position of leadership in Europe. The problem of federalism is reviewed:

> That European unity implies the leadership of some Great Power is clear. To conceive of it as a "spontaneous coming together" of the peoples in virtue perhaps of some federal idea, is to miss one of the most glaring lessons of recent years. Time and again, in the absence of decisive leadership, the bad old habits of sovereignty, neutrality, or national animosity have triumphed in the face of the most urgent crises. Failing Great Power leadership those habits will continue to triumph; nor can any regional groupings of smaller Powers, important as they may be as subsidiaries in a wider system, be regarded as even remotely adequate substitutes in themselves for the leader Power. The unity of Europe or any important part of it will be maintained in one of three ways—either under German, Russian, or British leadership.

The only workable alternative is the unity of Europe under British leadership, "with the full backing of the Dominions and the U. S. A., and in close working agreement with the U. S. S. R." Three reasons for this "natural solution" are stated:

1. "In her island position at the extremity of Europe and as the metropolis of a world-wide commonwealth based on the oceans, Great Britain is the natural bridge between Europe and America and between Europe and the world at large—between Europe and the universal economic commonwealth. . . .

2. "By receiving on their shores the governments or leading representatives of the oppressed nations, including Germans themselves, in the fight against Hitlerism, the British people have in fact already accepted the moral leadership of Europe in war. It would be an act of renunciation amounting almost to betrayal to throw it aside in the peace.

3. "The British peoples have a principle of international organization to offer Europe. Within the British Commonwealth they have evolved a system of free co-operation between independent nations under a leadership which offers full scope for the self-development of each separate nation on the basis of its own national traditions."

Two major conditions are recognized as prerequisite to the success of this policy: continuance of co-operation between Great Britain and the United States and settlement of Anglo-Soviet relations on the basis of mutual understanding far closer than any in the past. (It must be recalled that these conditions, published on December 9, 1941, were written down before America's entry into the war and before the Anglo-Soviet Pact.)

Two parallel processes will constitute the broad objectives to be pursued in the task of building a European Commonwealth:

"The first is the establishment by Britain and the Allies of a permanent ascendancy over the

aggressors. This will provide the framework of order and security within which the new Europe can begin to grow. . . . The object of Allied security policy must be to secure such unquestioned military predominance over Germany that all hope of challenging it disappears and the German people inwardly as well as outwardly accept a state of affairs in Europe in which their need for national self-expression no longer takes the form of military expansion and domination.

"The second process, to be worked out simultaneously with the first, will be the reconstruction and development of European life in the direction of a social and economic and cultural community which all its citizens have a common interest in maintaining and furthering, and to which all of them, Germans and Italians equally with Danes, Dutchmen, Spaniards, and Englishmen, will come to feel a loyalty commensurate with their loyalty to their own countries."

In the accomplishment of these broad objectives, methods of the following kind will be necessary:

"In the first stage they will consist of a program of first-aid relief and the organizations to carry it out. . . . The two essential principles which should guide it are: first, that all plans for the emergency period should be drawn up, not on a purely *ad hoc* short-term basis, but as integrated parts of a general plan, related to a clearly formulated pattern of the future Europe; and, secondly, that both the planning and execution of the program should be put in the hands of a unified authority or European Reconstruction Commission created with wide autonomous powers for the purpose, and not left to independent action by the British or any other Government.

"The second stage will be the development of a new, more coherent economic and social system in Europe. On the economic side two principles should be paramount: the system should be directed to a clear objective, namely, the welfare of the peoples of Europe and the progressive raising of their living standards; and the use of Europe's resources in working towards that end should be planned for Europe as a whole, and planned not on a year-to-year basis, as the practices of national budgeting have dictated in the past, but for five or ten year periods at a time. . . .

"Closely linked with the rebuilding of institutions is the gradual development of individual leaders in every sphere. In the early stages British, Dominion, and American personnel are bound to play a leading part; and it is one of the most urgent tasks that a start should be made with training British personnel here and now. But a start should also be made at once to place carefully picked individuals from allied nations in this country in key administrative positions, e.g., on skeleton staffs in European Reconstruction organizations, with a view to building up a European *élite*. Here the emphasis must be on individuals, not governments."

For the development of desirable European institutions, P E P remarks in this connection, no elaborate written covenants are required: "All that is needed is a European Conference on the pattern of the Imperial Conference but held regularly and at frequent intervals; the regular attendance of all Foreign Ministers; a strong permanent secretariat; and a regular meeting-place." The "natural choice" for this meeting-place is London.

Economic and Colonial Policies

SOME lines of approach to the goal of cooperation between Great Britain and the United States in the post-war world are sketched in *Planning*, No. 187, April 21, 1942. An enduring pattern of Anglo-American economic relations will be vital to the well-being of all of the United Nations. The central object of post-war economy, exemplified already in the Mutual Aid Agreement signed on February 23, is the establishment of an expanding world economic system for the purpose of "raising standards of life in all countries and of promoting the greatest possible degree of human welfare." A return to laissez faire or reliance upon predominantly financial agencies will fail to bring about this end. Certain definite suggestions may be summarized as follows:

1. An organization fulfilling the functions of a Welfare General Staff is needed both on a national and on an international plane.
2. Britain and the U. S. A. will have to bear much of the burden of reconstruction, for they alone will be in a position to supply a great part of the necessary materials.
3. Loans should be conditional on borrowing countries making the maximum possible contributions, in man power and material resources, and also on providing a stated number of men to be trained for an international security force.
4. America, which is likely to be the greatest creditor country, must be safeguarded against being swamped by cheap imports.
5. An international "Code of Economic Behavior" should be drawn up, with provision for an international economic tribunal comparable to the Federal Trade Commissioners.

A correct understanding of the program of Political and Economic Planning involves not only an examination of the proposals outlined above but a study of the plans and facts which P E P has published in respect to allied economic and social questions. No. 184 of *Planning* takes up the problem of the future of the colonies. The pooling of all colonies under an international administration is not

advised; the solution suggested is "the wholehearted adoption by the Colonial Powers of the principle of trusteeship and all its positive and practical implications, including that of some degree of international supervision and regulation of colonial affairs."

> The aim should be to substitute for the chaos resulting from nineteenth-century imperialistic colonial expansion a system designed to eliminate the jealousies of the industrially advanced nations, to promote the development of tropical areas in the interests primarily of their own populations, but also of the rest of the world, and to facilitate the progress of the non-self-governing territories towards self-government.

The conclusion reached is the following:

> By pooling their ideas, by administrative participation in joint regional schemes, by co-operating in projects of survey and research, by association on the international Colonial Commission, and in various other ways, the colonial Powers could within a brief period help in the establishment of a common colonial policy, of material, political, and cultural development. This would not only remove the main sources of friction between the great Powers over colonial questions, but would substantially increase the measure of stability, security, and prosperity available to the world at large, and would enable each major colonial region to make its own distinctive and increasingly independent contribution to the world by developing its own culture with the aid of Western thought and Western technical progress.

The scope of the ideas presented by the *Planning* broadsheets can be inferred from the titles of other numbers in the series dealing with problems of international concern: No. 171, America and Britain; No. 174, Commodity Control Schemes; No. 172, The Future of Germany; No. 193, Outlook for France.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The Planning series constitutes one of the most valuable sources of information and one of the most coherent guides to thinking which have been developed in the last decade. Within a relatively small and therefore flexible structure, its proceedings are democratic, responsive to informed criticism, and always governed by objective regard for facts. This method, as well as the wealth of concrete evidence which is brought to bear on the arguments for planned economy and the spreading of the goods of the world for the welfare of all men, inspire trust in both hard-headed "realists" and ardent believers in the need for radical change.

Some features of the program call for re-examination. While the emphasis upon the dominance of Britain in post-war Europe is understandable in view of the fact that this part of the program was drawn up before Soviet Russia had proved its fighting strength and before the United States was really in the war, nevertheless this emphasis may be construed as an underestimation of the power of the temporarily submerged peoples of Europe and of the fighting peoples on other continents. The aim of equality as one aspect of the new order of nations demands more importance than this group has given it. That the "old bad habits" of sovereignty, neutrality, or national animosity have triumphed in the past will not present itself as a convincing argument in all quarters of Europe that British leadership can be trusted to institute a new, correct code of behavior. Britain—and P E P has itself subjected Britain to healthy criticism—shares in the mistakes of the past. Until the wartime emergence of the Churchill administration, the dearth of adequate and enlightened leadership was as crippling in Britain as in any other country. Finally, it may be pointed out that the reliance on a European commonwealth as a guarantee of peace and progress is dangerous without a fuller conception of the relation of Europe to a world organization.

Within the limits which P E P sets for itself, its program is admirably grounded on fact and courageous in its assertions. Not only will it bear watching as a force behind coming British policy; it also demands study as a mine of information on social change and governmental control.

THE UNDERGROUND REPORTER

Two Letters from Paris

June 14, 1942.

AT a meeting last night Déat declared by implication, though unmistakably, that Laval was having his last chance. If he failed, others would take his place. Those others apparently are the Germans. Rumor has it that Laval will be replaced by a *Gauleiter,* with Doriot and Déat as possible figureheads. They will get a warm reception.

For the last few days Déat has been pouring forth very frank articles on French mentality. For two years, he complains, the French have not budged; they have not made one step toward collaboration. He realizes that they cannot be converted by circulars—here he is speaking particularly of teachers—nor by a slight reform in the curriculum.

In *L'Atelier* Georges Dumoulin congratulates Laval for having maintained the bread and wine ration and increased the coal ration. Workers, he writes, should show their gratitude by mass enlistments for work in Germany. In glowing colors he pictures the fascination of such an adventure. He raves about the idea of being privileged to work for Europe while German workers are sacrificing their lives at the front. The German women, incidentally, look upon these French "favorites of fate" without tenderness.

Meanwhile, the Germans have come out with demands for 150,000 workers before August 1. The Government is stalling for time by making counterproposals: it suggests the return of farmer prisoners and an improvement of the treatment of those French prisoners who work in factories. The Germans reject these demands and have meanwhile seized control over all French man power. They run the state employment service; they run factories and shipyards; they have increased the minimum working hours and are forcing employers to register all superfluous man power. According to the most recent decree, no one is allowed to undertake or even to finish without German permission any work which involves an expenditure of more than 100,000 francs. In other words, no one can any longer have his house redecorated without a German permit. The French Government has protested informally against this new encroachment upon its sovereignty. It is indeed a very "occupied" sovereignty!

The new Minister of National Education, Abel Bonnard, has sent out a circular denouncing the neutrality of the school programs. "Life is not neutral," he quotes the Marshal. The minister-academician who wants to make our youth "virile"—he has his own ideas about virility — wields great authority. He is known as the *"gestapette."*

It is two years now since I departed one foggy day, fleeing from the Germans with millions of others. Then, like the others, I returned here. Every day since then has been a day gained. Every day has been a day wasted. What remains is a feeling of wonder over every day we have been able to hold out against the enemy. In normal times only men who fear God or poets who create the universe anew each morning know this bewilderment. Today each of us is something of a poet, and in our subconscious all of us have learned to fear God. But only an era such as this one makes us appreciate consciously this daily gift of life. Deep down in my heart I still say the prayer of my childhood: thank God for having reopened my eyes this morning.

A few weeks ago two books were published: "Thoughts on History," a collection of lectures given by Germans at the German Institute at Paris, and "German Sketches," brought

out in the publications of the Institute of Germanic Studies at Paris and consisting of lectures given by nazi-approved or tolerated Germanists. In both there is an examination of German cultural values. The "Thoughts" extol the concept of will power, the Prussian state, Luther, Hegel, the Machiavelli who "loves the state more than his own soul." The "Sketches" glorify the universalism and humanism of German values. Everything revolves around Goethe. It is, if one may say so, a silent struggle which loses neither savor nor high universal significance with the passage of time.

Who is right? According to the Germans, those who believe in action, in the constant remaking of the world. In their words dynamism wrestles with the static view of life. Unfortunately dynamism travels roads which run contrary to our beliefs and convictions, while those who hold the static view know only how to preserve the *status quo*. They are unable to renew it, to add to the structure they have inherited. The revolution is not universalist—a bad sign for present-day mankind.

What I said about the days gained are the words of one who survived — who survived physically. Those who did not survive would think otherwise —if they were thinking. And they can't talk any longer.

Death of an Informer

A HIGH official, who is on our side and whose duties keep him in constant touch with the police, told me the other day: "The Communists are the only party which is really organized. If they are ordered to be at a certain place at a certain hour, they'll be there. They meet their section leaders there and receive their assignment on the spot. Before, they didn't know what they were to do or with whom they were to work. Everything is being done quietly and in a disciplined way. You may catch one, two, ten, but that's all. You'll never find the leaders. A short time ago, the owner of a hotel who is a follower of Doriot delivered some suspects to the police. A few days later two cyclists came to the hotel and asked to see the proprietor. When the latter appeared, they shot him down. The men leaped on their bicycles. The wife of the hotel owner called the police. One of the fleeing men was caught. He did not know anything; he had met his associate at some meeting, had never seen him before, and did not know where he was going nor why he was going with him."

All raids are made by bicycle. Cyclists, therefore, are in bad with the police. Thousands of them are stopped every day and asked to identify themselves. Even the smallest bag they carry with them is suspect. Does it contain pamphlets? Bombs? In the evening, officers on patrol before German restaurants force cyclists over to the other side of the street. Pedestrians, too, are directed to keep away from such places. "Turn to your right, sir; turn to your left, madam. Over to the center of the road, ladies and gentlemen." Along the streets all German military and administrative offices are boarded up. Certain streets are blocked night and day. To take the shortest route, via the Avenue Pierre I de Serbie, I had to make a detour of more than a kilometer the other day.

Paris police officers—and God knows there are plenty—have no longer time to take care of the traffic. There aren't even enough to protect all the Germans. Thus civilian members of the *Défense passive* are being mobilized at night.

The Luxembourg Palace is a maze of radio towers and antennas. It is fenced off with wire and barricades. Blocked streets, barricades, gendarmes. In that part of the park to which the public is still admitted people stroll peacefully in the sun. And in the cool shade the chestnut vendor still roasts his wares. Children play and run around, women knit—if they have something to knit with. And in the evening, when the sun sets in the immutable Parisian colors of a Grand Siècle painting, the guards still sing out, "Gentlemen, we are closing." But they no longer have their drums. And they no longer march on parade.

Now the quarter around the Luxembourg has become the scene of other ceremonies. The young soldiers who fill the hotels are charged with guarding prominent guests at the Palace. (Rumor has it that the Air Ministry is housed there and that Goering lives in the building when he is in Paris.) Several times every day soldiers goose-step around the park and exercise their lungs by singing their *Lieder*. Strength through joy? I don't know whether the public derives joy from anything. Is there at least still joy in Paris on Sundays? I suppose so. Today as always the most rational people of the world is rational only on weekdays.

At the other end of Paris another ceremony follows a rite unchanged for the last two years. Every day at two o'clock a fife-and-drum corps emerges from somewhere, followed by a band and escorted by about a hundred soldiers led by an

officer on horseback with drawn sword. Motor cyclists precede and surround them to make way for them on the streets. This group goose-steps along the Champs Elysées from the Place de la Concorde to the Etoile — to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The men stand rigidly at attention at the Tomb, idlers watch them curiously; pedestrians and cyclists —there aren't any cars—wait for them to pass on — like a sudden shower. There are no flowers, no waving handkerchiefs. There is no crowd of children running after them. This is not *"Le Congrès s'amuse"* of Vienna. This is a Potsdam which has been transplanted without taking root.

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September 20, 1942

IF you listened to the radio, you know that we have all been confined to our homes since 3:00 P.M. this Sunday. They have the *ville lumière* all to themselves. I can imagine how much fun they must have. . . .

We are being confined for one thing because of the bombing of the Rex Theater on the Boulevard St. Denis. It is one of the movie theaters for the soldiers; only members of the German Army are admitted to its shows. It charges its special admission and has its own pictures. While the audience was leaving, a bomb exploded. Thirty to fifty persons were wounded or killed. The authors of the attempt could not be found.

But we are being punished chiefly for the demonstration which was organized on the Place de la République on the anniversary of the battle of Valmy. The city was virtually flooded with pamphlets and illegal papers.

While the people thus vent their feelings, the prospective together. This week a meeting

successors of Laval are getting for the creation of a unified party. Representatives of various groups whose names were not published took part in the proceedings. It was a rather anonymous affair. Most likely Marcel Déat's R.N.P. [*Rassemblement National Populaire*] and some small groups and press representatives participated. The majority of them are outright adventurers, men of whom the collaborationist, Fabre Luce, has to admit in his second diary: "These typewriter heroes act like desperadoes. Since they don't have much hope for the future, they waste their money in the most expensive restaurants. To them collaboration is nothing but a black market, where racketeers sell the Germans a phony France." Jacques Doriot's P. P.F. [*Parti Populaire Français*] sent only an "observer" to this meeting. Déat did not attend at all; this gesture on his part was to dispel all rumors as to his strong ambitions.

Preparations for this meeting had taken a long time. Déat, the foremost champion of a unified party, had campaigned for it for months. In the end he was only partly successful; instead of one party, a "Revolutionary National Front" was established which leaves all member groups autonomous. The Front merely co-ordinates their propaganda activities around a few slogans, among which "Europe" and "collaboration" naturally take first place.

Déat could not help comparing this difficult birth with those days when the parties of the Left united in a People's Front. Then, too, each party was mainly concerned with preserving its autonomy and taking care of its own affairs. All these groups and grouplets have tasted independence ever since they sprouted out of the totalitarian chaos of the last two years. Though without influence and followers, they nevertheless managed to secure certain privileges. These they are unwilling to sacrifice on the altar of a unified party, even if such sacrifice might "save Europe."

All these groups, incidentally, were invited only to pack the meeting, to attract attention, and to demonstrate the complete unity of all collaborationist elements. In reality the struggle rages between two parties — that of Doriot and that of Déat. The exact influence and strength of neither one is known. Figures have never been published. From what we can see, we know only that their public meetings fail to draw enthusiastic crowds; in fact they draw neither crowds nor enthusiasts. Personal ambitions which both men have developed to a morbidly unnatural degree are, of course, the moving forces in this contest. In addition, the fight rages around slight, hardly perceptible differences of opinion. To put these divergences in a nutshell: Déat wants to be almost Hitler, while Doriot would like to out-Hitler Hitler.

Making of a Dictator

DEAT is working for a unified party with him as head or "gray eminence," although he does not say so expressly. This party would be the vanguard of the Laval Government. It would march ahead of the Government and draw it into this "festival of history" which the back to the right road. Thus he

VIVE LA LIBERTE !

VIVE LA REPUBLIQUE !

ORGANISEZ-VOUS !

"L'attaque de la Bastille ne fut nullement raisonnable ; ce fut un acte de foi, un acte qui devait tirer le monde de sa torpeur".

Jules MICHELET.

Connaissez-vous le nombre de Français emprisonnés pour délits politiques, enfermés dans les géôles ou parqués dans les camps de concentration ? Ils sont 400.000. 400.000 qui ont crié leur dégoût, 400.000 qui ont dit tout haut ce que tout le monde pense, 400.000 parmi lesquels la foule des bons Républicains de toutes nuances, et quelques hommes qui ont cessé de plaire.

Avant 1789, seul le roi avait le droit d'enfermer ses sujets sans jugement. Depuis le 22 juin 1940, depuis que le honteux Armistice a engendré "l'Etat français", cinquante préfets détiennent le redoutable et inhumain pouvoir de priver les Français, par lettre de cachet, de ce qui reste encore de liberté.

Les prisons sont surpeuplées d'hommes, d'enfants, de vieillards, de femmes et de jeunes filles qui attendent vainement les juges. On meurt dans les prisons françaises, et pas de faim seulement. A Marseille, à Lyon, à la prison Chave, à la prison St-Pierre, à la prison St-Paul, le typhus fait des ravages. A Grenoble, un jeune étudiant a été tué à coups de pieds dans le ventre.

LE SENS DE LA DIGNITE

Français ! Vous n'avez plus le droit de rester impassibles. Puisque vous n'ignorez rien des bassesses d'un régime soumis au vainqueur (jusqu'à s'efforcer dans tous ses actes à singer ses méthodes), vous devez maintenant agir.

On vous a tout enlevé : Le droit de vote, les libertés communales, la liberté de penser et d'écrire, et la libre disposition des produits de botre travail. Dans tous les quartiers des villes et dans tous les hameaux de France, on a installé à demeure des mouchards qui ouvrent vos lettres, qui écoutent vos conversations téléphoniques, qui censurent les écritures et qui même interrogent les enfants.

Et puis, c'est dans cette France du droit et de la raison qu'on vient de ressuciter la sanction collective ; des cantons, des départements entiers ont été mis en état de pénitence alimentaire parce que quelques citoyens avaient déplu au pouvoir ou résisté à la réquisition pour le compte des Boches. La sanction collective a replongé notre pays dans l'iniquité féodale.

Copiant bassement l'abject nazisme, l'Etat Français a classé ses sujets en deux catégories : policiers et délinquants, prétoriens et braves gens.

▲ Reproduction of a page of a mimeographed pamphlet published by the underground National Front on the fourteenth of July, giving evidence of the fact that there were at that date 400,000 Frenchmen held as political prisoners in jails and concentration camps for opposing the policy of collaboration.

new Europe is going to be, according to Déat. In a long series of articles which he ran throughout last summer, Déat outlined the basis of this new party. In minute detail he discussed program, organization, objectives. It is to be a totalitarian party which disclaims, however, all imitation of foreign models. Nevertheless, it is to embody obviously a mixture of nazi and communist ideas. It is to be an omnipresent, omniscient party which takes control of every man in the cradle and lets go of him only on his deathbed—and sometimes even speeds up the road to the deathbed. But that is another story. And as if reminiscent of the humanism of the old days in the Ecole Normale, Déat boasts of the spiritual maturity of the "totalitarian personality" as compared to the *citoyen* and the leading characters of the liberal era.

Like Laval, he gambles on a German victory and sees France's fortunes tied up with an "almost Hitlerian" co-ordination. If I remember correctly, he draws a historical parallel with the Holy Alliance and the French Restoration. . . . He endeavors to adapt nazism to the French spirit. At times he has even illusions of independence which earn him severe rebukes. But under pressure he always finds his way embarked recently on a campaign for higher wages, to mention only one example, but on orders from above switched his campaign to one for wage stabilization. This was in conformity with demands of the Germans who are anxious to speed up voluntary enlistments and prisoner exchanges.

Rival Gangster

DORIOT, on the other hand, has no use for programmatic discussions. He hates political formulas. He contents himself with a few slogans. His road is clear. Sphinx-like, he never discloses his intentions in advance and acts as he pleases. He feels himself bridled. Last year he called himself the "Man of the Marshal." He rages because he did not become that man. He sees the ever-hesitant Laval proceed cautiously where he would go full steam ahead. His intrigues and maneuvers against the Government have been condemned publicly, though in rather general terms, by Déat who fears that his rival might beat him in their race to power.

And now these two make one step—one little step—toward unity. Last year neither one thought of it. Each one believed he might be able to outrace the other in a free contest. But a year has gone by, and neither one has conquered the masses. Using threats and flatteries alternately, they both failed to convert them. Déat is still honest enough (although with him honesty assumes a certain coquettishness) to admit in the columns of *L'Œuvre* that the people sulk, that the "Europeans" represent but a tiny minority, a "vanguard," and that their programs are far ahead of any practical realization. "Faced with general resistance," their friend Fabre Luce observes rightly, "the renovators out of spite exaggerate their demands. If France would follow them, she could restrain and inspire them. But cut off from France, they march on without regard to the needs of their country. In their Europe cult we can sense a certain contempt for their fellow French and in their praise of force the knowledge of their own weakness."

Their attempts to set up a unified party are manifestations of this feeling of weakness. "Show us the goal, and you will find believers." So far we have not been shown the "European" goal. Even if we were, it would most likely not attract many believers.

—Translated by Andreas Dorpalen

BOOKS

FEDERALISM AND FREEDOM, by Sir George Young. xvi + 204 pages. Oxford; $2.50

These are the days when the presses hum with peace plans, when the reader is bewildered by the prescriptions of the doctors who have cures for a world in travail. Among the swelling ranks of the diagnosticians, Sir George Young now takes his place, and his prescription will be subjected to the scrutiny which his past work and wide experience warrant.

As always, Sir George is a lusty warrior who disdains the ranks and charges off on a knight-errant course which, though sometimes difficult to follow, is always interesting and frequently provocative. He scatters to left and right all the sacred cows which block his path and occasionally he seems to alter his course so as to catch up with and belabor still another scurrying bovine. All in all, a diverting performance!

Sir George is convinced that the peace will be lost if the victors are content merely to patch up the cracks in the badly shaken structure of world society. He does not believe in tearing it down for "revolution is a race over fences that are all rusted, on horses that are all running away, with riders that have never before been in the saddle." But he is convinced that a thorough-going job of remodeling is indicated, and he has tried to show how he thinks the job ought to be done.

Basically, his proposal is that Europe must federate or perish. A federation, however, cannot be established merely by drafting a constitution and hoping that by this act a sense of "European community" will develop. Also, a federation of large and small states is inherently unworkable. The problem, then, which he has tried to solve is that of planning a genuine federation which will be democratic in character and which will be composed of units reasonably equal in size and importance. This is no mean task.

To satisfy these conditions, the author advocates the regrouping of existing European states into units each of which will have between five and ten million inhabitants. This will be accomplished by dividing up the Great Powers into federal states and by grouping some of the smaller states into regional federations. Thus, Britain would be federalized into seven states, France into six, and Germany into ten; while the "Danish-Norwegian, the Czecho-Slovak-Sudeten, and (*pace* U.S.S.R.) the Baltic peoples [would be] respectively federated into Scandinavian, Bohemian, and Baltic Federations." The Swedes, Dutch, and Belgians, and possibly the Swiss, would form another federation. At the all-European level there would be a Union Council composed of two members from each federal unit and a Congress consisting of representatives elected directly by the people at the rate of one representative for each million persons.

Each state unit in each federation would have an arms quota, and, during a brief transitional period, peace would still be maintained by each federation. At the end of this period, the police and peace responsibility would pass entirely into the hands of the Union government. On the economic side, the Union would undertake, first of all, those enterprises which would be profitable and unopposed, such as public utilities, health, communications, and the like. A central banking system and a central finance ministry would be required. The Colonial problem would be solved by enlarging the mandate principle and by assuring the open door to all. Dominions would have separate representation in the over-all League of Nations. India would be the "firm pedestal to an Asiatic Federal system" and not "an inflamed appendix to a European Federal system."

The Russian problem is dealt with somewhat hesitantly and none too clearly. The author hopes that European Russia can be brought into the European federalized structure, and he feels that the evolutionary trends in the U.S.S.R. and in Western Europe are so convergent that this is a distinct possibility. Since the bulk of the book was written, however, before the outbreak of the Nazi-Russian War, it is understandable that the author is less trenchant in his analysis of this subject than he might have been had the book been written later.

This over-simplified sketch of the plan does not perhaps do full justice to all its ingenious features. At one point, however, the reader feels that the argument is fatally weak. This is the assumption that through federalization the various state units of the present Great Powers will cease acting together in such a way as to main-

tain a power bloc of great importance. Equally, the assumption rests upon the belief that the small states will be able to act together in a way which will bring about the rapid disappearance of existing nationalistic tensions and rivalries.

One is tempted to question the practicability of many of these proposals and, as well, the logic of the argument which supports them. Even so, however, the book is definitely not to be overlooked by any serious student of this baffling problem. Sir George may not have slain a dragon but he has thrown many a spear into his lair.

G. K.

AMERICA ORGANIZES TO WIN THE WAR, A Handbook on the American War Effort. 395 pages. Harcourt, Brace; $2.00

One of the great needs of the hour is a work which will present to the man in the street as simply and as clearly as possible what may be termed a three-dimensional view of this war—how it affects all mankind, how it concerns the United States, and how it bears upon his own individual interests. Issues and causes, conditions and activities, stakes and aims and results must all be integrated into as vigorous and as stirring an appeal as Tom Paine made in his pamphlet, "Common Sense."

This compilation of twenty chapters by as many different authors is not such a book. Although the contributions of Frederick L. Schuman, Max Lerner, Arthur Upham Pope, and Vice-President Wallace are of a high order, the volume as a whole lacks both the facts and the fervor which would make it informative and persuasive.

It starts off on the wrong foot in a chapter of platitudes by H. S. Commager, given the tumid title, What Are the Fundamental Issues of the War? Professor Commager could not quite make up his mind whether he was writing a piece for the *Times* Sunday Magazine or a chapter of history, with the result that his effort is neither good journalism nor sound interpretation and his borrowed eloquence from Longfellow and Whitman is not a little outdated. On the other hand, Professors Schuman and Lerner cover the same assignment brilliantly. Their exposition of the origins of this war and its essential character are simple enough to be understood by a high school student yet thorough and fundamental enough to satisfy the scholar, and they offer both a sound explanation of the past and an inspiring vision of the future.

What they leave unsaid is presented with forthright eloquence by Mr. Pope and Vice-President Wallace. The latter's chapter, Foundations of the Peace, is a reprint of the article which, when it appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly*, sounded the first call by a high-ranking statesman for deliberate planning of the future. It deals unequivocably with the political and economic problems which must be solved by an intelligent program of international action and it boldly proclaims that the aims of such a program must be the moral and physical welfare of the common man.

The other chapters consider specific topics: censorship, psychological warfare, national health, the organization of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, the duties and accomplishments of the farmer, the laborer, the scientist, and the creative worker, the cost of the war and its payment. One chapter presents excerpts from the outstanding speeches of Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt as well as the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.

J. J. S.

THE DIFFUSION OF SCIENCE, by Jesse Lee Bennett. IX + 141 pages. Johns Hopkins; $2.25

Here is an almost romantically idealistic book, predicated on the world revolution that would come about if scientific knowledge were properly diffused, written in 1930 by a man who proclaimed the advent of world catastrophe within the decade following that year. Jesse Lee Bennett was a vivid, stimulating, and informative conversationalist and many prominent Washingtonians went down to his place near Annapolis on Sundays to siphon off a few of the thoughts from his incredibly brilliant mind.

Like many vivid talkers Bennett is a bit drab as a writer. But he knows what he is talking about. If the truths he tells in this book had been accepted by mankind there would have been no Global War. The book is logical and orderly in the extreme. The author, now dead some years, first surveys the great and sudden world change caused in recent years by the development and integration of scientific discovery, and then discusses the new scientific knowledge and the agencies developing to diffuse it, with their limitations. He shows the need for a broader realization of changed conditions, a more general appreciation of the spirit and method of science, and a definite international plan for the world-wide spread of scientific knowledge. He next specifically discusses the possible aims, the possible materials, and the possible techniques of the education of the future, and closes with suggestions for the formation of an International Association for the Diffusion of Science.

A quotation indicates the texture and drive of his thought: "The mental picture possible to

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a man properly instructed in modern science cannot be combined with the mental pictures resulting from the philosophical and religious cosmogonies remaining as vestigial relics in our modern world. The incompatibility is too great. Unless the mental picture resulting from science is clear-cut and integrated, it is relatively worthless. If it is confused with the dogmas and superstitions of the past, it results in personal unhappiness and social misery. The problem of the scientific diffusion of knowledge, the great task now confronting the world, is to free instruction from the vestigial remnants of the past." The volume should be compulsory reading for all who are interested in the objectives of the Free World Association. It offers the only hope existing to those who sincerely wish a free world of tomorrow based on the best information available to the human race and destined to have some permanence.

T. SWANN HARDING

THIS LAND WE DEFEND, by Hugh H. Bennett and William C. Pryor. 107 pages. Longmans, Green; $1.50

This is the simple straightforward story of soil erosion and soil conservation in the United States, written by the Chief of the Soil Conservation Service in collaboration with one of the writers in the agency. Soil erosion was recognized in this country at the time the Founding Fathers flourished and they used somewhat inadequate methods to combat it. No concerted attack was made by competent Government agencies upon the continued destruction of our soil until about 1929, when the first erosion-control experiment station was established at Guthrie, Oklahoma. In September, 1933, the Soil Erosion Service was established in the Department of the Interior and in 1935 it became the Soil Conservation Service, was removed to the Department of Agriculture, and things really got under way.

The estimated annual bill America pays for soil erosion is $3,844,000,000, and that is a good deal of money even in time of Global War. There are only about 462,000,000 acres of really good farm land left in the United States. Of this, 342,000,000 acres are already under cultivation, the remaining 120,000,000 being mainly in grass or trees and so far unplowed. Of the 342,000,000 good acres only 62,000,000 are not subject to erosion, hence not in need of conservation, while another 70,000,000 acres might be made available for use by judicious, far-sighted clearing, drainage, or irrigation. Then we would only have one acre of nonerodible land per capita, and that is insufficient. Wind and water erosion and bad land practices are ruining a half million acres of land every year. A billion acres, half the land area of the nation, today need some degree of protection. This brief book presents the problem and tells what is being done about it, in language easily understood. The land is fundamental. There lies the real strength of America in international affairs. Fortunately we are at last moving in the right direction to effect its salvation, even if as yet too slowly. Science knows how to save the land and perhaps this book will convince you that we should get it to work at the job still more fully. T. S. H.

ONLY THE STARS ARE NEUTRAL, by Quentin Reynolds. xi + 299 pages. Random House; $2.50

Mr. Reynolds has the qualities which enable him to produce a book that is read with ease and pleasure, but leave, unfortunately, little of weight behind. He says, of himself, that a foreign correspondent travels more and faster, but learns and sees less than any other known form of animal or plant life. As far as seeing is concerned, Mr. Reyonlds does himself some injustice. He lived in London during the worst of the bombing raids. He struggled with the censorship, but pays tribute to its fairness. He went on one inspection tour with Mr. Churchill. He lived in Moscow for many months and in Kuibyshev. Later he traveled with the Litvinov-Steinhardt party via Baku and Teheran to Cairo, and while in Egypt he but narrowly escaped dying on the field of battle in a bombing raid. Stalin, he observes, "looks like the kindly Italian gardener who used to come twice a week to mow the lawn and clip the hedges."

In his opinions of men, Mr. Reynolds' judgments are possibly swayed by an over-warm temperment. His opinions of conditions require much larger additions of salt. Still, the suggestion he transmits from a Russian captain, that when the war is over England and America stand by and let the Russian Army occupy Germany, has features of merit, and Mr. Reynolds' book can be similarly described. K. M. H.

THE GUILT OF THE GERMAN ARMY, by Hans Ernest Fried. xi + 426 pages. Macmillan; $3.50

This is an important book which should be read with care by all persons who are interested (and who is not?) in the settlement which should be made after the war with Germany. The thesis of the book can be stated briefly: It is that nazi Germany is the creation of the German military caste, and that all ideas concerning differences between the militarists and the Nazis are just so much moonshine. Mr. Fried is convinced that nazi Germany merely represents a



VICTORY IS NOT ENOUGH

The Strategy for a Lasting Peace

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

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What to do with the German militarists? On this point the author is clearer in discussing what should not be done in making positive recommendations. He does not believe that the caste can be destroyed by any punitive peace characterized by prolonged occupation of Germany. On the contrary, such a policy would, he believes, give the caste an opportunity for another come-back under a new name. The only true remedy is the creation for the first time in German history of a truly "popular" army. This army would be the means whereby the German people would themselves provide protection against a return of a "German militarism of the National Socialist order." The author is frank to admit the dangers and shortcomings of such a policy, but he makes a strong case for it as one which is more likely to succeed than any alternative policy based on rigid suppression through policing systems imposed from the outside.

G. K.

MAN AND SOCIETY IN CALAMITY, by Pitirim A. Sorokin, 352 pages. Dutton; $3.00.

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G. L. K.

EUROPE IN REVOLT, by René Kraus. 563 *pages. Macmillan;* $3.50.

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HITLER, MAN OF STRIFE, by Ludwig Wagner. Norton. First full length biography of Hitler since 1936, written by the Berlin correspondent for the largest Austrian newspaper during Hitler's rise to power.

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PACIFIC CHARTER: OUR DESTINY IN ASIA, by Hallett Abend, Doubleday, Doran. An evaluation of our stake in the Pacific area from the point of view of a hypothetical "Pacific Charter." Chapters on personalities such as Matsuoka and on the palace politics surrounding Hirohito.

BEHAND THE JAPANESE MASK, by Jesse F. Steiner. Macmillan. A picture of Japanese life, customs, mental processes, social etiquette, morals, etc., from a former member of the faculty of North Japan College at Sendai.

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TOKYO RECORD, by Otto D. Tolischus. Reynal & Hitchcock. Detailed intimate record of the process by which the Japanese military clique undermined all efforts at a peaceful settlement of the issues in the Pacific, by the former Tokyo correspondent of the *New York Times.*

SHORTAGE OF VICTORY: CAUSE AND CURE, by Gabriel Javsicas. Appleton-Century. An examination of the genesis of the totalitarian state, the causes of democratic failure to stop aggression in time, particularly the French, English, and American failure.

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County of New York }

Before me, a notary public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Wousaofong, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the Secretary-Treasurer of FREE WORLD and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

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Secretary-Treasurer

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 13th day of November, 1942.

SEAL

(My commission expires March 30, 1944.)

(Signed) MARGARET C. HOLGERSON
Notary Public

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

DEWEY ANDERSON is Chief of the American Hemisphere Division of the Board of Economic Warfare. He is the author of twelve books in the economic field. In his own State of California, he has been a member of the legislature, budgeteer of the State, and administrator of unemployment relief.

When *STEPHEN K. BAILEY* was collaborating with Mr. Anderson in the writing of *Our Hemisphere in the People's Peace,* he was acting Assistant Chief of the American Hemisphere Division of the Board of Economic Warfare. He is a former Rhodes scholar and author of "Roosevelt and His New Deal." On November 24, he reported for active service as Ensign in the United States Navy.

JULIEN BENDA, famous French writer and philosopher, author of *"La Trahison des Clercs,"* has boldly written this defense of French political principles though he is still living in his native land. For further details illustrating the principal ideas of his article we refer the reader to his book, *"Esquisse d'une histoire des Français dans leur volonté d'être une nation,"* published in 1932.

Formerly a member of the League of Nations Secretariat, *HENRI BONNET* is an active leader in enterprises for international understanding. He is Director of the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, Professor at the Ecole Libre des Hautes Etudes in New York, and Special Adviser to the World Citizens Association in Chicago. He is a member of our International Editorial Board and Editor of the forthcoming French edition of FREE WORLD, *Le monde libre.*

ROBERT GROETSCH, considered one of the greatest authorities on Albania in Europe, reported the Albanian rebellion against the Turks for German newspapers in 1910. He has traveled in the Balkans five times, sometimes on foot among primitive tribes, and has written a book, *"Albanische Reise."* The author of plays, movies, and novels, he was editor-in-chief of the *Dresdener Volkszeitung* for fifteen years, and was obliged to flee the Reich in 1933.

PROFESSOR LI YU YING, President of the Chinese National Academy of Peiping, is a member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Democratic party (Kuomintang) and a member of our International Honorary Board. He is one of the leaders in organizing the World Confederation of International Groupments.

ERNEST T. NASH was for twenty-five years in administrative work in the International Municipality of Shanghai and is at present British liaison officer on Far Eastern Affairs in New York.

The Honorable *WALTER NASH,* Deputy Prime Minister of the New Zealand War Cabinet, is now the Minister for his country in Washington and a member of the Pacific War Council. In May, he participated in our Round Table, and contributed the article, *United Nations in War and Peace,* in the June issue.

NICOLAS REPETTO, Member of the Argentine Parliament, is head of the Socialist party and a leader of the democratic forces of his country. Moved by one of the recent speeches of President Roosevelt, he took time from his many activities to write for FREE WORLD this eloquent appreciation of the President's contribution to Pan-Americanism.

Last summer, *SANASEN* left the United States to assist in the formation of the Free Thai movement in London. His report on Japanese occupation of his native land gives the background for recent accounts of popular resistance to the invaders. Mr. *SANASEN* was formerly a member of the League of Nations secretariat.

The articles of *HENRY STANLEY* (pen name of a member of the Canadian Government) have called forth a large and enthusiastic response from our readers. *How to Make an Ally of India* appeared in the April issue; *India Since Cripps* in August.

OTTO ZOFF, Czechoslovak author of plays and novels and historical works, is now making a study of educational systems and methods in fascist countries. His latest book, published in New York, is "The Huguenots."

STEFAN ZWEIG, Austrian poet, novelist, essayist, whose death in Brazil in February, 1942, shocked readers on three continents, wrote, among other works, "Marie Antoinette," "Erasmus," "Beware of Pity," and "Tide of Fortune."

The high quality of the translations published by FREE WORLD has often received favorable comment from our readers. We take this occasion, when all of our translators are represented in this issue, to introduce them. *ANDREAS DORPALEN,* who contributed *The Language Question in Europe* to our May issue, is on the staff of the Columbia Encyclopedia and is the author of "The World of General Haushofer," which will be published in December. *RICHARD HOLDER* is the pen name of a lawyer and member of the New York University faculty who is engaged in work for the Government. *ALBERT LIPPMAN,* member of the Department of Romance Languages of New York University, has rendered equally well the dramatic style of Pierre Mendès France and the scholarly prose of Julien Benda. *HEINZ* and *RUTH NORDEN* have collaborated on many manuscripts and still continue to do so although Lieutenant *NORDEN* is now in the infantry at Camp Croft and Miss NORDEN has put her knowledge of languages to use in the International Press and Radio Division of the Office of War Information in New York.

In publishing our Round Table, *The United Nations,* from the May issue, the editors of *Diretrizes,* a weekly review in Rio de Janeiro, make the following comment: "Once more *Diretrizes* has the privilege of reprinting another of the already famous Round Tables which are organized by the FREE WORLD magazine of New York. These Round Tables are usually an assemblage of persons of world fame of the highest political, cultural, economic, and diplomatic background. The purpose is to discuss those vital problems which are presented far too infrequently. These Round Tables of FREE WORLD unite men of all races and origins in a common purpose: to ameliorate the world in which we live."

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